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Abstract 
 
Variables Influencing the Successful Passage of School Bond Referenda 
as Identified by Selected Stakeholders in Texas 
 
Shirley Marie Heitzman, Ed.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Rubén D. Olivárez 
 
School districts that successfully pass a school bond election after a failed bond election 
offer a unique opportunity to investigate variables involved in both the failure and 
subsequent successful passage of a bond referenda (Hickey, 2006). This in-depth 
qualitative case study of a representative school district that experienced success after a 
prior failure was used to develop a greater understanding of the variables associated with 
overcoming negative sentiment toward school bond passage, as well as update, enhance, 
elaborate, and clarify previous quantitative and qualitative work in the field. This study 
examined the participants’ views to establish what the variables were that affected the 
outcome of bond elections that “statistical analysis alone cannot capture” (Bowers et al., 
2010, p. 417). This qualitative study answered three questions: (a) What variables 
contributed to the failure of a school bond election? (b) What variables contributed to the 
success of a school bond election? (c) What relationships existed among these variables 
with regard to selected characteristics of a school district? The overarching research 
paradigm was a qualitative single-case study in which artifacts and interviews were the 
primary data analyzed. This study investigated one representative district in Texas that 
had a successful bond election after prior failure, using a purposive, theoretical sampling 
technique from the subset of districts who failed and then passed a subsequent bond 
referenda between May 2013 and May 2017 in Texas using bond data from the Texas 
viii 
Comptroller’s Office. The findings revealed that the school district leaders and the school 
bond referendum election process must be responsive to changing community 
environments and voter preferences. Key strategies that were used in successfully passing 
a school bond referendum included: an extensive pre-bond needs assessment process; 
securing strong consulting expertise to support a comprehensive school bond election 
planning process; mapping the political environment and involving key community 
influencers; a focus on effective leadership recruitment and development of parent and 
community leaders; substantive input and involvement from a representative group of 
stakeholders throughout the process, especially parents and campus staff; a clear, 
appealing bond proposal; and acknowledgement and recognition of losses caused by the 
change process. The study contributed new knowledge to the body of research on 
successful school bond referenda. This study also offered new insights into key strategies 
that enable leaders in public school districts and communities to be able to succeed in 
school bond referendum elections in the future. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The quality of school facilities affects the lives of children and communities for 
years to come and reflects the value communities place on children and their future. 
“Research shows that high-quality facilities help improve student achievement, reduce 
truancy and suspensions, improve staff satisfaction and retention, and raise property 
values” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). Excellent school facilities are the very foundation of 
educational and community success (Holt, 2009; Ortiz, 1994). “It is not an accident that 
communities that have the means to invest in their public school buildings do so. They 
improve and enhance their school facilities because it matters to the quality of education, 
the strength of their community, and the achievement and well-being of their children and 
teachers” (BEST, 2006, p. 29). 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO), in a 1995 report entitled School 
Facilities: Condition of America’s Schools, recognized the need to provide adequate 
educational facilities: “A number of state courts as well as Congress have recognized that 
a high-quality learning environment is essential to educating the nation’s children. 
Crucial to establishing that learning environment is that children attend school in decent 
facilities" (p. 3). Nevertheless, school districts encounter challenges when raising funds 
for facilities. Therefore, this chapter includes sections specific to the background of the 
problem, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, a brief 
overview of the methodology, definition of terms, limitations, delimitations, assumptions, 
and significance of the study. 
2 
Background of the Problem  
School facilities needs have repeatedly emerged as a major issue in ongoing 
efforts to improve education over the past two decades. The scale of the nation’s public 
school facilities is astonishing. “Nearly 50 million students and 6 million adults are 
served in close to 100,000 buildings, encompassing an estimated 7.5 billion gross square 
feet and 2 million acres of land” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). The square footage of public 
school district buildings is almost half the area of all commercial office space in the 
United States (Filardo, 2016). Texas’ public schools alone serve over 10% of the nation’s 
school-age population, with over 5.3 million students served by 1,247 public school 
districts (Texas Education Agency [TEA], 2017). 
Over the past 20 years, numerous reports have documented the need to repair, 
renovate, and replace aging school building or school structures considered to be in poor 
condition (BEST, 2006; Filardo, 2016; Holt, 2009; National Education Association 
[NEA], 2000; USGAO, 1995). The average age of schools throughout the United States 
is 44 years, and this average building age for the nation’s schools has been increasing 
(NEA, 2014). Almost a quarter of the nation’s school buildings operate while in fair or 
poor condition, growing from 16% of all schools in 1998-1999 to 24% in 2012-2013, 
representing a 50% increase in the number of school buildings kept in operation 
regardless of their poor structural conditions (NEA, 2014). As a result, the country has an 
increasing number of schools operating while aging under deferred maintenance 
conditions and in poor repair that need to be renovated, repaired, or replaced. In 1995, the 
USGAO indicated that it would cost $112 billion to bring all public school buildings 
3 
throughout the country into good overall condition. By 2000, the NEA estimated $322 
billion was needed for school facilities’ repairs, construction, and technology updating 
(Edweek, 2004).  
In one of the newest and most comprehensive summaries on K-12 school 
facilities’ conditions and funding needs to date, Filardo (2016) estimated that school 
districts and states have spent over $2 trillion dollars ($99 billion annually) over the past 
20 years to maintain and modernize school facilities, making state and local investments 
in school facilities “the second largest sector of public infrastructure spending,” behind 
only investments in highways (Filardo, 2016, p. 2).  “School districts worked hard from 
1994 to 2013 to operate, maintain, modernize, and meet the enrollment growth of the 
nation’s K–12 public schools” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). 
Increased Educational Program and Facilities Requirements 
In addition to the challenges related to outdated and aging facilities, school 
districts also have faced increasing educational program and facilities requirements 
associated with rising enrollment, increasing national and state accountability 
requirements, changing student demographics, expanded educational programming, 
increased accessibility and safety standards, and technology requirements (Filardo, 2016; 
Kowalski, 2002). These changes are often accompanied by significant new facilities 
requirements. “Over the past 20 years, educational environments have undergone 
enormous change, driven by shifting expectations and requirements from educators, 
parents, communities, and regulators” (Filardo, 2016, p. 7). Increasing accountability 
requirements, changing student demographics, and expanded educational program 
4 
requirements have created extra facilities’ requirements to support “new teaching models 
and student-directed learning” (p. 11).  Filardo (2016) summarized the kinds of facilities’ 
alterations needed “to add capacity and make the facility more suitable for education or 
other district purposes” in the 21st century: 
Significant drivers for facilities alterations included new requirements for special 
education and physical accessibility; expansion of early childhood education; 
integration of technology for instruction and administration; class-size reduction; 
and heightened safety and security concerns. (p. 10) 
Filardo (2016) also indicated that districts expanded facilities’ space for programs 
that “reduced barriers to students’ academic success” enable districts to assign: 
Additional administrators and student-support personnel, such as social workers 
and academic counselors. And they have expanded after-school care and other 
school-based services and support for families through partnerships with 
community-based organizations. These added functions require additional space. 
(p. 11) 
School districts have also “modernized labs to support sophisticated and specialized 
science and technology instruction so that students can pursue studies in fields such 
as robotics and biotechnology” (Filardo, 2016, p. 11). Increasing health, safety, 
accessibility, and technology requirements have required increased facilities repairs, 
renovations, and modernization (Kowalski, 2002; Tanner & Lackney, 2006; Penn State, 
2017). “In the span of these 20 years, school facilities changed more rapidly than at any 
time in recent memory, fueled by improved health and safety standards, stronger 
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accessibility requirements, increased use of technology, and expanded programming 
within schools” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). Tanner and Lackney (2006), citing Graves (1993), 
indicated that aligning school facilities to educational programming is an ongoing 
challenge, especially in times of rapid change: “Facilities should be more sensitively 
designed to the new needs of education in a period of rapid, indeed revolutionary, change 
in instruction and social conditions” (Tanner, C. K. & Lackney, J. A., 2006, p. 83). 
Growing Enrollment 
Many districts have needed to renovate or expand existing schools or construct 
new schools to meet the needs of rapidly growing student populations (EdWeek, 2004; 
Holt, 2009). “Public school enrollment has increased in recent years, particularly in the 
southern and western United States, and more growth is expected in the future” (TEA, 
2017, p. 5). Rising enrollment has resulted in the need for school districts to expand or 
reconfigure existing facilities or build new temporary or permanent facilities (Filardo, 
2016). Filardo (2016) predicted school districts will need an additional $87 billion 
annually for capital construction and new facilities costs between 2014 and 2024 (a gap 
of $38 billion annually) (p. 26). 
Texas school districts find themselves in dire need of renovating and expanding 
existing facilities and constructing new school facilities. Texas educates one of the largest 
school-age populations in the country and also is one of the highest growth states in the 
country (Filardo, 2016; NCES, 2016; TEA, 2017). “In the 2006-07 school year, 
4,594,942 students were enrolled in Texas public schools. By 2016-17, enrollment had 
risen to 5,359,127 students. Over the 10-year period, total enrollment increased by 
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764,185 students, or by 16.6 percent” (TEA, 2017, p. ix). Student enrollment is projected 
to continue to increase between 9% and 14% between 2014 and 2024 (Filardo, 2016; 
TEA, 2017). With this record student growth, recent estimates indicated Texas has the 
second highest projected costs for new construction in the nation over the next 10 years at 
$13.8 billion for new construction alone (Filardo, 2016). Due to the size and rapid growth 
of school enrollment in Texas, the renovation and expansion of school facilities is a 
significant undertaking. In the end, “Improving the quality of school facilities is an 
expensive undertaking. However, when the positive impacts of facility improvement on 
teachers and students are translated into dollar figures, the rewards of such investments 
far outstrip the cost of the investments” (Penn State, 2017). 
The Need for Local School Bond Referenda 
Traditionally, financing for school facilities has been almost entirely a local 
school district responsibility approved through local bond referenda, making the 
successful passage of school bonds elections vital to the continued growth and 
development of school districts and communities (Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Sielke, 
2001; Zimmer, Buddin, Jones, & Liu, 2011). Despite the existence of several forms of 
state support for school facilities funding in Texas including the Permanent School Fund 
(PSF), the Instructional Facilities Allotment Program (IFA) and the Existing Debt 
Allotment (EDA) program, local school bond elections continue to be the primary 
method used to finance school facilities’ repair, renovation, and new construction in 
Texas (Clark, 2001; Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Plummer, 2006; Sielke, 2001). Although 
84% of school districts participate in the IFA or EDA program in Texas (Legislative 
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Budget Board, 2016, p. 1), the state’s share of capital outlay for school facilities was only 
about nine percent (9%) of the total costs, leaving the remainder to local communities to 
fund (Filardo, 2016). 
As communities in Texas are faced with the challenge of maintaining and 
modernizing facilities, superintendents and school boards are under significant pressure 
to pass school bond referenda to renovate or expand existing facilities and finance new 
construction (Filardo, 2016; Hickey, 2008). “When it comes to persuading voters to 
provide capital improvement funding, each school district is largely on its own” (Bowers, 
Metzger, & Militello, 2010a, p. 404). Without school facilities’ funding, districts may 
risk “falling behind more successful neighboring districts, particularly in regions where 
school-choice competition and high-stakes accountability exists” (Bowers et al., 2010a, p. 
399). However, in an environment where passing a school bond referendum is critical to 
the long-term health of schools, the likelihood of passage is far from certain. Many 
school boards and superintendents have difficulty gaining the support needed to pass 
bond referenda (Hickey, 2006; Zimmer et al., 2011). The ability to work with the 
community to ensure success in a school bond election is a critical duty of school boards 
and superintendents (Hickey, 2006, 2008). Godown (2010) found as school boards and 
superintendents turn toward the community to gain voter approval to fund building 
projects, it is essential “to understand how to properly plan and execute a school facilities 
bond referendum” (p. 4). 
In addition, researched indicated that superintendents and school administrators 
are rarely prepared to conduct school bond referenda: 
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The problem of passing school bond referendums [sic] is exacerbated by the fact 
that few institutions of higher education prepare school administrators for the 
task. Most of the textbooks on educational facilities used to prepare school 
administrators are directed towards the specifics of planning educational facilities. 
They adequately address the historic development of educational facilities, how to 
determine school building needs, how to plan a building, how to modernize a 
building and how to finance the capital outlay. But few, if any provide specific 
strategies on how to win bond referendums [sic]. In many instances, school bond 
issues have failed because administrators were not prepared to plan an effective 
strategy for passing them. (Holt, 2009, p. 17) 
Research on School Facilities Bond Passage 
Prior research in the field of school bond referenda passage can be classified into 
two main categories: empirical and normative models of school bond passage. Empirical 
research over the past 40 years has focused on factors that impact the likelihood of bond 
passage that can be quantitatively measured, including voter preferences, district and 
community characteristics, bond characteristics, and election characteristics (Bowers & 
Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010a, 2010b; Gong & Rogers, 2014; 
Hickey, 2008; Ingle, Johnson, Givens, & Rampelt, 2013; Piele & Hall, 1973; Theobald & 
Meier, 2002; Zimmer et al., 2011). Normative models have consisted mainly of 
unpublished dissertation articles and procedural advice found in professional/trade 
journals for school and district administrators on “lessons learned” and suggestions on 
“how to pass your bond” (Bowers et al., 2010b). There also is an additional line of related 
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research that explored the factors in passing school levy referenda as opposed to school 
bond referenda (Ehrenberg, Ehrenberg, Smith, & Zhang, 2004; Ingle & Johnson, 2009; 
Ingle, Petroff, & Johnson, 2011; Ingle, Johnson, & Petroff, 2013; Ingle, Johnson, et al., 
2013; Johnson & Ingle, 2009; O’Connor, 2011). 
Empirical research. The empirical research addressed voters, bond 
characteristics, and other variables affecting bond referenda viability. Appendix A 
displays the detailed comparison of the empirical research discussed in this section. First, 
voter impact studies are explained. 
Early research focused on voter impact on bond elections. Early work in the 
empirical field on school bond referenda concluded school leaders and practitioners 
might have little impact on school bond elections outcomes (Piele & Hall, 1973), but 
more recent work suggested there are a number of factors that school leaders can 
influence in order to impact the outcome of a school facilities bond election (Bowers & 
Lee, 2013). Piele and Hall’s (1973) early influential work, based on an exhaustive 
analysis of 100 studies, created a groundbreaking theory about the factors that most 
impact school bond elections. Their work advanced the theory that two major factors, 
voter participation and voter characteristics, such as voter age, economic status (SES), 
education, and ethnicity significantly affected the outcome of a school bond election. 
They found increasing voter participation actually decreased the likelihood of bond 
passage. Voter age was negatively associated with bond passage; that is, older voters 
were more likely to vote no. Other voter characteristics such as socioeconomic status, 
race/ethnicity, and education also impacted election outcomes. Although they also looked 
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at other factors including district demographics and bond and election characteristics, 
Piele and Hall (1973) concluded these factors were not as impactful to bond election 
outcomes as voter participation and voter demographics. This research “painted a fairly 
discouraging picture of the ability of the school district to influence the outcome of 
school bond elections” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 735). Increasing voter turnout would 
likely decrease the odds of bond passage; whereas, other intrinsic voter characteristics 
that impacted the likelihood of bond passage, such as age, socioeconomic status, 
race/ethnicity, and education level were not able to be influenced by school leaders. 
In literature reviews in the field since Piele and Hall (1973), researchers 
concluded empirical research on the factors most associated with passing or failing 
school district bond elections since the early work of Piele and Hall (1973) had been 
limited. “Very little peer-reviewed, published research has examined what factors have 
an impact on the outcome of school levies, budget referenda, or bond issues” (Johnson & 
Ingle, 2008, p. 5). Bowers et al., (2010b) found “Surprisingly, few studies since the 1970s 
have focused on modeling the factors associated with the likelihood of whether school 
bond elections pass or fail” (p. 378). Bowers and Lee (2013), in one of the most recent 
and exhaustive literature reviews in the field, concluded “recent empirical research is 
sparse on exactly what factors are most associated with passing or failing a school 
facilities bond” (p. 734-35).  
Recent research focused on bond characteristics impacting bond passage. More 
recent empirical studies discovered that a “small and growing body of research has begun 
to focus on updating this research domain on facility bonds” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 
11 
735). A series of quantitative studies over the past 15 years utilized inferential statistics to 
investigate quantitative factors that might be important in predicting bond passage or 
failure. Through these studies, researchers identified district, community, bond, and 
election characteristics significantly linked to the likelihood of bond passage. 
Quantitative research in the field concluded that numerous factors linked to bond passage 
likelihood may be influenced by district leaders including the amount of the bond request, 
purpose of the bond, timing of the bond election, number of bond floats, bond wording, 
and the number of the bond proposal on the ballot (Bowers & Chen, 2015; Bowers & 
Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010a, 2010b; Gong & Rogers, 2014; Ingle, Johnson, et al., 
2013; Zimmer et al., 2011).  
Despite this work in the field, Bowers et al. (2010b) indicated “considerable 
investigation was conducted in the 1960s and 1970s,” but “school bond passage has 
received less attention by policy researchers in recent decades” (p. 394). They recognized 
the lack of a theoretical model regarding school bond passage: “What is needed is a 
theoretical model that takes into consideration the variables tested in the past and updates 
them for the 21st century.” They called for development of a theoretical model regarding 
school bond passage: “Future research is necessary to construct a broader theory of bond 
passage.” They recommended that future qualitative research was needed “to describe 
and understand the complex work and interrelationships of district and community actors 
during the bond election phases,” and to “address how or why each of the significant 
variables in the model act in districts attempting to pass bonds” (p. 394). 
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Consequently, Bowers and Lee (2013), in one of the most recent quantitative 
studies on school bond passage, addressed many of the concerns of prior quantitative 
studies. The Bowers and Lee (2013) study, which analyzed 2,224 school bonds in Texas 
from 1997-2009, addressed criticisms that prior work had limited geographic 
representation and small sample sizes. Based on a synthesis of results of earlier work on 
voter preferences, as well as more recent quantitative research on district and bond 
characteristics, Bowers and Lee’s (2013) study proposed a mediated model of school 
bond passage that included the impact of district and community characteristics, bond 
characteristics, and voter preferences on school bond election outcomes. They contended 
“there are significant malleable factors in a bond election that are under the control of 
school district administrators” (p. 759).  
While the Bowers and Lee (2013) mediated model of school bond passage is the 
most comprehensive theoretical model to date, this model still only accounted for 33.2% 
to 44.3% of the variance in outcomes of a bond election. In other words, the best 
quantitative models currently available only account for up to 44% of the variation in 
bond outcomes, leaving a significant amount of variation potentially due to other factors. 
They also had specific recommendations for Texas, suggesting that athletics and the arts 
might be difficult to pass. They also recommended the use of “omnibus single ballot 
measures” for school districts, specifically advising against separate bond proposals. 
For Texas bonds, proposing renovations and debt refinancing appear to be 
successful strategies for passing a bond. As a caution, while specific requests for 
athletics and art facilities were not significant in the final model, the preliminary 
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models and descriptive statistics indicate that, by themselves, these two types of 
requests are favored less than others at the polls and we would caution against 
districts putting these two types of requests as individual and separate ballot 
measures. . . . Together, these findings indicate that omnibus single ballot 
measures that include all of the needs of the district and include renovations, that 
are at the top of the ballot (or are the only issue on the ballot), and that are the first 
float are the most likely to pass [italics added for emphasis]. (p. 762) 
Bowers and Lee (2013) hinted of the potential for change in the environment for 
school bond passage in Texas:  
For Texas, interesting times appear to be ahead, as what has been seen in the past 
research on bond passage as a constant—the percentage of voters who will vote 
yes—may be shifting as the demographics of the state change. (p. 762) 
Additional research on variables affecting bonds. There also are a series of 
unpublished dissertations and articles in professional publications included investigations 
of variables that impact school bond elections and attempted to identify effective 
campaign strategies used in successful bond passage. While this literature is promising, 
there are serious limitations with the existing research.  
Holt (1993), in an unpublished dissertation, used an exploratory data analysis to 
investigate the “factors within a community, inherent in the proposal, and within the 
campaign structure that have an effect on school bond election outcomes” (p. 5). The 
study interviewed the superintendent of schools, a member of the citizens’ bond support 
committee, the editor of the local newspaper, and a local banker in 4 districts in South 
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Dakota. The study was conducted in 2 school districts with successful bond passage and 
2 districts with bond failure. Holt (1993) found these factors important to bond success: 
Results from interviews reveal these factors to include: having an active citizens 
support committee and adequate organization; understanding of the needs of the 
community; effectively communicating of the needs of the schools; using 
campaign activities that are personal and direct; appealing to the appropriate 
target audience; and involving all segments of the community in all stages of the 
campaign. Findings suggest that school boards and administrators need to plan the 
amount of the bond issue and must demonstrate a good plan for managing the 
funds after the election. 
While this study provided valuable information about potentially significant 
elements of successful school bond elections and effective campaign strategies in bond 
passage, the study examined only relatively small school districts with a median size of 
2,197 students, making generalizability potentially difficult to larger districts. In addition, 
the study is limited to the state context of South Dakota, which may have a different 
political and educational context than Texas. The study is now almost 25 years old, and 
there have been significant social, political, and educational changes in the intervening 
years.  
Holt’s (2009) book updated this work. In the 2009 work, Holt organized factors 
that impact school bond elections into factors that influence campaigns, variables the 
contribute to the success of school bond referendums [sic]; variables that contribute to the 
failure of school bond referendums [sic]; and influential variables specific to the 
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characteristics of a given school district. Factors that Holt (2009) identified as important 
to campaigns, included: placement of citizen participation, community relations program, 
consultants, unity of purpose, voter turnout, endorsements, opposition groups, tax 
increase limitations, and timing and length of campaign. Holt identified voter turnout of 
“yes” voters, an active citizens’ support group, media support, and personal campaigning 
as variables important to the success of the school bond referenda. Variables that 
contributed to the failure of school bond referenda included: “lack of understanding of 
the attitudes and perceptions within the community and among educational staffs about 
the schools” (p. 22). Other variables that contributed to the failure of school bond 
referenda included: lack of school board support and the size of the increase of the school 
bond referendum. Variables that were specific to a given school district, included: 
placement of school buildings, school design, demographics, and perceptions about the 
economy. 
Lode (1999) replicated Holt’s (1993) study with a similar study in Iowa also 
interviewing four key stakeholders: superintendent of schools, a member of the citizens 
bond support committee, the editor of the local newspaper, and a local banker in 4 
districts in Iowa: 2 school districts with successful bond passage and 2 districts with bond 
failure. Findings of the study indicated the importance of an organized and well-
represented citizen committee in the promotion of the school bond election. In addition, 
the findings supported the need for bond promotion groups to target "yes" voters to 
ensure they vote to ensure success. Good internal and external communication and use of 
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the media were supported by the findings as elements essential to a successful bond 
election. Neither of these studies gathered information from parents. 
Stockton’s (1996) dissertation utilized a quantitative research design to examine 
what factors influenced the voters' decision during the October 1, 1994 Conroe 
Independent School District (CISD) Bond Referendum (Texas). The study utilized 
surveys that were sent to 400 randomly selected voters who voted absentee/early in the 
October 1, 1994 CISD School Bond Referendum during the summer of 1995. Surveys 
were followed by personal interviews to gather further data. Stockton (1996) analyzed 
data according to 26 elements that might be important in school bond passage. This 
research found 20 elements voters indicated were important. Those factors included: the 
opportunity for early/absentee voting; trust in the CISD School Board; trust in the CISD 
administration; trust in CISD in general; the involvement of school personnel; personal 
endorsements and endorsements from the Chambers of Commerce; the growth in student 
population; having children in CISD; having detailed information about the bond 
referendum; information comparing surrounding school district's tax rates; previous 
school bond follow through; information on the cost increase for the average home in 
CISD; government compliance needs; the use of a public relations campaign; campus 
activities to promote the needs of bond passage; community participation in the bond 
referendum; parent participation in the bond election; the consequences of a failed bond 
referendum; the theme Taking Hold of the Future...A Plan for our Students to the Year 
2000; and the presence of long range planning. While these results are informative, they 
also are now over 20 years old. Results explored only the input of an undifferentiated 
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group of voters, without differentiation between stakeholder groups, e. g. parents, 
teachers/district staff, and community members. 
Faltys’ (2006) dissertation studied the factors influencing the successful passage 
of a school bond referendum as identified by selected voters in the Navasota Independent 
School District in Texas, and examined pre- and post-strategies of a failed and then 
successfully passed bond referendum. Faltys (2006) found that lack of trust in the 
administration and lack of follow-through in previous bond referenda played a significant 
role in determining the negative outcome of the initial school bond referendum failure. 
Faltys (2006) identified factors impacting success in the succeeding bond referendum 
included: detailed information on bond plans; individual campus activities promoting 
needs for the passage of the bond referendum; opportunity to vote on more than one 
proposition; and information on the cost of the tax increase for the average home were 
instrumental in the positive outcome of that referendum. In regards to demographics of 
the voting population, the factor “currently having children in the district” played a 
significant role in determining the outcome of the referenda. The limitations of this study 
is that it is in one district in Texas, the district is of small size, and a mixed group of 
voters were interviewed. 
In 2009, Kraus’ dissertation analyzed the perceptions of selected school district 
stakeholders regarding potentially critical factors in school bond referendum success and 
failure in Kansas during the years 2004 through 2007. Of 72 eligible school districts in 
Kansas, one district was randomly selected from each of six groups formed through a 
stratified random sampling process utilizing district enrollment (small, medium, large) 
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and bond election result (successful, unsuccessful). Four purposefully selected 
respondents–the superintendent of schools, a member of the local citizens’ bond 
committee, a local banker, and the editor of the local newspaper from each district–
participated in a mixed methods strategy of inquiry that included completion of a 32-item 
written survey and participation in an interview. This study found three critical factors in 
a successful bond election: having unanimous school board support for the school bond 
referendum; having an ongoing public relations strategy with patrons; and 
communicating the elements of a bond referendum to all patrons in simple, clear, and 
honest language. Again, feedback from parents was not specifically solicited. 
Godown’s (2010) dissertation looked the factors that contributed to passing a 
successful school bond referendum as identified by selected New Jersey school 
superintendents. The study utilized an online electronic survey of superintendents of 121 
New Jersey school districts, and follow-up interviews of randomly selected participants 
to explore four variables potentially impacting bond passage: Credibility/Trust; 
Involvement of Stakeholders; Campaign Organization; and Financial Factors. This study 
utilized an adapted version of Stockton's (1996) survey, which was originally developed 
to study voter perceptions in the Conroe School District in Texas. Godown (2010) found 
that the perception of trust, credibility, and involvement of the stakeholders proved to be 
very influential in passing a school bond referendum. Hickey’s (2006) study qualitatively 
analyzed “three school districts that achieved bond election success after a prior failure” 
and found “obtaining the support of teachers, listening and communicating to all 
stakeholders, and consistently building a foundation of trust to help in overcoming the 
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negative sentiment” were important in bond success (p. 1). This study interviewed 
superintendents on their perceptions of school bond efforts. 
Closely related research also investigated the variables involved in the passage of 
school levy referenda (for district operating costs vs. capital costs). Ingle, Johnson, and 
Petroff (2012) examined five districts pursuing new operating levy campaigns in Ohio, 
and interviewed district-level administrators, school-level administrators, teachers, and 
parent volunteers in the selected Ohio school districts regarding the districts’ role in 
crafting school budget referenda campaigns. Using a macropolitical, micropolitical, and 
campaign strategies framework, this study found four macropolitical themes significantly 
impacted levy passage: state campaign policies, state education finance policy, the high-
profile nature of the Presidential election, and the state of the economy. They found 
school districts had a great deal of variation in strategies used and community 
involvement. Districts that had significant community engagement and created a sense of 
urgency produced greater success at the polls than “central office campaigns.”  
Message training for campaign participants also was critical to success. They 
utilized Johnson (2008)’s 21 school levy strategies that had been previously identified 
through a literature review associated with successful school levy campaigns in the 
context of a single Ohio case study district to analyze campaign strategies. Johnson 
(2008) identified the following strategies for the passage of school levy referenda: create 
a clear vision for the district’s future; justify the need; create a sense of urgency; establish 
an ongoing school-community relations program; use all positive data available; survey 
constituents; consider the amount requested; consider the timing and length of the 
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campaign; ensure board unity; involve community leaders, staff and media; educate 
district staff and students; analyze previous elections; establish a diverse campaign 
committee; focus on “Yes” voters; disseminate information; focus on the benefits; utilize 
experts; keep a low administration profile; use technology; avoid controversy; and 
debrief regardless of the results. While this study was more recent and included a broader 
sample of districts, including urban and suburban school districts, this study was part of 
related literature pertaining to school levy referenda passage, and did not specifically 
investigate bond referenda passage. 
In summary, the dissertation literature on school facilities bond passage to date 
has the following limitations, creating a number of gaps: 1) much of the literature is over 
10 years old (Holt, 1993; Stockton, 1996; Pappalardo, 2005; Faltys, 2006; Lode, 1999; 
Williamson, 1997); 2) the literature is from other states (CA, KS, IA, OH, SD) and may 
not generalize to the Texas context (but might be successfully replicated in Texas) (Holt, 
1993; Kraus, 2009; Godown, 2010); 3) No study has specifically included parents or 
community members in the interviewed or surveyed stakeholder groups (Holt, 1993; 
Stockton, 1996; Kraus, 2009; Godown, 2010; Williamson, 1997); 4) literature examined 
school districts of small size (Holt, 1993; Faltys, 2006); 7) the dissertation studies in 
Texas examined the perceptions of voters, but not specific stakeholder groups such as 
parents (Stockton, 1996; Faltys, 2006, Williamson, 1997). Most importantly, 8) lack of a 
theoretical framework regarding variables significant in school bond referenda passage. 
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Statement of the Problem 
There is no updated qualitative study that has investigated the variables that 
impact the outcome of school bond elections in Texas from the perspective of key 
stakeholders. The overall literature providing guidance for superintendents and school 
boards on the variables influencing the successful passage of a school bond referenda is 
sparse (Bowers et al., 2010; Hickey, 2006, 2008; O’Connor, 2011). Theobald and Meier 
(2002) found “school bond elections receive little attention in political science of 
educational policy literature, and the research that does exist is based on the observation 
of a single or handful of elections” (p. 1).  
Second, there is a lack of updated research on variables impacting school bond 
passage for the 21st century. Despite the fact that school bond elections have a significant 
impact on school facilities, student achievement, and property values, Bowers, et. al 
(2010b) concluded there was a lack of updated research on variables that impact 
successful passage of school bond referenda in the 21st Century: 
While considerable investigation was conducted in the 1960s-70s (Piele and Hall 
1973, 1973b), school bond passage has received less attention by policy 
researchers in recent decades. What is needed is a theoretical model that takes into 
consideration the variables tested in the past and updates them for the 21st 
century. (p. 394) 
Even in some of the most recent research on school bond elections, Bowers and 
Lee (2013) identified that changing demographics in Texas as a factor that could 
potentially impact voter willingness to support school bond referenda in the future:  
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For Texas, interesting times appear to be ahead, as what has been seen in the past 
research on bond passage as a constant—the percentage of voters who will vote 
yes—may be shifting as the demographics of the state change . . . the effects of 
the most recent recession are obvious in the most recent data, but it is difficult to 
predict how tastes for community self-taxation in support of school facilities may 
change in the coming years, especially with the changing demographics. (p. 762) 
In addition, there is little research on “overcoming the negative community 
environment after a bond election failure, leading to the development of support and 
success in a later bond election” (Hickey, 2006). School districts that successfully pass a 
school bond election after having failed a bond election offer a unique opportunity to 
investigate and compare variables involved in both the failure and subsequent successful 
passage of a bond referenda (Hickey, 2006).  Bowers et al. (2010a) called for research on 
“strategies employed by school districts that fail to get a bond request passed on the first 
attempt” (p. 417). 
Bowers and Lee (2013) proposed a new theoretical model of school bond 
passage1, based on some of the most recent and extensive quantitative research on school 
bond elections to date. However, this model still only accounted for 33.2% to 44.3% of 
the variance in outcomes of school bond referendum elections. This may be because 
quantitative research “does not address how or why each of the significant variables in 
the model act in districts attempting to pass bonds” (Bowers et al., 2010a, p. 394). 
                                                          
1 The Bowers and Lee (2013) research was based upon a quantitative analysis of 2,224 
school bonds in Texas from 1997-2009. 
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Bowers et al. (2010a) suggested that qualitative research was needed to identify 
additional variables that play a key role in school bond passage: 
Finally, we recommend qualitative research to examine case studies of actual 
bond elections by school districts as “lived experiences” . . . [to] explore how 
local context and decision-making processes affect the outcome of bond elections 
that statistical analysis alone cannot capture. (p. 417)  
Prior research also failed to include the viewpoints of key stakeholder groups such 
as parents and community members. Bowers, et al., (2010a) suggested the potential of 
“Future qualitative research . . . to describe and understand the complex work and 
interrelationships of district and community actors during the bond proposal and election 
phase” (p. 394). Consequently, the problem involved the lack of updated research on the 
variables impacting the passage of school bond elections from the perspectives of key 
stakeholders in Texas. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative single-case study was to investigate and analyze 
the perceptions of a representative group of district and community stakeholders 
regarding variables that contributed to the failure or successful passage of school bond 
referenda. Using qualitative methods, this study was conducted to update, enhance, 
elaborate, and clarify previous bond passage models developed by recent quantitative and 
qualitative studies, and to illuminate issues and factors influencing school bond passage. 
This in-depth qualitative case study of a representative school district that experienced 
success after a prior bond election failure was used to develop a greater understanding of 
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the variables associated with overcoming negative sentiment. This study examined the 
participants’ views of the variables that affect the outcome of bond elections that 
“statistical analysis alone cannot capture” (Bowers et al., 2010, p. 417). 
Research Questions 
1. What variables contributed to the failure of a school bond election? 
2. What variables contributed to the success of a school bond election? 
3. What relationships existed among these variables with regard to selected 
characteristics of the school district? 
Overview of the Methodology 
This qualitative study used a single-case study design to examine the passage of 
school bond referenda. This researcher analyzed a representative district that had a 
successful bond election after prior failure, to uncover variables associated with 
overcoming negative sentiment in bond elections (Hickey, 2006). The single-case study 
design was used to examine stakeholder perceptions of key variables in the failure and 
subsequent passage of school bond referenda.  This researcher investigated a 
representative district in Texas that had a successful bond election after prior failure to 
explore variables associated with overcoming negative sentiment in bond elections 
(Hickey, 2006). The district was selected using a purposive, theoretical sampling 
technique from the subset of districts who failed and then passed a subsequent bond 
referenda between November 2013 and May 2017 in Texas using bond data from the 
Texas Comptroller’s Office. (Out of 444 districts that sought a bond referenda during the 
same time period, 35 school districts failed, then passed a bond referenda). In this 
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qualitative study, the researcher investigated the perceptions of a representative group of 
key stakeholders, including the superintendent, selected school board member(s), key 
district personnel, such as the chief financial officer and the chief communications 
officer, parents, and community members. Data were collected through semi-structured 
interviews with district leaders, school board members, interviews or focus group(s) with 
parents and community members, and a review of documents. Additional data sources of 
documents associated with school bond referenda were reviewed in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the development and execution of bond referenda plans and activities 
that contributed to school bond referenda failure or success. 
Definition of Terms 
Approval Rate – The percentage of voters who voted in favor of a school 
district’s bond referendum. 
Bond Election – School districts hold a school bond election to support expenses 
associated with capital projects, such as the construction, maintenance, or renovation of 
facilities. Bond elections generate revenues for the building, remodeling, and 
maintenance of facilities. Bond elections are also referred to as Bond or Capital Project 
referenda. 
Capital Construction Costs – As defined by NCES, capital construction costs 
include “the direct cost for construction contracts (‘hard’ costs) and ‘soft’ costs for 
architects, engineers, bond counsel, and other fees and administrative costs required to 
manage building improvements, whether done in-house or contracted out. Capital 
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construction costs do not include the costs for land and existing structures or instructional 
and other equipment” (Filardo, 2016, p. 13). 
Instructional Facilities Allotment (TX) – “The Instructional Facilities Allotment 
(IFA) program provides funding to school districts for debt service payments on debt 
associated with the purchase, construction, renovation, and expansion of instructional 
facilities” (TEA School Finance 101: Funding of Texas Public Schools, 2013, p. 37). IFA 
funds are for “districts whose voters have granted them authority to sell bonds for 
instructional facilities, but who have not yet issued the bonds nor levied the related I&S 
taxes” (Plummer, p. 534). 
Interest and Sinking Fund (TX) (I&S) - Tax rate increases generated through 
bond elections are levied to meet capital asset needs of a district. If bonds are approved, 
the taxes required to pay for the bonds are levied through the interest and sinking (I&S) 
fund tax rate. The tax rate levy for the building, remodeling, or maintenance of facilities 
is often referred to as the interest and sinking (I&S) fund. The I&S fund is established 
only for paying for capital projects (TEA, 2010). 
Maintenance and Operations of Plant (M&O of Plant) – “M&O of Plant 
expenditures include the annual costs for routine and preventative maintenance, minor 
repairs, cleaning, grounds keeping, utilities, and security of facilities, in accordance with 
the definition used by NCES for Operation and Maintenance of Plant. School districts 
pay for M&O of Plant activities out of their annual operating budget” (Filardo, 2016, p. 
3). 
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Maintenance and Operations Tax Rate in TX (M&O) – The tax rate levy for 
the general operations of the district is often referred to as the maintenance and operation 
tax rate (M&O). The M&O tax rate is used to support basic operations of a school district 
such as employee salaries, electrical bills, curriculum needs, and transportation. M&O 
taxes can support all programs in the day-to-day operations of a school district (TEA, 
2010). 
New Instructional Facilities Allotment (TX) – The New Instructional Facilities 
Allotment (NIFA) in Texas “was enacted in 1999 to provide funding to equip newly 
constructed instructional facilities” (Sielke, 2001, p. 696). 
Passage – A majority vote on each election day. 
Permanent School Fund (TX) – In Texas, the Permanent School Fund (PSF) 
uses the accumulated assets derived from the income from state-owned land (including 
many oil and gas reserves) to guarantee school-district bonds, thus providing a general 
obligation loan guarantee as a mechanism for lowering district-interest costs (Duncombe 
& Wang, 2009). 
School Wealth – In Texas, school wealth is the “district’s taxable property per 
student. This measure is consistent with the state of Texas to evaluate school districts for 
purposes of school funding” (Plummer, 2006, p. 540). Plummer’s model utilizes five (5) 
quintiles (20% segments – Q1 poorest 20%; Q2 next poorest, Q5 – wealthiest). 
Total Capital Outlay Costs – “Capital investments defined by NCES include all 
capital costs for school construction, land, building, facilities improvements, and 
equipment” (Filardo, 2016, p. 13). Total capital outlay costs include capital construction 
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costs (the ‘hard costs’ of actual construction and the ‘soft costs’ of project planning, 
design, engineering, and project management), as well as land acquisition, furniture, 
fixtures, instructional and non-instructional equipment, other related fees and costs, and 
interest (BEST, 2006). 
Tax Rate – Texas school districts can impose two separate tax rates: one for 
maintenance & operations (M&O) that can support all programs in the day-to-day 
operations of the school district, and another for debt that is specifically limited to capital 
expenditures, called the I&S tax rate where revenues fund an ‘interest and sinking’ fund 
for bonded debt (Plummer, 2006, p. 533). 
Tax Ratification Election (TRE) – The “tax ratification election” (TRE) is a tax 
election held in Texas to increase the M&O tax rate to support the day-to-day general 
operations of a district. A tax ratification election must be held if Texas school districts 
exceed a $1.04 M&O tax rate (TASB, 2010). 
Limitations 
 A limitation of this study involved the single-case sample size of the study. 
However, the single-case sample size allowed for depth during the interview process as 
part of investigating the complex work and interrelationships of district and community 
stakeholders regarding the bond proposal and school bond election process. The 
participating school district was selected from the 444 districts in Texas who participated 
in school bond elections from November 2013 to May 2017. The selected district failed a 
bond election that was subsequently followed by a successful school bond election. 
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Another limitation of this study involved the potential for selective or altered 
recall by study participants. The participants who participated in the study were asked to 
reflect upon their experiences from school bond referenda elections which had occurred 
up to 4 years in the past. It was possible participants only recalled limited experiences or 
had beliefs, opinions, and perceptions that had changed over time. 
Delimitations 
This study focused on one school district that first had a failed school bond 
election followed by the successful passage of a school bond election between November 
2013 and May 2017.  This study did not include districts that only successfully passed 
school bond referenda nor school districts that only showed failed school bond referenda. 
This study included stakeholder perceptions of the superintendent, key district 
administrators, school board members, parents, and community members. 
Assumptions 
This study proceeded under several assumptions. First, the researcher assumed 
there were variables that influence the failure or successful passage of school bond 
referenda. The researcher assumed interview participants could distinguish between 
effective and ineffective approaches in a school bond referendum passage or failure and 
were able to recall and share key variables involved in school bond referenda failure or 
success. The researcher assumed the participants would openly and honestly share their 
experiences and perceptions regarding the passage of a school bond referendum, and they 
would report their observations truthfully, objectively, and thoroughly in the interviews. 
The researcher assumed adequate records were available to accurately describe what 
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occurred in the school bond referenda elections pertaining to the case study school 
district being investigated. 
Significance of the Study 
With the explosive growth of school facilities’ needs, school administrators and 
researchers have been keenly interested in the variables that influence school bond 
referendum election outcomes. This study documented the perceptions of district and 
community stakeholders regarding failed and subsequently passed school bond referenda. 
There was a demonstrated gap in the literature on variables influencing the successful 
passage of a school bond referenda, especially from the perspective of key stakeholders, 
particularly parents.  Thus, this study contributed new knowledge to the body of research 
on successful school bond referenda. 
The data and findings from this study were used to update, enhance, elaborate, 
and clarify previous theory regarding the variables that influence the failure or passage 
sbetter able to develop a plan for school bond election success. The study was significant 
both for “the researcher focused on the theory of why and how bonds come to be passed, 
and the practitioner looking for specific generalizable, and applicable findings that they 
can apply to help them pass their bond” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 736). The study 
provided valuable information to inform future researchers as well as school board 
members, superintendents, school district administrators, and community leaders facing 
important decisions regarding local school bond referendum elections. 
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Summary 
Chapter One of this proposal introduced the study, including background 
information, a statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, research questions, and 
an overview of the methodology.  Also included were the definition of terms, limitations, 
and delimitations of the study, and assumptions and significance of the study. 
 Chapter Two provides a review of the existing literature on school bond elections.  
The chapter is divided into three sections.  Section One provides information on the need 
for school facilities improvement. Section Two provides information on state and local 
funding for school facilities.  Section Three provides a summary of recent research on 
school bond passage. 
 Chapter Three contains a detailed explanation of the research methods and 
procedures used in the study as well as a description of the study design.  This chapter 
outlines sources of data, site and participant selection, procedures for data collection, and 
methods of data analysis. Chapter 4 contains the extensive data presentation and findings 
that resulted from data collection. Chapter 5 concludes the study with the discussion of 
the findings and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the current literature and expert opinion 
on variables that have been found to be influential to the passage of school bond 
referenda. The chapter is divided into five sections. Section One provides an overview of 
the need for school facilities improvements. Section Two reviews existing research on 
state and local methods for generating funding for school facilities improvements. 
Section Three examines school leadership models impacting school facilities 
improvements and the school bond referenda process. Section Four presents an overview 
of the research on factors affecting school bond referenda passage. Section Five 
summarizes the review of literature and provides an introduction to Chapter Three. 
The Need for School Facilities Improvements 
The quality of school facilities affects the lives of children and communities for 
years to come. It is not surprising that investments in school facilities reflect the value 
communities place on children and their future. “Research shows that high-quality 
facilities help improve student achievement, reduce truancy and suspensions, improve 
staff satisfaction and retention, and raise property values” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). Excellent 
school facilities are the very foundation of educational success (Holt, 2009, Ortiz, 1994). 
The U. S. General Accounting Office, in a 1995 report entitled School Facilities: 
Condition of America’s Schools, recognized the need to provide adequate educational 
facilities: “A number of state courts as well as Congress have recognized that a high-
quality learning environment is essential to educating the nation’s children. Crucial to 
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establishing that learning environment is that children attend school in decent facilities" 
(US GAO, 1995, p. 3). 
School facility needs have repeatedly emerged as a major issue in ongoing efforts 
to improve education over the past two decades. The scale of U.S. public K–12 school 
facilities is astonishing. “Nearly 50 million students and 6 million adults are in close to 
100,000 buildings, encompassing an estimated 7.5 billion gross square feet and 2 million 
acres of land” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). The square footage of public school district buildings 
is almost half the area of all U.S. commercial office space (Filardo, 2016). Texas alone 
accounts for over 10% of the nation’s school-age population, with over 5.3 million 
students served by 1,247 public school districts (TEA, 2017). 
The Cost of Schools in Aging/Poor Condition 
Over the past 20 years there have been numerous reports documenting the need to 
repair, renovate, and/or replace schools in aging or poor condition (GAO, 1995; NEA, 
2000). The average age of schools in the US is 44 years, and it has been increasing (NEA, 
2014). Almost a quarter of the nation’s school buildings operate while in fair or poor 
condition, growing from 16% of all schools in 1998-1999 to 24% in 2012-2013, 
representing a 50% increase in the number of school buildings kept in operation 
regardless of their poor structural conditions (NEA, 2014). The result is the country has 
an increasing number of schools aging or in poor repair that need to be renovated, 
repaired, or replaced. In 1995, the U.S. General Accounting Office report indicated it 
would cost $112 billion to bring K-12 schools throughout the country into good overall 
condition. By 2000, a National Education Association report estimated $322 billion was 
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needed for school repairs, construction, and technology (Edweek, 2004). The problem of 
school districts needing new buildings or major upgrades to existing buildings or major 
upgrades to existing facilities is real and has been serious for many years” (Bowers et al., 
2010a, p. 400). 
In one of the newest and most comprehensive summaries on K-12 school 
facilities’ conditions and funding needs to date, Filardo (2016) estimated school districts 
and states have spent over $2 trillion dollars ($99 billion annually) over the past 20 years 
to maintain and modernize school facilities, making state and local investments in school 
facilities “the second largest sector of public infrastructure spending,” behind only 
investments in highways (Filardo, 2016, p. 2). “School districts worked hard from 1994 
to 2013 to operate, maintain, modernize, and meet the enrollment growth of the nation’s 
K–12 public schools” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). 
Increased Educational and Facilities Requirements 
In addition to the challenges related to outdated and aging facilities, school 
districts also have faced increasing educational program and facilities requirements 
associated with rising enrollment, increasing national and state accountability 
requirements, changing student demographics, expanded educational programming, 
increased accessibility and safety standards, and technology requirements (Filardo, 2016; 
Kowalski, 2002). These changes are often accompanied by significant new facilities 
requirements. “Over the past 20 years, educational environments have undergone 
enormous change, driven by shifting expectations and requirements from educators, 
parents, communities, and regulators” (Filardo, 2016, p. 7). Increasing accountability 
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requirements, changing student demographics, and expanded educational program 
requirements have created extra facilities’ requirements to support “new teaching models 
and student-directed learning” (p. 11).  Filardo (2016) summarized several kinds of 
facilities’ alterations needed “to add capacity and make the facility more suitable for 
education or other district purposes” in the 21st century: 
Significant drivers for facilities alterations included new requirements for special 
education and physical accessibility; expansion of early childhood education; 
integration of technology for instruction and administration; class-size reduction; 
and heightened safety and security concerns. (p. 10) 
Filardo (2016) also indicated that districts expanded facilities’ space for programs 
that “reduced barriers to students’ academic success” by assigning: 
Additional administrators and student-support personnel, such as social workers 
and academic counselors. And they have expanded after-school care and other 
school-based services and support for families through partnerships with 
community-based organizations. These added functions require additional space. 
(p. 11) 
School districts have also “modernized labs to support sophisticated and specialized 
science and technology instruction so that students can pursue studies in fields such 
as robotics and biotechnology” (Filardo, 2016, p. 11). Increasing health, safety, 
accessibility, and technology requirements have required increased facilities repairs, 
renovations, and modernization (Kowalski, 2002; Tanner & Lackney, 2006; Penn State, 
2017). “In the span of these 20 years, school facilities changed more rapidly than at any 
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time in recent memory, fueled by improved health and safety standards, stronger 
accessibility requirements, increased use of technology, and expanded programming 
within schools” (Filardo, 2016, p. 3). Tanner and Lackney (2006), citing Graves (1993), 
indicated that aligning school facilities to educational programming is an ongoing 
challenge, especially in times of rapid change: “Facilities should be more sensitively 
designed to the new needs of education in a period of rapid, indeed revolutionary, change 
in instruction and social conditions” (Tanner, C. K. & Lackney, J. A., 2006, p. 83). 
Growing Enrollment 
Many districts have needed to renovate or expand existing schools or construct 
new schools to meet the needs of rapidly growing student populations (EdWeek, 2004; 
Holt, 2009). “Public school enrollment has increased in recent years, particularly in the 
southern and western United States, and more growth is expected in the future” (TEA, 
2017, p. 5). Rising enrollment has resulted in the need for school districts to expand or 
reconfigure existing facilities or build new temporary or permanent facilities (Filardo, 
2016). Filardo (2016) predicted that school districts will need an additional $87 billion 
annually for capital construction and new facilities costs between 2014 and 2024 (a gap 
of $38 billion annually) (p. 26). 
Texas school districts find themselves in dire need of renovating and expanding 
existing facilities and constructing new school facilities. Texas educates one of the largest 
school-age populations in the country and is also one of the highest growth states in the 
country (Filardo, 2016; NCES, 2016; TEA, 2017). “In the 2006-07 school year, 
4,594,942 students were enrolled in Texas public schools. By 2016-17, enrollment had 
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risen to 5,359,127 students. Over the 10-year period, total enrollment increased by 
764,185 students, or by 16.6 percent” (TEA, 2017, p. ix). Student enrollment is projected 
to continue to increase between 9% – 14% between 2014 and 2024 (Filardo, 2016; TEA, 
2017). With this record student growth, recent estimates indicate that Texas has the 
second highest projected costs for new construction in the nation over the next 10 years at 
$13.8 billion for new construction alone (Filardo, 2016). Due to the size and rapid growth 
of school enrollment in Texas, the renovation and expansion of school facilities is a 
significant undertaking. In the end, “improving the quality of school facilities is an 
expensive undertaking. However, when the positive impacts of facility improvement on 
teachers and students are translated into dollar figures, the rewards of such investments 
far outstrip the cost of the investments” (Penn State, 2017). 
The Need for Local School Bond Referenda 
Nationally, and in Texas, the primary way to pay for school facilities’ renovation, 
expansion, or new construction is through property taxes at the local level. This makes 
the successful passage of school bond referenda critical to the continued growth and 
development of school districts (Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Hickey, 2006; Sielke, 2001; 
Zimmer et al., 2011). “It is not an accident that communities that have the means to 
invest in their public school buildings do so. They improve and enhance their school 
facilities because it matters to the quality of education, the strength of their community, 
and the achievement and well-being of their children and teachers” (BEST, 2006, p. 29). 
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Funding for School Facilities Local Tax Responsibility 
Historically, funding for school facilities has been a local responsibility (Clark, 
2001; Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Plummer, 2006; Sielke, 2001). “While school 
infrastructure needs have changed dramatically over the years, in far too many states the 
fiscal responsibility still falls heavily on the local school district” (Sielke, 2001, p. 653).  
Although Texas has several forms of state support designed to equalize school 
facilities funding, including: the Permanent School Fund (PSF), the Instructional 
Facilities Allotment Program (IFA) and the Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) program (see 
further discussion in section below), school bond elections continue to be the foremost 
method used to finance school facilities repair, renovation, and new construction in Texas 
(Clark, 2001; Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Plummer, 2006; Sielke, 2001). Although 84% 
of school districts participate in the IFA or EDA program in Texas (Legislative Budget 
Board, 2016, p.1), the state’s share of capital outlay for school facilities was only about 
nine percent (9%) of the total costs, leaving the remainder to local communities to fund 
through local property taxes (Filardo, 2016). 
Long-Term Negative Impacts of School Bond Election Failure 
In this funding environment, school communities and district leaders are under 
significant pressure to pass school bond referenda to renovate existing facilities or 
finance new construction (Filardo, 2016; Hickey, 2008). “This trend put school district 
leaders in the position of needing to make the case to their local communities that capital 
fund requests are necessary to provide adequate educational services” (Bowers, Metzger 
& Militello, 2010, p 401). Bowers et al. (2010b) summed up the very visible and negative 
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consequences of failing to pass a school bond referendum election for students, schools, 
and the community:  
Districts that cannot secure funding from their voters for up-to-date capital 
improvements may fall behind more successful neighboring districts in providing 
quality teaching and learning conditions. This can be potentially damning in 
regions where high-stakes accountability puts school districts in a results-driven 
race and school-choice competition empowers families to move their students into 
whichever nearby district looks to be doing the best. Given that adequate capital 
facilities are a very publicly visible component in this equation, school district 
leaders need to find strategies for convincing local voters to approve bond 
request. (p. 375) 
Theobald and Meier (2002) summarized the negative impact that a failed school bond can 
have for a superintendent: “Seeking a bond issue is a risk. The superintendent who 
presents a bond issue risks the public rebuke of the citizens if the bond issue fails” (p. 3).  
Unfortunately, in this environment where passing a school bond referendum is 
critical to the long-term health of schools, the likelihood of school bond referendum 
passage is also far from certain (Zimmer et al., 2011). Many school boards and 
superintendents have difficulty gaining the community and voter support needed to pass 
school bond referenda (Hickey, 2006). As school boards and superintendents turn toward 
the community to gain voter approval to fund building projects, it is essential for school 
boards and school district administrators “to understand how to properly plan and execute 
a school facilities bond referendum” (Godown, 2010, p. 4). 
40 
National Overview of State Funding for School Facilities 
School districts typically issue long-term general obligation bonds to finance 
facilities’ investments. Because the amount of property taxes a community has available 
to invest is based upon the value of the property and the size of the community, the 
amount of funding for school facilities that can be raised based on local taxation can be 
inequitable across communities (Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Plummer, 2006; Sielke, 
2001). 
Larger, wealthier communities have more available resources to invest in their 
school buildings with the ability to raise more money with a smaller tax rate (lower tax 
burden), as each property generates more tax revenue. Smaller or less wealthy districts 
are able to generate fewer dollars overall and/or must place a higher tax burden to 
generate the same amount as wealthier districts, resulting in an inequity between school 
districts and their ability to raise capital for their schools (Plummer, 2006). Sielke (2001) 
summarized this situation: 
Reliance on local bond issues raises equity issues for students and taxpayers alike 
as bond issues are inextricably tied to property wealth. The amount of property 
wealth not only limits the size of the bond issue, but places a heavier burden on 
taxpayers in low-wealth districts. Since most states impose debt limits, many local 
school districts are limited to a fixed percentage of total property wealth, which 
can limit the size and standards for infrastructure project. (p. 657) 
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State Facilities’ Funding Programs 
In response to growing school facilities’ needs, as well as “equity concerns 
stimulated by existing or potential litigation,” states have adopted a number of funding 
programs to equalize funding for school facilities (Duncombe & Wang, 2009, p. 325). 
Plummer (2006) concurred “because of the enormity of estimated funding requirements, 
existing or threatened litigation, and equity concerns, states are taking an increasingly 
active role in funding school facilities” (p. 533). 
Types of state aid programs for school facilities. State aid to support the 
financing of school infrastructure improvements is a relatively recent occurrence. In an 
initial analysis of state facilities funding mechanisms, Sielke (2001) categorized state aid 
for school facilities into four major categories: “flat grants, equalized grants, categorical 
grants, and full state funding” (p. 655). This analysis of state funding mechanisms for 
school infrastructure in 1998-1999 found that states used various combinations of types 
of funding for school facilities (38 states) or provided no state aid for school facilities at 
all (12 states). At that time, Texas was categorized as a state that “embedded 
infrastructure into the basic support program” (Sielke, 2001, p. 657). The amount of 
support also varied significantly from state to state. 
In an updated study in 2009 on state aid for school facilities, Duncombe and 
Wang (2009) examined the “relationship between the type of capital assistance program 
adopted by a state and the equity of capital-outlay distribution” (p. 325). In order to 
analyze the impact of the type of state aid program on funding equity for school facilities, 
they created a detailed categorization of state aid programs for school facilities, which 
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classified state facilities’ aid programs into three major categories: 1) credit 
enhancements, 2) state loan programs, and 3) building-aid programs. Duncombe and 
Wang (2009) found that Texas utilized the second and third type of equalization 
programs. 
Overview of state aid programs for school facilities in Texas. Duncombe and 
Wang (2009) defined the first type of state facilities’ aid program as “credit 
enhancements” that “involve state-government investment in local school district 
borrowing with the goal of raising district credit ratings and lowering interest costs” (p. 
329), allowing bondholders first claim on state aid in case of bond default. Texas did not 
utilize this type of facilities’ aid program. However, Duncombe and Wang went on to 
delineate a second type of state aid for school facilities as state loan programs that 
“directly provide loans or guarantee school district loans . . . [where] the objective is 
reducing the borrowing cost for school district” (p. 329). One of these state loan 
programs included the Permanent School Fund in Texas. The Texas PSF is one of the 
largest such programs in the nation in which “accumulated assets derived from the 
income from state-owned land (including many oil and gas reserves) is used to guarantee 
school district bonds” (Duncombe & Wang, 2009, p. 329). 
Duncombe and Wang (2009) defined a third type of state aid for school facilities 
as direct building-aid programs. The direct building-aid programs were categorized by 
their scope as general or categorical aid; selection process as ranking, prioritization, or 
application process); distribution via lump-sum grant or matching aid and via open-ended 
or closed-ended amounts; and formula components labeled as flat grant or weighted 
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differences that include student needs and district fiscal capacity (Duncombe & 
Wang,2009). Texas utilized open-ended, matching aid programs through the Instructional 
Facilities Allotment Program (IFA), New Instructional Facilities Allotment Program 
(NIFA), and the Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) programs that are described in more 
detail in the section below. 
Impact of State Aid Programs on School Facilities Funding 
Duncombe and Wang (2009) observed “significant variation across states in the 
equity of the capital-finance systems” and noted that “many states provide considerably 
less financial support for capital investment by school districts than for operating 
expenses (Sielke, 2001), which results in significant disparities across school districts in 
their ability to fund school infrastructure” (Duncombe & Wang, 2009, p. 325).  
For states like Texas with matching aid programs, Duncombe and Wang (2009) 
found that these states “have on average a higher per-pupil capital expenditures ($639) 
than states with other types of building aid”; “have bigger differences between 
expenditures at the 95th percentile and the 5th percentile than states that provide lump-sum 
or a combination of both matching and lump-sum aid”; and “have shown on average 
higher inequality across districts than states that have a lump-sum aid program” (p. 342). 
In the end, despite state aid programs, Sielke (2001) concluded that “39 of 50 
states, still rely on voter approved bond issues to fund some, if not all, of their 
infrastructure needs” (p. 657). 
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Texas State Support for School Facilities 
Traditionally, financing for school facilities in Texas has primarily been the 
responsibility of the local community (Luke, 2007; Sielke, 2001). However, several 
major supports for school facilities funding have been established in the state: the 
Permanent School Fund (PSF), the Instructional Facilities Allotment Program (IFA), the 
Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) program; and the New Instructional Facilities Allotment 
Program (NIFA).  
Permanent School Fund 
The PSF was established in the Texas Constitution in 1854 with an appropriation 
of $2 million “expressly for the benefit of the public schools of Texas” (Texas Education 
Agency [TEA], 2018, para. 1). Through the Bond Guarantee Program, the Texas 
Permanent School Fund (TPSF) is pledged to guarantee bonds issued by Texas school 
districts with the accumulated assets of the PSF. The Bond Guarantee enhances school 
districts’ credit rating, allowing participating school districts to borrow at a lower cost 
(TEA, 2017e; Boswell, 2010).  
PSF assets are the “product of royalties, leaseholds, and other revenue contributed 
by Texas land dedicated to the fund” (Clark, 2001). Today, the PSF has an approximate 
value of $37 billion and continues to receive revenue from state taxes on land and 
minerals (including oil and gas) (PSF Annual Report, 2016, p. 73). Since its 
establishment in 1983, the Bond Guarantee Program (BGP) has guaranteed 6,582 school 
district bond issues for a total of more than $151.7 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2016, 
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there were 3,244 issues of guaranteed school district bonds outstanding with a balance of 
$67.34 billion (PSF Annual Report, 2016, p. 79). 
Foundation School Programs (FSP) for School Facilities’ Funding in Texas 
The Tier 3 Foundation School Programs (FSP) or The Instructional Facilities 
Allotment Program (IFA) and Existing Debt Allotment Program (EDA) were authorized 
in response to litigation that found Texas’ school finance system inequitable and thus 
unconstitutional.  
Between 1984 and 1993, in what has become known as the Edgewood lawsuits, 
the Texas Supreme Court found various school finance systems to be 
unconstitutional because they failed to provide equitable funding for property-
poor school districts. In 1993, the Texas legislature designed a school finance 
system . . . whereby high-wealth school districts must reduce their wealth to a 
specified level, and the excess tax revenues are distributed to lower-wealth 
districts (Plummer, 2006, p. 534).  
However, the new finance system did not address facilities funding, and the courts 
indicated the school finance system could be found unconstitutional if the inequity in 
school facilities funding was left unaddressed. As a result, the Texas legislature first 
implemented the IFA program in 1997, and then the EDA program in 1999 (Plummer, 
2006). 
Instructional facilities allotment program (IFA). The IFA Program is a 
“matching aid” program that helps school districts “cover debt service costs associated 
with bonds issued for school construction” (Plummer, 2006, p. 533; Legislative Budget 
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Board, 2016). The main purpose of the IFA funding program was to increase school 
facilities construction (Plummer, 2006). The IFA program was approved in House Bill 4 
by the 75th Legislature in spring 1997 and became effective September 1, 1997 (IFA 
FAQ p. 1).  
IFA funds were made available only to districts whose voters granted the 
authority to sell bonds or enter lease-purchase agreements but had not yet issued debt. 
School districts accessed the program through an application and award process managed 
by the Texas Education Agency (TEA). Awards were based upon the availability of new 
funding appropriations. “By statute, districts are ranked for the purpose of making 
awards, with district property wealth per student being the primary ranking criterion to 
ensure that funding is targeted toward property-poor school districts” (Legislative Budget 
Board, 2016). Three other factors were then considered with priority given to districts 
with a high rate of enrollment growth, districts with no outstanding debt, and districts not 
awarded IFA funding in a prior funding cycle (Clark 2001; Legislative Budget Board, 
2016). The amount of funding award amounts per district per biennium were limited to 
the greater of $250 per student or $100,000 (Legislative Budget Board, 2016). “State 
assistance for facilities funding is equalized, meaning that low-wealth districts receive 
more IFA state aid per penny of tax than do higher-wealth districts” (Clark, 2001, p. 
693). 
There have been 10 IFA award cycles since the program’s launch. The 84th 
Legislature appropriated $55.5 million for a new cycle of IFA awards for fiscal year 
2017. In fiscal year 2016, 440 school districts had debt service covered by previously 
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issued IFA awards, making the projected entitlement for the IFA program for the 2016–
17 biennium $1.5 billion.  
Plummer’s (2006) research analyzed the impact of IFA funding in Texas and 
found that “IFA districts have increased their capital outlays more than non-IFA districts” 
(p. 532) and that “districts receiving IFA funds have increased their capital outlays more 
than non-IFA districts by an average of $1.77 per student dollar of IFA funding” (p. 532).  
Plummer (2006) also investigated whether or not capital outlays had become more 
equitably distributed across school districts of different wealth levels and found that: 
Research suggests that the poorest school districts (those in Quintile 1) increased 
their capital outlays because of significant IFA funding they received, while the 
richest districts (Quintile 5) increased capital outlays by increasing tax rates. In 
contrast, middle wealth school districts (the 60% of school districts in Quintiles 2, 
3, and 4) do not receive significant amounts of IFA funding, nor do they have the 
tax revenue ability of the richest school districts. (p. 534) 
In other words, while the IFA program helped many districts in Texas, many 
more school districts were still entirely reliant on local bond funding for their school 
facilities capital improvements needs. In addition, IFA assistance was a matching grant 
program, which means school districts needed to pass a school bond referendum election 
in order to access IFA funding. Furthermore, while a high percentage of districts received 
state aid, the IFA covered only a small percentage of overall school district need for 
capital for facilities. Between 2013 and 2016, school districts passed $31.5 billion in 
bonds, approximately $10 billion per year. While the IFA amount was high, $1.5 billion 
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is approximately 15% of $10 billion in total bonds passed during those 3 years (Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2017). 
Existing debt allotment program (EDA). The Existing Debt Allotment Program 
(EDA) provided “assistance for existing debt” (Plummer, 2006, p. 535). Created by the 
Texas Legislature in 1999, the Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) program “provides a 
guaranteed yield on interest and sinking fund (I&S) taxes levied by school districts to pay 
the principal of and interest on eligible bonds” (Texas Education Agency, 2017b). 
The primary purpose of the EDA program was to provide tax relief for districts 
receiving funding.  
The EDA program provides state aid through a guaranteed yield on school district 
taxes levied to pay the principal and interest on eligible bonds. Annual EDA 
entitlement per school district is limited to a guaranteed yield of $35 per penny 
per student for the lesser of the following three rates: (1) the district’s effective 
rate needed to service eligible debt; (2) the district’s effective interest and sinking 
rate for the second year of the prior biennium; or (3) $0.29. School districts’ local 
share of EDA is met by levying and collecting property tax revenue. For the 
2016–17 biennium, 851 school districts have debt service that is eligible for the 
EDA program. Projected entitlement for the EDA program for the 2016–17 
biennium is $6.7 billion, consisting of $0.6 billion in state aid with a local share of 
$6.1 billion. (Legislative Budget Board, 2016, p. 2) 
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In fiscal year 2016, 419 (of 1,019) or 41% of school districts had qualifying debt 
service for the EDA program as seen in Figure 1 (Legislative Budget Board, 2016, p. 2).  
Figure 2 shows the state and local share of entitlement for the programs for historical 
fiscal years and the current biennium. 
Figure 1. The school district’s participation in FSP facilities programs for fiscal year 
2016. 
Figure 2. The state and local shares for FSP facilities entitlement for fiscal years 2005, 
2010, as well as 2015-2017. 
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During fiscal year 2016, “the share of local revenue making up total entitlement 
has increased due to the combined effects of property value growth and the guarantee 
remaining constant at the $35 level” (Legislative Budget Board, 2016, p. 2). Additionally: 
As property values have increased, a larger proportion of districts have local 
yields above the guarantee level. For fiscal year 2016, the $35 per penny per ADA 
yield represents the 45th percentile of wealth per ADA among school districts. Of 
the 859 districts with qualifying debt service in one or both programs, 416 are 
projected to have local yields at or above the $35 yield during fiscal year 2016. 
For districts with local yields greater than or equal to $35 guarantee level, EDA 
and IFA entitlement consists solely of local revenue. (Legislative Budget Board, 
2016, p. 2) 
Over the past 10 years, school districts were bumped above the level where the 
EDA could help them; thus, they became more dependent upon their local tax base once 
again. In addition, Texas’ equalization programs were matching grant programs, which 
made passing the local bond referendum election even more important because without 
passing the local bond referendum election, school districts were not able to access any 
additional state aid. 
Conceptual Frameworks 
Three conceptual frameworks were identified from the literature regarding the 
variables that impact school bond elections. The first two conceptual frameworks were 
organizational leadership models affecting leaders in school districts promoting 
organizational change. The third conceptual framework was a theoretical model 
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specifically related to the process of school bond passage. The three conceptual 
frameworks included the following: (a) Olivárez’s (2013) Ten Functions of the School 
District; (b) Bolman and Deal’s (2008) Framework for Analyzing Organizational 
Behavior (a.k.a., the four frames); and (c) Bowers and Lee’s (2013) mediated model of 
bond passage. Olivárez developed the 10 Functions of the School District model to 
provide an administrative, instructional, and political leadership theory for 
superintendents and school district leaders seeking to more effectively perform executive 
leadership roles in public schools. Bolman and Deal provided a methodology to analyze 
change in organizations through the lenses of the following four frames: (a) structural, (b) 
human resources, (c) political, and (d) symbolic. In 2013, Bowers and Lee proposed a 
theoretical model for the school bond election process based on their synthesis of earlier 
research about voter preferences as well as more recent quantitative research on district 
and bond characteristics. Those three models are explained in this section. 
10 Functions of the School District Model 
The responsibilities of superintendents, school leaders, and school districts have 
magnified in scope and complexity. Today’s superintendents, district administrators, and 
school leaders must be prepared to address a complex array of leadership and managerial 
responsibilities that go far beyond the basic delivery of instructional content, including 
but not limited to: (a) safety and security of students and staff; (b) comprehensive health, 
physical, social and nutritional services; (c) coordination with institutions of higher 
education; (d) federal and state accountability standards for student academic 
performance; (e) complex financial and technology-based planning and management 
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systems, and (f) site-based decision making and collaboration with professional 
educators, labor organizations and other external service providers (Olivárez, 2011). In 
response to significant changes in education, Olivárez of the University of Texas at 
Austin, and Director of the Cooperative Superintendency Program, developed the Ten 
Functions of the School District to provide an administrative, instructional, and political 
leadership theory for superintendents and school district leaders seeking to more 
effectively perform executive leadership roles in public schools. 
The 10 Functions leadership theory is based upon the premise that “school 
districts are organized to carry out critical functions that collectively make up the totality 
of the district’s operations, under the leadership of the superintendent and the approval of 
the district’s board of trustees” (Olivárez, 2011, p. 5). The leadership responsibilities of 
the superintendent “encompass ten distinct but overlapping functions that provide 
definition to the ongoing activities of school districts: 1) governance & operations; 2) 
curriculum and instruction; 3) elementary and secondary campus operations; 4) 
instructional support services; 5) human resources; 6) administrative, finance, and 
business operations; 7) facilities planning and plant services; 8) accountability, 
information management, and technology services; 9) external and internal 
communications; and 10) operational support systems: safety and security, food services, 
and transportation” (Olivárez, 2011, p. 5). 
Facilities planning and plant services. One of the major responsibilities of 
school leaders is to ensure students are educated in high-quality facilities (Kowalski, 
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2002; Ortiz, 1994; Tanner & Lackney, 2006). Texas Education Code #11.201 indicates 
the superintendent is responsible for ensuring the adequacy of school facilities: 
The duties of the superintendent include: assuming administrative responsibility 
and leadership for the planning, organization, operation, supervision, and 
evaluation of the education programs, services, and facilities of the district . . . 
and overseeing compliance with the standards for school facilities established by 
the Commissioner under Section 46.008. (Texas Education Code, Subchapter E, 
Sec.11.201.d.1-4, 2015) 
Facilities Planning and Plant Services is one of the 10 Functions of the school 
district for which the superintendent is responsible (Olivárez, 2011). Of the 10 Functions, 
the Facilities Planning and Plant Services directly includes all aspects involved with 
school facilities, including the following:  
(a) evaluation of existing facilities, (b) operational management of facilities, (c) 
long- and short-range planning of facilities, (d) plans for and implementation of 
school construction, (e) educational specifications for new buildings including 
technology integration, (f) safety and security in addition to flexibility for variable 
learning purposes; (g) development of a capital improvement program, (h) site 
selection and acquisition, and (i) architect selection. (Purcell, 2017, p. 43) 
Olivárez (2013) indicated that as a part of the Facilities and Plant Planning 
function, superintendents must be able to project future district enrollment, ascertain 
future facility needs, maintain existing facilities in good repair to ensure the safety of 
students and staff, oversee the renovation, replacement, or construction of new facilities, 
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and update infrastructure priorities due to changing enrollment or legislative mandates. 
Purcell (2017) summarized the superintendent’s role in the Olivárez 10 Functions Model 
regarding facilities: 
The superintendent is responsible for the following: (a) direction and oversight to 
the maintenance and improvement of facilities system-wide; (b) leadership for 
long-range planning for facility renovations, acquisition of additional real estate, 
and fund raising for new buildings or remodeling of existing facilities; (c) the 
selection and hiring of external architects and/or contractors and for guiding their 
work during projects involving the renovation or construction of district facilities. 
(Purcell, 2017, p. 44-45) 
Purcell (2017), citing Olivarez (2013), reported that an important role of the 
superintendent in the facilities’ planning process is to “continually address the learner-
centered values and ethics and maintain the district culture and vision with community 
support in relationship to facilities planning and plant management.” Olivarez’s model 
indicated that  
The district must have advisory structures to actively incorporate community 
voices in the design and implementation of facilities maintenance, renovation, and 
construction projects. The superintendent shares the vision of the district’s and the 
community’s learner-centered values that is reflected in the design and use of 
facilities system-wide. (Purcell, 2017, p. 45) 
Facilities Planning and Plant Service is the function that seems most directly and 
obviously related to, and supported by, the passage of school bond referendum elections. 
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The superintendent must ensure processes and procedures are in place to procure support 
for capital improvement funds, and also must establish decision-making processes 
regarding all aspects of facilities planning in order to avoid challenges regarding site 
selection, facilities design, or construction management (Olivárez, 2013). Based on prior 
research into school bond referendum passage, additional functions that are indicated to 
be related to facilities planning and successful school bond passage include Governance 
& Operations; Curriculum & Instruction; Elementary & Secondary Campus Operations; 
Administrative, Finance, and Business Operations; and Internal/External 
Communications. 
Governance and operations. The Governance & Operations function ensures the 
appropriate implementation of the duties and responsibilities of school board members 
and superintendents as delineated in the Texas Education Code (TEC). This function 
includes the structure and organization of school boards and the formal processes 
necessary to carry out the management oversight and policy development responsibilities 
of the superintendent and school board as they deliver the state-required instructional 
school program, including facilities (Olivárez, 2013). This includes guidance and support 
in the development of the district’s comprehensive plan of operation and the 
corresponding allocation of financial resources. Long-range facilities planning and school 
bond referendum election planning is a part of this comprehensive plan of operation. The 
governance operations function of the school district is carried out by the superintendent, 
the school board, and the district leadership team. The school board hires the 
superintendent and the superintendent administers all district operations and school 
56 
programs. All aspects of school bond referenda are heavily impacted in the Governance 
and Operations function, including the facilities planning process and the bond planning 
process, including bond timing. Roles and responsibilities of the school board, as well as 
roles and responsibilities of the superintendent, the school district leadership team, and 
district employees must be carefully understood and communicated to all stakeholders. In 
Texas, there are specific and strict legal requirements regarding the role of the school 
board versus the role of the superintendent and the school district leadership team and 
employees regarding school bond referenda. This function also includes 
intergovernmental coordination with other government agencies regarding bond 
elections, such as cities or institutions of higher education, which may be seeking bond 
funding during the same election as the school district (Olivárez, 2017, direct 
communication). 
Curriculum and instruction. This function is designed to ensure the schools are 
provided the state-adopted curriculum in a timely and efficient manner, as well as ensure 
that the curriculum is designed to meet the needs of all learners despite differences in 
learning styles or cultural backgrounds. School facilities’ maintenance, renovations, and 
construction must take into account the implementation of the overall academic vision, as 
well as support the needs of effective instructional programs and practices (Filardo, 
2016). “Facilities should be more sensitively designed to the new needs of education in a 
period of rapid, indeed revolutionary, change in education and social conditions (Tanner 
& Lackney, 2006, p. 83).  Ultimately the superintendent must continually address learner-
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centered values as well as maintain the district culture and vision with community 
support in relationship to facilities planning and plant management (Olivárez, 2013). 
Elementary and secondary campus operations. This function is focused on the 
systemic coordination and integrated focus on the overall educational mission of the 
campus. This involves both long- and short-range planning processes and monitoring on 
an ongoing basis to ensure excellence in learning at all campuses. Research suggests that 
as school and campus leaders consider facilities improvements, consideration of the day-
to-day functioning of the campus and classroom learning environments is critical. 
National recommendations suggest “effective learning environments are designed to: 
enhance teaching and learning and accommodate the needs of all learners; serve as 
centers of the community; result from a planning and design process involving all 
stakeholders; provide for health, safety, and security; make effective use of all resources; 
and allow for flexibility and adaptability to changing needs” (Bingler, Quinn, & Sullivan, 
2003, as cited in Tanner & Lackney, 2006, p. 101). School buildings are some of the 
most prominent buildings in the community, well known to parents, business members, 
and community members. Facilities planning and bond planning processes should 
involve stakeholders from the campuses, including principals, teachers, staff, parents, and 
business and community members (Purcell, 2017). 
Administrative, finance, and business operations. This function involves all 
aspects of the leadership, management, and oversight of the district’s finances (Olivárez, 
2011). Fiscal planning is a major part of the facilities planning process, as well as the 
school bond referendum process. As previously discussed, “school districts may use a 
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variety of means for raising revenue and for acquiring funds to construct school 
facilities” (Ortiz, 1994, p. 39). The school board, superintendent, school district 
leadership, and community must fully understand the costs associated with school 
facilities’ maintenance, renovation, and new construction as a part of a school bond 
referendum process (Olivárez, 2011). 
Internal/external communications. Ongoing internal communication must occur 
at the campus-level, at central office, and at the level of superintendent/school board in 
order to keep all internal staff informed of important activities. External communication 
informs parents and community members of campus and district activities, events, 
performance results, and other critical information such as board meeting schedules and 
construction proposals (Olivárez, 2011). Advisory structures are recommended to 
actively incorporate community voices in the design and implementation of facilities 
maintenance, renovation, and construction projects (Purcell, 2017). A major role of the 
superintendent is to share the district and the community’s vision of learner-centered 
values that are reflected in the design and use of facilities system-wide (Olivárez, 2013). 
Bolman & Deal Framework for Analyzing Organizational Behavior 
A robust theoretical framework is needed when seeking to investigate the 
complex work and interrelationships of school district and community stakeholders 
inherent in the school bond process. Bolman and Deal (2008) presented a Framework for 
Analyzing Organizational Behavior that utilizes four lenses or “frames” to analyze and 
understand complex behavior within and between organizations: (a) structural, (b) human 
resources, (c) political, and (d) symbolic. Bolman and Deal (2008) argued these frames 
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offer leaders in today’s organizations a sophisticated tool for making effective decisions 
in fast-paced organizational environments. Therefore, for this discussion the four frames 
represent a robust, yet flexible, framework to understand and analyze organizational 
behavior in complex situations, such as in the school bond passage process. The four 
frames are reviewed in turn, while Appendix H contains a tabular formation of the 
adaptation of the actions of the bond election process based on the frames outlined by 
Bolman and Deal (2008). 
Structural frame. The first frame, the structural frame, focuses on “the 
architecture of the organization --- the design of units and subunits, rules and roles, goals 
and policies” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 21).  The metaphor for the structural frame is a 
factory or machine, or the skeleton in a body.  The structural frame is based upon a 
“belief of rationality, and a faith that a suitable array of formal roles and responsibilities 
will minimize distracting personal static and maximize people’s performance on the job” 
(Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 47).  Groups can be organized on the basis of a variety of 
dimensions: by function; knowledge or skill; units of time (e.g. shifts); by product; by 
customers or clients; by place or geography; or by process.  Factors that affect the choice 
and success of an organizing frame are the size and age of the organization; core 
processes; environment; strategy and goals; information technology; and nature of the 
workforce.  Bolman and Deal summarize, “At the heart of organizational design are the 
twin issues of differentiation and integration.  Organizations must divide work by 
creating a variety of specialized roles, functions, and units.   They must then use both 
vertical and horizontal procedures to lash the many elements together” (2008, p. 68). 
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“Leaders who make change using this approach focus on structural elements within the 
organization as well as strategy, implementation, and adaptation. Changing institutional 
structures works well when goals are clear, when cause-and-effect relationships are well 
understood, and when there is little conflict, uncertainty, or ambiguity” (McCleod, n. d.). 
Human resources frame. As opposed to the structural frame where the 
organization is like a machine, the analogy for the human resources frame is the family.  
This frame “emphasizes understanding people, their strengths and foibles, reason and 
emotion, and desires and fears” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 21).  As opposed to the 
structural frame, which focuses on goals, strategies, and systems, this frame focuses on 
“the relationship between people and organizations.  Organizations need people (for their 
energy, effort, and talent) and people need organizations (for the many intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards they offer)” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 137).  This theory addresses 
developing and implementing a human resources philosophy, hiring the right people, 
keeping employees, rewarding performance, protecting jobs, promoting, sharing the 
wealth, investing in, and empowering employees.  
Leaders who approach change from a Human Resource Frame focus on people. 
This approach emphasizes support, empowerment (perhaps through distributed 
leadership mechanisms), staff development, and responsiveness to employee 
needs. A focus on people works well when employee morale is a consideration 
and when there is relatively little conflict. (McCleod, n. d.) 
Political frame. The political frame focuses intensely on the power aspects of 
organizational life.  Bolman and Deal (2008) found the major political skills needed by 
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leaders to be agenda setting, mapping the political terrain, networking and forming 
coalitions, and bargaining and negotiating. They quoted Kotter (1995) who said, 
“Organizational excellence . . . demands a sophisticated type of social skill: a leadership 
skill that can mobilize people and accomplish important objectives despite dozens of 
obstacles; a skill that can pull people together for meaningful purposes despite the 
thousands of forces that push us apart; a skill that can keep our corporations and public 
institutions from descending into a mediocrity characterized by bureaucratic infighting, 
parochial politics, and vicious power struggles” (p. 213).  
Leaders who use a political approach to facilitate change focus on the political 
realities that exist within and outside organizations. This approach emphasizes 
dealing with interest groups (and their varying agendas), building power bases, 
coalition-building, negotiating conflicts over limited resources, and creating 
compromises. The political approach is appropriate when resources are scarce or 
diminishing as well as when goals or values are in conflict. (McCleod, n. d.) 
Symbolic frame. The symbolic frame puts “ritual, ceremony, story, play, and 
culture at the heart of organizational life” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 21).  Rituals and 
ceremonies offer direction, faith, and hope (Bolman & Deal, 2008).  “Managers who 
understand the significance of symbols and know how to evoke spirit and soul can shape 
more cohesive and effective organizations” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 269).  
Leaders who make change using a symbolic approach focus on vision and 
inspiration. Symbolic leaders feel that people need to believe that their personal 
work, and the work of the organization, is important and meaningful. Traditions, 
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ceremonies, and rituals are very important to the symbolic approach, which is 
most appropriate when goals and/or cause-and-effect relationships are unclear. 
(McLeod, n.d., para. 5) 
Research on School Facilities Bond Passage 
Prior research in the field of school bond referenda passage can be classified into 
two main categories: empirical research and normative research that consisted mainly of 
dissertation articles as well as procedural advice found in professional/trade journals for 
school and district administrators on “lessons learned” and suggestions on “how to pass 
your bond” (Bowers et al., 2010b).   
Empirical research over the past 45 years has focused on factors that impact the 
likelihood of bond passage, including voter preferences, district and community 
characteristics, bond characteristics, and election characteristics (Bowers & Chen, 2015; 
Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010a, 2010b; Gong & Rogers, 2014; Hickey, 2008; 
Ingle, Johnson, et al., 2013; Piele & Hall, 1973; Theobald & Meier, 2002; Zimmer et al., 
2011). Normative models have consisted mainly of unpublished dissertation articles as 
well as procedural advice tactical campaign strategies consisting mainly of procedural 
advice found in professional/trade journals for school and district administrators on 
“lessons learned” and suggestions on “how to pass your bond” (Bowers et al., 2010b). 
There is also an additional line of related research that has explored the factors in 
passing school levy referenda (Ehrenberg et al., 2004; Ingle & Johnson, 2009; Ingle, 
Petroff, & Johnson, 2011; Ingle, Johnson, & Petroff, 2013; Ingle, Johnson, et al., 2013; 
Johnson & Ingle, 2009; O’Connor, 2011). The following section reviews the literature of 
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empirical models of bond passage, additional literature regarding school bond passage, 
and related literature on school levy passage. 
Seminal Research on Bond Passage 
Piele and Hall (1973a, 1973b) conducted some of the most influential research on 
the factors related to school bond passage almost 50 years ago. Utilizing a meta-analysis 
of over 100 studies from the 1950s and 1960s, they produced seminal theories on how 
school district characteristics, election characteristics, voter demographic characteristics, 
voter psychological characteristics, information factors, and political characteristics 
impact school bond-elections. While Piele and Hall (1973) looked at various factors, 
including district and community demographics and bond and election characteristics, 
their longest-lasting contribution to the field was their work on voter impact on school 
bond elections. Piele and Hall concluded that “there were two major determinants the 
outcome of a school bond referendum: who was most likely to participate versus who 
was most likely to vote ‘yes’” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 734).   
Piele and Hall (1973) found that voter participation and voter characteristics, such 
as voter age, economic status (SES), education, and ethnicity were the most significant 
factors affecting the outcome of school bond elections. In terms of voter participation, 
they found that increased voter turnout decreased the chances of passing a school bond. 
“Although the use of these ‘get out the vote’ techniques represents an admirable faith in 
the ‘democratic model’, they may well cause a net increase in negative voting” (Piele & 
Hall, 1973a, p. 87). They found that voter age, economic status (SES), education, and 
ethnicity all impact election results (Piele & Hall, 1973). They found that middle- to 
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older-aged voters were more likely to participate, but also more likely to vote against the 
bond, partly due to not having children enrolled in school and in general being opposed to 
new taxes.  The found that both higher socioeconomic status and higher education levels 
of voters resulted in increased participation in the election as well as the likelihood of 
voting yes. While White voters were more likely to participate, African American voters 
were more likely to vote yes.  
While this research was significant both to the research field and school 
practitioners, the conclusion for districts was ultimately disheartening regarding the 
ability of school district leaders to significantly impact school bond elections. 
Piele and Hall set forth an apparent paradox for school districts looking to pass 
their bond. They theorized that community support for a local bond election in a 
school district is constant, with fairly intact groups that will vote yes or no, based 
mostly on demographics, while at the same time there was little evidence to show 
that factors under the influence of the district (election timing, bond amount, 
purpose, and wording) were associated with final bond outcomes. (Bowers & Lee, 
2013, p. 735) 
Recent research has confirmed Piele and Hall’s (1973) research on voter turnout. 
Gong & Roger’s (2014) recent research on role of voter turnout in school bond election 
outcomes that looked at 662 school bond elections held in 17 (of 77) Oklahoma counties 
between 1997 and 2009 found that “change in turnout has a negative and significant 
influence on change in approval share and probability of bond success” (p. 247), 
supporting previous research that “higher-than-expected turnout is associated with lower 
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bond approval shares and lower chances of passing” (p. 260). Bowers et al.’s (2010b) 
research on 789 bond elections in Michigan from 1998-2006 also confirmed a negative 
and significant relationship between voter turnout and bond passage. 
 However, current researchers cited several issues with the Piele and Hall (1973) 
research. Although Piele and Hall’s (1973) work has been extremely influential and was 
exhaustive at the time, the study is now dated. Most of the studies they analyzed came 
from the 1950s and 1960s and are over 70 years old; there have been significant 
demographic, social, and political changes in the past 70 years. The second issue 
researchers have with their analysis is that the original studies in the Piele and Hall 
(1973) meta-analysis “focused almost exclusively on descriptive statistics only, with few 
studies using inferential statistics.” In addition, “sample sizes were relatively small, 
intact, and cross-sectional across the vast majority of their studies reviewed, hampering 
the ability to generalize across contexts and into the present” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 
735). 
Recent Research on Bond Passage 
While a relatively large amount of research on the empirical factors related to 
passing or failing a school bond was conducted in the United States during the 1960s and 
early 1970s during periods of high birth rates, most recent researchers concluded that 
research in the field of school bond elections since the early 1970s has been sparse 
(Bowers & Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010a, 2010b; Hickey, 
2006, 2008; Ingle, Johnson, et al., 2013; Johnson & Ingle, 2008; Zimmer et al., 2011). A 
“small and growing body of research has begun to focus on updating this research 
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domain on facility bonds” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 735). Recent research efforts have 
shifted from the voter as the primary unit of analysis, to the bond as the primary unit of 
analysis. Bowers and Lee (2013) explained the shift to focus on bonds as the primary unit 
of analysis allowed the following for recent researchers: 
Focus on the factors most associated with passing or failing a school bond, rather 
than focus on theories around school district median voter behavior . . . in an 
attempt to build theory specifically associated with school bonds and to inform 
administrator practice to help schools find the funding they need to build adequate 
facilities for their students. (p. 736) 
Researchers over the past 15 years have been able to examine data-rich, complete 
databases containing data for entire states to analyze factors quantitatively thought to be 
significant for predicting the passage or failure of school bonds. As a result, these 
researchers have “identified bond and election characteristics that can be tailored by the 
school administration” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 753). Integrating the results of earlier 
work on voter preferences, as well as more recent research on district and community 
characteristics, as well as on bond and election characteristics, Bowers and Lee (2013) 
concluded that “there are significant malleable factors in a bond election that are under 
the control of school district administrators” (p. 759). 
A review of the literature below provides a review of the studies over the past 20 
years that have investigated voter preferences, district and community characteristics, 
bond characteristics, and election characteristics as factors that impact the likelihood of 
school bond passage (see Appendix A). Sielke (1998) looked at the amount of debt a 
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district already had on the effect of bond passage and found that “those who are already 
paying debt mills or high amounts of debt mills are willing to tax themselves even more 
in support of their schools” (p. 321).  
In 2008, Hickey found that “little research on socioeconomic trends in bond 
elections” (p. 22) had been completed. This research explored the relationship between 
successful bond passage in Texas bond elections in 2006 and following district and 
community factors: the city population percentage of white, African-American, and 
Hispanic groups; district percentage of white, African American and Hispanic students; 
city poverty percentages; district socioeconomic percentages; median city household 
income; median age; senior citizen population percentage; and city percentage of 
residents with a bachelor’s degree. Hickey (2008) found that “the highest positive 
correlations existed with Hispanic city and district populations, as well of the factor of 
population percentage who hold a bachelor’s degree” (p. 26). Level of education was 
strongly positive, consistent with previous research. Age trends, which showed a “slightly 
negative correlation for senior citizen percentage” (p. 25) was also consistent with 
previous research. The White and African American demographics both showed negative 
trends with the correlations regarding socioeconomic level being inconsistent. 
Socioeconomic factors were inconsistent: Low socioeconomic status at the district level 
had a slightly positive correlation, whereas poverty levels in the city were negative 
correlated with bond success. 
Bowers et al. (2010a) studied four parameters related to the likelihood of passing 
school bonds by local district and examined statewide data school bond data for 505 
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school districts in Michigan that held school facilities bond elections from 2000 to 2005. 
They found four variables that were significant in predicting either success or failure of 
school bonds: bond amount, number of students enrolled, the number of times the bond 
was attempted, and district urbanicity (the size of city the district was located in: urban, 
suburban, small town, and rural). Bowers et al. found that bond amount is a “significant 
negative predictor of bond passage” (that is, as the amount goes up, the odds of passing a 
bond go down). Second, they sound that enrollment is a “significant positive predictor (as 
enrollment goes up, chances of passing a bond go up)” (Bowers et al., 2010a, p. 410). 
Their analysis found that “rural districts have worse chances of passing bond elections 
than urban and suburban districts and that small-town districts have the worst chances of 
all” (p. 398). They also found that the bond timing matters: “the first time a bond request 
is floated has the best chance of being passed, whereas second and third floats return 
precipitously lower chances” (p. 415). 
Bowers et al. (2010b) performed a second study, in which they investigated the 
outcome of 789 bond elections from 1998 to 2006 in Michigan to analyze ten variables: 
amount of the bond request; district enrollment; district locale; percentage of students 
receiving free and reduced lunches; percentage of the district’s population with only a 
high school degree; the district’s long-term debt; voter turnout; the day of the calendar 
year on which the election was held; the number of the bond proposal on the ballot; and 
the inclusion of technology in the ballot proposal’s wording (Bowers et al., 2010b). This 
follow-up study confirmed the previous finding that bond amount is a significant negative 
predictor of bond passage and confirmed Piele and Hall’s (1973) finding that voter 
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turnout has a significant and negative impact on bond passage. In addition, they found 
that the percentage of students receiving free lunches, percentage of the district 
population with only a high school degree, and bond placement further down the ballot 
were all significant and negative factors. That is, the higher the percentage of students 
receiving free lunch in the district, the lower the odds of passing the bond.  The higher 
the percentage of the district population with only a high school degree, the lower the 
odds of bond passage. Bond placement looked at the order in which the bond wording 
was place on the ballot; the further down the ballot, the less likely the bond was to pass 
(Bowers et al., 2010b).  
Furthermore, Bowers et al. (2010b) began to compile the major types of variables 
that had been tested in the past and recommended to be researched in the future to lay the 
foundation for building a coherent model of factors impacting bond passage. These 
factors included:  
1. SES and education levels of the community: Are the percentages of students in 
poverty in the district or the district’s overall education levels associated with 
bond election outcome? 
2. Debt-load parameters: Is the district’s overall long-term debt a significant 
predictor of bond election outcomes 
3. Technology: Is inclusion of wording to fund technology improvements in a 
bond proposal associated with the outcome of bond elections? 
4. Bond Amount: Is the amount of money requested in the bond associated with 
the outcome of bond elections? 
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5. Number of bond attempts and locale: Do the number of “floats” or district 
type predict the outcome of bond elections? 
6. District enrollment: Is student enrollment associated with the outcome of 
bond elections? 
7. Voter turnout: To what extent is voter turnout associated with the outcome of 
bond elections? 
8. Day of year and proposal number on the ballot? Is the proposal’s position on 
the ballot or when the election is held during the year associated with the 
outcome of bond elections? Is it best for a capital request to appear as the first 
or only issue or to be listed among many funding requests on an election 
ballot? 
 Zimmer et al. (2011) looked at an entirely new factor which was the type of 
capital project that voters were willing to support. They studied the “likelihood of bonds 
passing for maintenance of existing buildings versus construction of new buildings or 
additions” (p. 38). They examined the outcomes of 248 local bond referenda in the state 
of Michigan between 1999 and 2001. They found that maintenance of existing structures 
received more support from voters than construction of new facilities and additions. “The 
coefficient of estimates for the percent yes models suggest that ‘maintenance’ of existing 
capital receives nearly 6 percent more yes votes. Similarly, maintenance and operations 
referenda are about 37 percent more likely to pass than other referenda” (p. 51). They 
also created an important typology for future research on types of proposed facilities 
changes: new academic buildings; additions; operation or maintenance of existing 
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facilities (purchasing of equipment, remodeling, re-equipping, refurbishing); athletic 
facilities; band/art facilities; buses; and parking facilities. 
Gong and Roger (2014) researched the role of voter turnout in school bond 
election outcomes using a sample of 662 school bond elections held in 17 of the 77 
Oklahoma counties between 1997 and 2009. They found that “change in turnout has a 
negative and significant influence on change in approval share and probability of bond 
success” (p. 247). This research confirmed prior research by Piele and Hall (1973a) that 
showed that a higher voter turnout is associated with lower bond passage rates. 
Bowers and Chen (2015) followed up on previous research regarding factors that 
impact bond passage, by investigating the effective of bond wording (content of the 
bond) on bond passage. Using automated text mining, a new data mining technique, they 
looked at 1,210 bond election ballot proposals over a 16-year period from 1998 to 2014 
and identified “nine different latent topics across the bonds, including requests to 
purchase new buildings, renovations, and athletics facilities, and then analyzed the 
“independent effect of bond topics on the probability of passing the bond and voter 
turnout. Their findings showed how bonds for athletic facilities only “were 4.35 times 
less likely to pass than bonds that request new construction or omnibus ballot proposals” 
(p. 164).  They argued their research showed “that capital facility bond proposals that 
pass the most often include all facility needs in a single ballot proposal, are the first 
attempt at the polls, are at the top of the ballot, and request lower amounts of spending” 
(p. 164). 
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Comparisons between studies can be made using Bower and Lee’s (2013) 
categorization of factors impacting the likelihood of school bond election outcomes, 
including: (a) bond characteristics: including, number of float, and bond amount; (b) 
bond wording: renovations, debt refinance, athletics, technology, art, other; (c) district 
characteristics, meaning district locale (using NCES CCD codes city, suburb, town, and 
rural), district enrollment, and change in district enrollment (growth); (d) community 
characteristics: population over 65, population with a college degree, percent free lunch 
of students, and ethnicity of students: Native American, Asian, African American, and 
Hispanic; (e) election characteristics included: tax rate, percentage of the residential 
assessed value, election date and time of year, location of the bond on the ballot on 
election day.  The factors that quantitative researchers indicated were correlated with 
school bond referendum election results included the following: bond characteristics, 
bond wording, district characteristics, community characteristics, and election 
characteristics. 
Bond characteristics. These were bond amount, float attempt, and long-term 
debt. First, for bond amount, numerous studies consistently found that the bond amount 
or size of the bond is negatively related to school bond referendum election success; that 
is, the larger the bond, the less the likelihood of success (Bowers & Chen, 2015; Bowers 
& Lee, 2013; Bowers, Metzger, & Militello, 2010a, 2010b; Theobold & Meier, 2002). 
Second, for float attempt, passing a school bond on the first “float” or attempt was 
positively associated with bond passage; second or third attempts were not as effective. 
Several studies found a negative correlation for second and third bond attempts (Bowers 
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& Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010a, 2010b). Third, long-term debt 
by districts produced mixed results (Bowers, 2010b; Theobold & Meier, 2002). 
Bond wording (bond content). The content of the bond wording includes 
renovations, athletics, and arts/technology categories.  In two studies, researchers 
determined that renovations were positively related to school bond referendum election 
success; that is, school bond referenda for renovations had a greater likelihood of passage 
(Bowers & Lee, 2013; Zimmer et al., 2011). Second, athletics was negatively correlated 
with school bond referendum election passage (Bowers & Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 
2013). Bowers and Chen (2015) found “bonds that focused exclusively on athletic 
facilities were 4.35 times less likely to pass than bonds that request new construction or 
omnibus ballot proposals” (p. 164). Finally, arts or technology showed no correlation 
with school bond referenda including affecting the likelihood of school bond passage. 
(Bowers & Chen, 2015; Bowers et al., 2010b). 
District characteristics. These characteristics include size of town, enrollment, 
and growth. First, research on the impact of the size of the town on the likelihood of 
school bond referendum election passage was mixed, but several studies found that small 
towns and rural towns had a negative correlation with bond passage. Bowers et al. 
(2010a) found that “rural districts have worse chances of passing bond elections than 
urban and suburban districts and that small-town districts have the worst chances of all” 
(p. 398). Second, researchers produced mixed results on the impact of the size of 
enrollment on the correlation with the likelihood of school bond election passage results. 
One study found a positive correlation (Bowers et al., 2010a), another study found a 
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negative correlation (Theobold & Meier, 2002), and several studies found no correlation 
(Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010b). Third, the one study that looked at district 
growth found a positive correlation between district growth and likelihood of school bond 
referendum election passage (Bowers & Leek, 2013). 
Community characteristics. The community characteristics included senior 
citizens, community demographics, and low-socioeconomic composition of the district. 
First, recent quantitative research findings confirmed prior research that senior citizen 
voting had a negative correlation with school bond referendum success (Bowers & Chen, 
2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013; Hickey, 2008). Second, mixed results for correlations 
between ethnic/racial groups in the community and the district have been found. Bowers 
and Lee (2013) and Hickey (2008) found a positive correlation between number of 
Hispanics in the district and likelihood of school bond referendum passage. Other studies 
produced mixed results (Bowers & Lee, 2013; Hickey, 2008; Zimmer et al., 2011). Third, 
mixed results have been found regarding the percent of low-socioeconomic students in 
the district and likelihood of school bond passage. Hickey (2008) and Theobold and 
Meier (2002) found a positive correlation; while Bowers et al. (2010b) and Zimmer et al. 
(2011) found a negative correlation; Bowers and Lee (2013) found no correlation. 
Election characteristics. The final group of variables for election characteristics 
include voter turnout, tax rate, position of proposition(s) on the ballot, timing of the 
election, and single versus multiple propositions on the ballot. First, recent quantitative 
studies on voter turnout confirmed earlier research in which increased voter turnout was 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of school bond referendum passage (Bowers & 
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Chen, 2015; Bowers et al., 2010b; Gong & Rogers, 2014). Second, in the one study of 
impact of the local tax rate, the local tax rate was “not significantly related to the 
likelihood of bond passage” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 757). Third, in several studies, the 
positions of the propositions on the ballot were significant, because the lower the 
proposition(s) were on the ballot, the less likely they were to pass (Bowers & Chen, 
2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers et al., 2010b). Fourth, results for the timing of the 
school bond election were mixed.  
Bowers et al. (2010b) and Bowers and Chen (2015) indicated that the timing was 
significant because bond elections held later in the year were more likely to pass in their 
studies, but Bowers and Lee (2013) found no effect from timing of the election within the 
calendar year. Finally, Bowers and Chen noted that Bowers and Lee had “proposed a 
theory of voter fatigue in which community voters are more willing to vote for a single 
omnibus ballot measure that includes all requests when it’s at the top of the ballot” (p. 
171). Even though no studies of single versus multiple propositions were conducted by 
this group of researchers, Bowers and Lee postulated that the single bond proposition 
would be preferred by voters over the multiple propositions bond based on the factors of 
bond placement and bond wording. 
The Bowers and Lee (2013) Mediated Model of Facility Bond Passage 
Research by Bowers and Lee in 2013 is the largest and most sophisticated recent 
quantitative study analyzing factors impacting the likelihood of school bond passage. The 
Bowers and Lee (2013) study analyzed all public school capital facility bonds (n = 2,224) 
in Texas between 1997 and 2009. Based on the findings of this and previous quantitative 
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studies identifying factors correlated with the likelihood of school bond passage, Bowers 
and Lee (2013) created what they labeled at the mediated model of school bond passage 
and explained that their study: 
Factors replicate and extend the findings from the past literature across state 
contexts using a direct effects model, focusing here on Texas using the longest 
time span to date, 1997-2009. We then move to reexamining the theory from Piele 
and Hall (1973), informing the model using our findings and the findings across 
the studies to date in which we postulate a mediated model of school bond 
passage. (p. 742) 
In the 2013 study, Bowers and Lee addressed several significant limitations they 
had identified that existed in the most recent prior empirical research on bond passage. 
First, because most of the recent facility bond studies had been almost exclusively 
focused in Michigan, there had been a “lack of evidence demonstrating which factors 
associated with bond passage generalize across state contexts and multiple years of data” 
(p. 742). The second issue they had identified was a lack of a generalizable theory 
developed from previous empirical findings. They concluded that “there is a need in the 
literature to study these models and effects in other state contexts” (p. 740), in order to 
generalize results and create a coherent theory for the field. 
Out of this new research on factors, Bowers and Lee (2013) produced a new 
“mediated model of bond passage” based upon the last two decades of research as seen in 
Figure 3.  This new model unified prior work on voter preferences, district and 
community characteristics, bond characteristics, and election characteristics, and 
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explained between 33.2% and 44.3% of the variance in the likelihood of passing a school 
bond election.  The variance accounted for was the “largest reported variance explained 
to date” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 751). However, while this range is extremely high for a 
study involving human variables, the variance not accounted for of 56% includes 
variables heretofore unidentified as affecting bond election outcomes. 
 
Figure 3. Bowers and Lee (2013) alternative mediated model of school bond passage (p. 
751). 
Bowers and Lee (2013) based their quantitative analysis on prior theory, 
literature, and the availability of data for relevant variables, with the dependent variable 
being school bond passage or failure. The independent variables were “separated into five 
categories that represent the main themes from the literature” as follows: (a) bond 
characteristics: including, number of float, and bond amount; (b) bond wording: 
renovations, debt refinance, athletics, technology, art, other; (c) district characteristics, 
meaning district locale (using NCES CCD codes city, suburb, town, and rural), district 
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enrollment, and change in district enrollment (growth); (d) community characteristics: 
population over 65, population with a college degree, percent free lunch of students, and 
ethnicity of students: Native American, Asian, African American, and Hispanic; (e) 
election characteristics included: tax rate, percentage of the residential assessed value, 
election date and time of year, location of the bond on the ballot on election day.  
 Bowers and Lee (2013) found first that Texas bond passage rate is high, at 77%. 
Similar to prior research results, first floats had the highest likelihood of passing. In 
addition, school bonds requesting renovations or refinancing of debt were more likely to 
pass than other types of bonds, confirming Zimmer et al.’s (2011) work. In addition, bond 
requests for athletics (such as stadiums and fields) or art (such as performance halls or 
auditoriums) seemed to pass much less often. District locale did not appear to be 
significant, as it was in the Michigan studies. District enrollment, percentage of 
population of with a college degree, or percent students with free lunch, also were not 
significant, which differs from prior findings. However, average percentage annual 
change rate of the school district was positive and significant. Percentage of population 
age 65 or over had a strong negative correlation, more so than other variables in the 
model (Bowers & Lee, 2013). In addition, the “percent of students from different ethnic 
groups was tested in the model as a proxy for community demographics, and [the results] 
indicated percentage of Asian and Hispanic student had a significant and positive 
relationship with passing a school bond” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 9). The Hispanic 
results concur with the results found by Hickey (2008). For election characteristics, 
proposition number was significant and strongly negative. “Each successive lower 
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placement down the ballot experienced increase negative odds of passage, with bonds 
that were in position four or lower being 5.71 times less likely to pass than bonds in the 
reference group” (Bowers & Lee, 2013, p. 75). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology & Procedures 
The purpose of this qualitative single-case study was to investigate and analyze 
the perceptions of a representative group of district and community stakeholders 
regarding variables that contributed to the failure or successful passage of school bond 
referenda. Using qualitative methods, this study was conducted to update, enhance, 
elaborate, and clarify previous bond passage models developed by recent quantitative and 
qualitative studies, and to illuminate issues and factors influencing school bond passage. 
This in-depth qualitative case study of a representative school district that experienced 
success after a prior bond election failure was used to develop a greater understanding of 
the variables associated with overcoming negative sentiment. This study examined the 
participants’ views to establish what the variables were that affected the outcome of bond 
elections that “statistical analysis alone cannot capture” (Bowers et al., 2010, p. 417). 
Research Questions 
1. What variables contributed to the failure of a school bond election? 
2. What variables contributed to the success of a school bond election? 
3. What relationships existed among these variables with regard to selected 
characteristics of the school district? 
Research Design 
The overarching research paradigm is a qualitative single case study.  Patton 
(2002) indicated that qualitative methods are appropriate in the following three situations: 
(a) the researcher focuses on the process or implementation of a program; (b) the purpose 
of the study is to understand the nature of the problem being addressed and how actions 
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led to desired or undesired outcomes; and (c) the researcher seeks to add depth to 
quantitative work. Case-oriented research “looks at the complexity of a phenomenon 
within its context” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 265). Case studies within the 
qualitative tradition “allows the researcher to study individual(s), events, activities, or 
processes of a bounded system,” in this case the school bond election process. “The 
emphasis in the case study is on examining a phenomenon as it exists in its natural 
context” (Hays & Singh, 2012, p. 44).  
Qualitative methods involve techniques “associated with the gathering, analysis, 
interpretation, and presentation of narrative information” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 
6). Qualitative methods such as interviews and document reviews are predominant in this 
paradigm (Mertens, 2010). The researcher utilized documents related to school bond 
passage.  These included, but were not limited to, district strategic planning documents 
related to school facilities planning; school district bond referendum information 
documents; professional documents from school facilities professional consulting firms; 
newspaper articles on the school bond election; internal and external communication 
documents related to the school bond election; meeting minutes or notes from school 
bond advisory group meetings; documents from a school bond consultant; board meeting 
minutes regarding the school bond election topic; and any relevant school bond referenda 
documents. 
This qualitative study investigated the perceptions of a representative group of 
key stakeholders, including the superintendent, selected school board member(s), key 
district personnel, such as the chief financial officer and the chief communications 
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officer, parents, and community members through semi-structured interviews. Hogue 
(2012) pointed out that interviews enable the ability to attain a deeper understanding of 
the variables of study.  In addition, Merriam (1998) indicated that interviews are 
important for gaining data that cannot be gathered with observations or artifact review.  
Berger, Cunningham, and Drumwright (2004) explained the purpose of the semi-
structured interview is the following: 
Interviewing is a particularly useful tool when one wants to understand the 
meaning of events and actions to the actors.  It stresses the informant’s definition 
of the situation, encourages the informant to structure the account of the situation, 
and allows the informant to reveal his or her notions of what is relevant. (p. 60) 
Site and Participant Selection 
The participants from the study were selected using the criteria and methods 
below and interview sites were selected accordingly.  
Site Selection 
One public school district/community in Texas served as the site for the study. 
The initial population of sites for this study were all Texas school districts that held a 
bond election from November 2013 to May 2017 based on bond election information 
from the Texas Comptroller’s Office. An analysis of the bond data between May 2013 
and May 2017 showed 444 districts held local bond elections during this time period. 
Further analysis produced to a subset of 35 districts with failed bond elections followed 
by a successful school bond referendum (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2017). 
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A case study district was chosen using purposive sampling from the subset of 35 
school districts that had failed bond elections followed by a successful school bond 
referendum. Purposive sampling is “typically designed to pick a small number of cases 
that will yield the most information about a particular phenomenon” (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009, p. 178). Criteria for the purposive sampling included: 1) District which 
failed and then subsequently passed a bond; 2) District in Texas; 3) District with 
superintendent consistency between the failed and successful bond; 4) District that was 
Meets Standard according to state accountability criteria. The third and fourth criteria 
eliminated several additional districts who either were not Meets Standard through state 
accountability system or whose superintendent had changed after the initial school bond 
election failure. 
A single case study was chosen to increase the depth of investigation in the target 
district. Research generated a significant amount of data from school bond referenda 
documents and as well as rich interview data from a representative group of stakeholders 
in the target district and community. The goal of this single case study was to increase the 
strength of the study by generating a wealth of detail from an intensive sample and to 
create an information-rich documentation of a single case study. Embedded case. As data 
was collected and analyzed it became apparent that this was an embedded case study: 
with the 2013 school bond data and 2015 school bonds acting as separate but connected 
“embedded units of analysis.” This resulted in data collection and analysis for both 
“embedded units of analysis” (two school bond elections) (Yin, R. K., 2012, p. 8). An 
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expert in the field (former superintendent) helped identify and secure a final school district 
that met the research study criteria and that was willing to participate in the study. 
Interviews were held where it was most convenient for participating stakeholders.  
For superintendents, school district administrators, and board members, the interviews 
were held at the school district central office location. Parents and community members 
were interviewed either at the school district central office location or at a convenient, 
private location. Interviews were scheduled according to the convenience of participants.  
The researcher was provided extensive access to internal and external key documents for 
both school bond referenda process, both online and in digital format. 
Sampling and Participants 
Participants in key district positions were selected by purposive sampling based 
on their positions. The superintendent, chief financial officer, and chief communications 
officer were central office staff interviewed. The chief facilities officer was not in the 
district at the time of either school bond election and was not interviewed. The current 
school board member was based on recommendation by the superintendent. One parent 
and one community member were interviewed based upon the recommendation of the 
superintendent. Additional parents, community members, and former school board 
president were selected through snowball sampling. Snowball sampling refers to the 
researcher choosing a participant and then asking that participant for additional 
participants who meet the criteria of the study (Hays & Singh, 2012). Snowball sampling 
provides quick access to participants. The total number of study interview participants 
was 11.  
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Using the selection method just described, personal interview data was gathered 
from the named respondents in the selected school district. As the purpose of this study is 
to gain information about critical factors in bond referenda success or failure, named 
respondents to interviews were deliberately chosen based on their likelihood to have 
substantial knowledge about the phenomenon in question. The selected actual 
respondents were: the school district superintendent, chief financial officer, chief 
communications officer, current school board member, former school board member, 
parents, and community members. The superintendent of the selected district was 
contacted to request participation in the study. The superintendent secured participation 
in the study from five additional representative stakeholders: chief financial officer, chief 
communications officer, school board member, parent, and community member. The 
superintendent indicated the district executive director of facilities was a new hire and 
had not experienced either the 2013 or 2015 school bond elections, so was not 
interviewed. Five additional interview participants were secured through a snowball 
sampling process. It was requested that each of these individuals was knowledgeable 
about the impact of various election strategies on the result of the election in their 
respective communities. Each person who agreed to participate received a letter 
describing the purpose of the study and the assurance of complete confidentiality (the 
cover letters and requisite forms relating to approval to conduct research involving 
human subjects are included in Appendices B, C, D, and E). All interview participants 
signed the Waiver to Consent in Appendix E for the study. 
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Sources of Data 
Four sources of data were triangulated for analysis: semi-structured interviews, 
archival documents, field notes, and reflective journals were triangulated to ensure 
accuracy of findings. 
Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews, document review, and reflective memo-ing provided 
data sources for the research.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 
superintendent, current and former school board members, chief financial officer, chief 
communication officer, parents, and community members.  The “role as the researcher 
[is] to develop quality questions and guide the interview in a way that would lead to 
valuable information” (Hogue, 2012, p. 73). 
Documents 
Documents were collected and reviewed, such as: district strategic planning 
documents related to school facilities planning; school district bond referendum 
information documents; professional documents from school facilities professional 
consulting firms; newspaper articles on the school bond election; internal and external 
communication documents related to the school bond election; meeting minutes or notes 
from school bond advisory group meetings; documents from a school bond consultant; 
and any relevant school bond referenda documents. The list of document reviewed for the 
data analysis appears in Appendix G. 
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Field Notes 
As Bogden and Biklen (2003) recommended, the researcher kept reflective field 
notes of observations during interviews to capture “assumptions, impressions, attitudes, 
and ideas (as cited in, Mertens, 2010, p. 228).  Field notes help the researcher “keep track 
of any follow up questions as well as describing . . . preliminary impressions” (Hogue, 
2012, p. 9).  Stance, intended audience, and point of view were included (Hays & Singh, 
2012, p. 229). 
Reflective Journaling 
The researcher’s reflective journals served as an additional data source. Reflective 
journaling assisted the researcher in pre-planning for the interviews, reflecting on the 
content of the interviews, and anticipating possible options to “make decisions on where 
to continue to lead the interview” (Hogue, 2012, p. 73). As Bogden and Biklen (2003) 
recommended, the researcher engaged in reflective journaling during interviews to 
capture “assumptions, impressions, attitudes, and ideas (as cited in, Mertens, 2010, p. 
228).  Reflective journaling helped the researcher “keep track of any follow up questions” 
and to explain all “preliminary impressions” (Hogue, 2012, p. 9), such as stance, intended 
audience, and point of view (Hays & Singh, 2012). 
Methods of Data Collection 
Data collection for this single-case study included 11 semi-structured interviews 
(one in-depth interview with each of the participants, with member checks including a 
review of transcripts), documents related to the study, and reflective memoing.  
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Institutional Approval 
To ensure that appropriate steps have been taken to protect the rights, privacy, and 
welfare of participants, the researcher completed the steps to obtain approval from the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Texas at Austin.  Appendix B 
contains the approval letter.  The researcher contacted the selected district and completed 
any required application processes to conduct external research. 
Interviews 
After receiving IRB approval to conduct research by the University and 
participating district, the researcher requested interviews from the participating 
stakeholders, based on purposive sampling for the superintendent, chief financial officer, 
and chief communications officer; intentional sampling for the school board member, 
parent, and community member (recommendation by the superintendent); and snowball 
sampling for additional parent and community member participants. As previously stated, 
the researcher met with study participants at a time and location of their preference, either 
at the district central office, or other convenient location.  All interviews were digitally- 
recorded and transcribed in full.  A professional transcription service was utilized to 
expedite transcript production and to create consistency in transcription techniques.  This 
afforded the researcher an opportunity to deeply interact with the participant responses. 
All participants signed the waiver to consent form prior to conducting the 
interview. During the interviews, participants were asked a set of standard questions as 
well as questions uniquely related to their role in the election process. The semi-
structured nature of the interview process allowed for the inclusion of clarifying 
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questions and follow-up questions based on the real-time process of the interview. The 
questions (seen in Appendix F) were designed to prompt in-depth responses about factors 
critical to the failure of one bond and the success of a second bond, as well as to garner 
useful advice for other districts preparing for a bond election. Interviews were used to 
discover new data, further develop existing data, and assist in organizing all data sources 
to construct a ‘story’ describing bond election experiences.  Hesse-Biber and Leavy’s 
(2006) step-by-step process for qualitative data was used for data analysis.  This includes 
preparing the data for analysis, data exploration, and data reduction or coding.  The 
qualitative data analysis approach was “recursive . . . findings are generated and 
systematically built as successive pieces of data are gathered” (Mertens, 2010, p. 424).  
Coding 
 Interview transcripts were coded using categories from the theoretical frameworks 
and categories that emerge through the interview and data analysis process.  Charmaz 
(2007) provided a coding strategy that utilizes an initial coding phase where the 
researcher coded “individual words, lines, segments, and incidents” (as cited in Mertens, 
2010, p. 426).  Corbin and Strauss also called this “open coding” (as cited in Mertens, 
2010, p. 426.  The researcher then used “focused coding” to test the initial codes against 
the more extensive body of data to determine how resilient the codes are in the bigger 
picture that emerges from the analysis” (Mertens, 2010, p. 426).  A priori codes were 
determined ahead of time due to what the literature claims to be characteristics of 
successful school bond elections (Austin, 2003; Bennett & Thompson, 2011). The a 
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priori codes from the literature review were used as a framework from which to compare 
emerging codes. 
         Identifying information from participant responses was assigned codes to ensure 
that respondents’ privacy was ensured.  The researcher organized all notes and files of 
data to ensure ease of data analysis and ensure accurate reporting of results.  Data 
obtained from the study were stored in a locked file.  All participant data and coding 
information were stored in separate locked files to safeguard the data privacy and 
confidentiality. 
Strategies to Promote Trustworthiness 
This study used the member checking, peer debriefing, field notes and reflective 
journaling, and thick, rich descriptions to promote trustworthiness of research findings. 
Member Checking 
Member checking is the cyclical discourse with participants to verify that the data 
analysis accurately represents their intended meanings.  Guba and Lincoln (1989) 
described this strategy as an important tool in establishing trustworthiness. The researcher 
sent transcripts to all stakeholders interviewed to provide interviewees that opportunity to 
check the transcripts for accuracy and completeness. Member checking gave the 
participants the opportunity to respond to the information gathered and ensured that their 
input was portrayed correctly (Abowitz, 2000).   
Field Notes and Reflective Journaling 
This researcher wrote field notes and entries into a reflective journal as another 
form of data collection to ensure trustworthiness.  It was essential for the researcher to 
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keep adequate notes and reflections throughout the research process. The reflective 
component of theoretical journaling involved the recording of “feelings, reactions, 
hunches, initial interpretations, speculations, and working hypotheses” (Merriam, 2009). 
Hays and Singh (2012) wrote: “Given that the role of the researcher is an integral part of 
the qualitative inquiry, keeping adequate notes and reflections throughout the research 
process is imperative” (p. 205).  Reflective journaling was used to improve the “active 
self-reflection” of the researcher in the research process to improve the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the qualitative research, and include “reactions to participants and 
settings involved in the research, thoughts about data collection and analysis procedures” 
as well as “hunches about potential findings, and descriptions of how data method, 
source, and analysis plans may need to change” (Hays & Singh, 2012, p. 205).  Field 
notes and reflective journal notes were kept electronically and on paper. These notes also 
were used as reminders as to why specific questions were asked and why themes were 
coded in a specific way (Hays & Singh, 2012).  
Peer Debriefing 
Peer debriefing was used to calibrate findings with a third party. Peer debriefing 
allowed for a cross-check of findings with other researchers.  The researcher engaged “in 
an extended discussion with a peer of findings, conclusions, analysis, and hypothesis” 
(Mertens, 2010, p. 257).  Peer debriefing allowed for posing probing questions and 
enabled the researcher to confront her “own values and to guide the next steps in the 
study” (Mertens, 2010, p. 257).  Peer debriefing established a method for obtaining 
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ongoing, peer feedback in addition to the self-reflection in reflective journaling. Peer 
debriefing was used to ensure the researcher’s conclusions were validated. 
Thick, Rich Descriptions 
The researcher used thick, rich descriptions to support trustworthiness and 
transferability.  “Thick description is a detailed account of your research process and 
outcome” that “goes beyond the basics of facts, feelings, observations, and occurrences, 
to include inferences into the meaning of present data” (Hays & Singh, 2012, pp. 212-
213).  The researcher captured numerous, salient details of the case under study to allow 
readers to determine whether or not the research findings might be applicable in their 
situations.  Denzin’s (1989) four elements of thick description were utilized in this study: 
“(1) it gives the context of an act; (2) it states the intentions and meanings that organize 
the action; (3) it traces the evolution and development of the act; [and] [sic] (4) it presents 
the action as a text that can then be interpreted” (as cited in Hays & Singh, 2012, p. 213). 
Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the research design, procedures for data 
collection, the process for data analysis, strategies employed to promote trustworthiness 
of the study, and the need for a qualitative research study. Chapter 5 concludes the study 
with a discussion and recommendations. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Findings 
The purpose of this qualitative single-case study was to investigate and analyze 
the perceptions of a representative group of district and community stakeholders 
regarding variables that contributed to the failure or successful passage of school bond 
referenda. Using qualitative methods, this study was conducted to update, enhance, 
elaborate, and clarify previous bond passage models developed by recent quantitative and 
qualitative studies, and to illuminate issues and factors influencing school bond passage. 
An in-depth qualitative case study of a representative school district that experienced 
success after a prior bond election failure had the potential to allow researchers to 
develop a greater understanding of the variables associated with overcoming negative 
sentiment. This study examined the participants’ views to establish what the variables 
were that affected the outcome of bond elections that “statistical analysis alone cannot 
capture” (Bowers et al., 2010, p. 417). The overarching research paradigm was a 
qualitative single-case study in which artifacts and interviews were the primary data 
analyzed. The research questions were the following: 
1. What variables contributed to the failure of a school bond election? 
2. What variables contributed to the success of a school bond election? 
3. What relationships existed among these variables with regard to selected 
characteristics of the school district? 
Chapter 4 presents the findings about the variables that impacted the failure of a 
school bond election in Town-Fringe in 2013, as well as the variables that contributed to 
the success of a school bond election in Town-Fringe in 2015. Findings are based upon 
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document review as well as interview data from the superintendent, central office 
administrators, former and current school board members, parents, and community 
members. 
Description of the Participants 
In total for both the 2013 and 2015 bond elections, 11 stakeholders were 
interviewed. The superintendent was the first participant to be interviewed. This 
participant provided the bulk of artifacts used in the analysis, as well as additional 
artifacts found online. Table 1 provides the description of the sample. Multiple 
participants (6 of 11) were parents and explicitly indicated that they had at some point in 
the past or present had children who were students in the school district. 
2013 School Bond Election 
In 2013, Town-Fringe2, Texas was gaining population and had begun to 
experience the opportunities and challenges of growth that many towns in Texas faced 
during the late 1990s and 2000s. Town-Fringe was located 10 miles outside of the city 
limits of and about 25 miles from the nearest urban metropolitan area. Town-Fringe was 
once a small town, had enjoyed a strong local history, and had long served as an 
independent presence and hub of activity for its surrounding smaller rural communities. 
                                                          
2 The National Center for Education Statistics (n.d.) defined its locale codes based on a school district’s 
location ranging from City, Large to Rural, Remote. The Town-Fringe classification referred to a “territory 
inside an urban cluster that is less than or equal to 10 miles from an urbanized area” (NCES, n.d., p. 1). By 
2017, the NCES classified the case study locale as Town-Fringe. Consequently, the pseudonym of Town-
Fringe was chosen. 
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Much like the rest of Texas, Town-Fringe experienced double-digit population growth 
over the past 20 years, growing from classification as a small town to a large town.3  
Between 2000 and 2008, the community grew from 20,793 residents in 2000 to 
26,686 residents in 2008, a 40.5% growth rate. The community only continued to grow 
over the succeeding decade, with the population rising to 27,403 residents in 2013, 
29,043 residents in 2015, and 29,969 in 2016 (the latest statistics available). Census 
projections showed a 3.5% increase in population per year between 2010 and 2035, with 
projected population at 31,726 in 2025 and 37,865 in 2035.  
Population growth over the past 5 years outpaced projected increases, with the 
community reaching the projected 2020 population of 29,646 residents in 2016, 4 years 
earlier than expected.4 Double-digit population growth was projected in the succeeding 
25 years in Town-Fringe’s county as well as in the 10 surrounding counties. The county 
in which Town-Fringe was located projected a 66% household population change 
between 2010 and 2035, with surrounding counties projected to have population growth 
ranging from a minimum of 32% to a high of 120%.5 The population in Town-Fringe was 
89% White, 13% Hispanic, 4% Other, 2% Black, 2% Two or More, < 1% Asian, and < 
1% American Indian.  The median age in Town-Fringe was 35 years old. 
 
                                                          
3 Prior to 2006, Town-Fringe would have been considered a Small Town according to the NCES’s (n.d.) 
locale designations, but by 2013, Town-Fringe was considered a Large Town by pre-2006 NCES locale 
designations. 
4 Data found in 2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #2 Presentation showed the population growth 
projections and current district website showed Town-Fringe’s current population. 
5 Data found in 2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #2 Presentation. 
 Table 1  
Characteristics of the Sample in Relation to the 2013 and 2015 Bond Elections 
Interviewee(s) Role in Bond(s) Length of Time in Community Location of Previous 
Residence 
Relationship to District, If any 
Superintendent Superintendent 7 years (2 years before 2013 
elections) 
Central Texas Superintendent 
Administrator 1 
(A1) 
Chief Financial Officer Not available Not available Central Office Staff 
Administrator 2 
(A2) 
Communications Officer Not available Not available Central Office Staff 
School Board 
Member (SBM) 
2013 School Board Candidate; 
2015 School Board Member; 
Parent; Voter 
Not available Northeast US School Board Member; Wife was a teacher; 
Children in district 
Former School 
Board President 
(FSBP) 
1999 Bond Committee; 2013 
Board President; 2015 
Community Member; Voter 
18 years (13 years before 2013 
election) 
Not available Former School Board Member; No children in 
district; Small business in the community 
Community 
Member (CM) 
1999 Bond Treasurer; 2013 
Committee Member; 2015 
FACTS Committee∙Co-chair; 
2015 Bond Treasurer; Voter 
50+ years Not available Wife is former teacher; Daughter teachers in 
district; Grandchildren attend school in district 
P1 (P1) 2015 FACTS Committee 
Member; 2015 Political Action 
Committee (PAC) member; 
Parent; Voter 
12 years (7 years before 2013 bond 
election 
Nearby metropolitan 
area 
Wife taught in district’s Middle School #2; 
Daughter graduated from high school; Two 
sons currently attending schools in district 
P2 (P2) Parent; Voter Approximately 25 years Nearby small town Children attended district schools for 3 years, 
but currently in same district for which parent 
works; Worked for a nearby school district 
P3 (P3) Parent; Voter 2 years (1 year after 2015 bond 
election) 
Maine (rural area) Parent of current Grade 6 student in newly 
renovated Middle School #1 
P4 (P4, also 
married to P5) 
PTA President (P4); School 
volunteer; Parent; Voter 
15 years (10 years before 2013 
bond election) 
Family lived in town since 1800s 
Parents owned local business for 
15 years 
Suburb on another side 
of nearby metropolitan 
area 
Daughter attended & graduated high school in 
district schools; Son attended schools through 
middle school as of interview attended school 
in a different district 
P5 (P5, also 
Married to P4) 
School volunteer; District 
Health Advisory Committee; 
Parent; Voter 
15 years (10 years before 2013 
bond election) 
Suburb on another side 
of nearby metropolitan 
area 
See P4 
9
6
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Along with the community, the school district experienced significant growth 
over the past 20 years as families the community had children or new families with 
school-aged children moved into the community. P5 reported moving “back out there so 
our kids could go to school there. I mean, we moved out there specifically for the school. 
That was the purpose of moving there.”  P3 had recently moved to the community and 
indicated that the school district was the primary reason for moving to the community. 
Demographic projections showed increases in school-aged children living in the 
Town-Fringe Independent School District (TFISD) between the 1999-2000 and the 2013-
2014 school year. TFISD had 6,774 students in the 1999-2000 school year with 420 
teachers. By the 2013-2014 school year, TFISD had 7,710 students and 504 teachers 
(TEA TAPR Report, 2013-2014). Between 1999-2000 and 2013-2014, the district had 
added almost 1,000 students, a 14% increase.  During this time, the demographic makeup 
of the students in the district changed. The district began serving increasing numbers of 
economically-disadvantaged, minority, and English Learning students.  
In 1999-2000, 85.2% of students were White; 12.1% were Hispanic; 1.7% were 
African American; and < 1% were Asian/Pacific Islander or Native American. Among 
other categories, 31.6% of students were economically disadvantaged. During that same 
school year, 4.3% of students were English Learners, and 12.4% of students were 
enrolled in special education. By the 2013-2014 school year, 71.2% of students were 
White, 23.1% were Hispanic, 2.3% were African American, and 2.8% were Asian/Pacific 
Islander or Native American. Nearly 45% of students were economically disadvantaged, 
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and the percent of students considered at-risk was 46.1%.6 The percent of English 
Learners doubled to 8.1% by the 2013-2014 school year. In that school year, 8.6% of 
students were identified for special education eligibility. 
Pressure on Elementary School Facilities 
Aging facilities, as well as growth in the school-aged population put pressure on 
school facilities, especially at the elementary grade levels. The growth of student 
population and the pressure it put on school facilities was mentioned by the 
superintendent, district central office staff, school board members, parents, and 
community members during interviews. The superintendent, while talking about the 
reasons for pursuing a school bond election in 2013 said the following:  
One, it was population. TFISD is fairly close proximity to [major urban area], and 
we’re experiencing growth, and continue to experience growth. So, capacity of 
our school buildings was being stretched. . . . We have seven elementary 
campuses in our district, and all of them were experiencing pressures from 
growth. So, how can you relieve that pressure across the district and address some 
aging facilities and infrastructure that’s out there at the same time?  
Information from school bond election documents corroborated the pressure on school 
facilities discussed by the participants. The original district presentation slide about 
overcrowding in the district as used by the Citizen’s Advisory Committee in its 
presentation for the 2013 bond included is Figure 4. 
                                                          
6 Note that the 1999-2000 percentage of students classified as at-risk was not available. 
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Figure 4. 2013 Bond election presentation bar chart indicating each school’s and all 
schools combined capacity levels. 
2013 Decision to Pursue a School Bond Election 
This growth in the district student population and pressure on school facilities led 
to the pursuit of a school bond referendum election by the TFISD school board in 2013. 
Participant FSBP discussed the need for more school facilities to accommodate the 
growth in student population as the reason the school board pursued a school bond 
election in 2013 as follows: 
[Central administration] came to the board and said, “Look, we’re probably look 
at overcrowding in the elementary schools. We’re either going to have to do 
portable buildings or we’re going to have to look at a bond.” . . . We [the school 
board] started a workshop and information gathering type of meetings that we 
needed to have in order to determine what would work. . . . It was time. I mean, 
we’d outgrown our facilities and what our long-range plan looked like was that 
we were going to keep growing . . . And so, it was time to have another bond. 
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CM echoed the concerns about this growth in the school-aged population as the 
main factor in pursuing a school bond election in 2013 as follows:  
Space. I think that’s always the thing, here. You’re running out of space and 
you’re trying to figure out how you're going to accommodate the community 
when the community is growing. You can’t keep the community from growing 
and this community is growing. When I first come here . . . 46 years ago, we had 
6[000], 7[000], 8,000 people in the town area. As far as in the district, I don’t 
remember what that was. Now we’re probably at about 40,000 inside TFISD. You 
can’t keep going without building buildings and redoing buildings. That’s the 
main thing. 
2013 School Bond Election Bond Proposal 
Review of the 2013 Bond Presentation Documents revealed four published bond 
priorities that included Safety and Security, Capacity, Technology, and Capital 
Improvements. P2 characterized the 2013 bond proposal as supporting safety and 
security, as well as technology and athletics, which matched closely with the campaign 
materials. P2 said the following:   
They were updating facilities to try to modernize the schools that they had. They 
had a heavy emphasis on security, a really heavy emphasis on security. . . . There 
was a big technology component built into it that they were trying to keep up with 
as well. Then, there was a mention of athletics facilities. 
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The 2013 school bond presentation documents included a graphic of the bond priorities. 
Figure 5 displays the graphic used in the 2013 bond presentations. Additionally, those 
priorities were packaged to the TFISD voters as seen in Table 2. 
 
Figure 5. 2013 school bond presentation pie chart indicating categories for bond funding. 
2013 School Bond Election Failure as a Shock 
Based on this need, the school board and central administration went out to the 
community with a school bond referendum election in May of 2013. The election results 
were a resounding defeat, with “yes” votes at 31.06% and “no” votes at 68.94% (Election 
Results May 11 2013). P1, a parent supportive of the bond efforts, referred to the results 
as a “stinging defeat.” A2 discussed as follows: 
In the 2013 election, I knew that we weren’t going to pass it. I knew we weren’t, 
because I could see the demeanor of people walking in to vote, and they were real 
obvious. Some of them were flat out rude to us. It was just miserable that day. But 
when I saw the earlier voting returns, and I think the early voting even was about 
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75/25. . . . It didn’t matter how many people showed up to vote that day, because 
I’d watched their demeanor, and I knew we weren’t going to win. 
Table 2 
2013 Bond Priorities Included in the 2013 Bond Presentation as part of TFISD Bond 
2013 Bond 
Priority 
Items Included in Bond Priority Total Amount Allocated 
Safety & 
Security 
● Constructing secure entries into all campuses 
● Creating a self-contained high school campus 
● Developing keyless entry systems 
● Upgrading classroom door locking systems 
● Placing additional parking lot lighting, including 
additional cameras/surveillance equipment 
● Adding perimeter fencing 
73% x $107,320,000 = 
$78,343,600 
 
(Safety & Security 
Combined with 
Capacity) 
Capacity ● Adding a Career & Technology Center to the high 
school ($13.5 million) 
● Adding a Grade 9 academic wing to the high school 
in order to move ninth graders out of a separate 
Grade 9 Center into the high school ($13.2 million) 
● Reconfiguring all elementary campuses to PK-4 
facilities (extend building capacity out 10+ years) 
● Reconfiguring two existing middle schools to 
become Intermediate Schools (Grades 5-6) and 
redesigning the Grade 9 Center to become a middle 
school (Grades 7-8) to relieve pressure on 
elementary campuses 
● Athletics facilities at the high school ($11.4 million). 
73% of $107,320,000 = 
$78,343,600 
 
(Safety & Security 
Combined with 
Capacity) 
Technology ● “State of the art” technology, e.g., digital interactive 
whiteboards, teacher workstations, wireless Internet 
access, and document camera 
$10.7 million 
(10% of total budget) 
Capital 
Improvements 
● Parking lot lighting 
● Roofing upgrades 
● Energy efficiency upgrades (HVAC replacements 
and lighting/fixture upgrades) 
● Classroom and hallway enhancements 
● Restroom renovations 
● Perimeter fencing 
$18.2 million 
(17% of total budget) 
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 It was a huge shock to the school board and school district administration when 
the school bond referendum did not pass, according to A2. It was also devastating to 
some parents whose children were in school at that time as discussed by P5:  
Yeah, and there is a need for facilities and that’s why it was very . . . It’s kind of 
devastating when that didn’t pass because the school our son and daughter went 
to, the elementary school, was already overcrowded, even when that [the 2013 
school bond] was happening.  
2013 Bond Election Failure Impact on School Board Election 
Debate over the proposed school bond referendum impacted local school board 
elections that year. Anti-bond efforts ignited by school bond election referendum also 
catalyzed new candidates for the local school board election who ran on an anti-bond 
platform. “I think there was deliberate attempt, which I appreciate, to make over the 
board. To include some dissenting voices” [P1]. A1 recalled: 
Our board president lost his seat that year, and we lost at least one of our good 
members that chose not to continue with this, a rerun, and it caused great anguish 
to the board and our superintendent. They took it very personally, and they knew 
they were just trying to do the right thing for kids. 
One candidate running on an anti-bond platform was successful in being elected 
to the school board. SBM reported: 
These two other gentlemen decided to run for two other seats. When it came 
down to it, I had won, and I think to date it's the largest number of voters for a 
school board seat in [Name of County] to date. That has not been surpassed in the 
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last elections I've done. There was a big turnout. The turnout just wasn't the way I 
originally thought it was going to be. There were a lot more folks in the town that 
felt like I did than I realized. It wasn't close. The bond got destroyed. 
Participant FSBP said: 
Yeah. I was President of the Board and because of its [the school bond] failure, I 
also didn't get re-elected to the board. The guy that ran against me was a Tea 
Party kind of guy. Made me out to be a real liberal who you know, just wanted to 
create debt and spend tax payer money. 
The question is: What happened? Why did the school bond referendum not pass 
in the 2013 school bond referendum election? What were the variables that caused failure 
in the school bond referendum election in 2013?  
Variables in 2013 School Bond Failure: Traditional Bond Process 
 Eleven major variables characterized the 2013 school bond failure in TFISD, TX. 
These variables included: (a) the school board and school district used existing processes; 
(b) an assumption of community support and lack of awareness of changes in stakeholder 
perceptions and community context by the school board and school district; (c) a lack of 
expert capacity to support bond election processes; (d) a lack of community needs 
assessment & pre-planning; (e) a lack of overall comprehensive school bond election 
planning process (f) poor leadership recruitment and development; (g) a lack of input and 
involvement from a representative group of stakeholders, especially parents, teachers, 
and the opposition; (h) poor communication and lack of trust; (i) a weak bond proposal, 
including high bond amount, bond content, and single proposition; (j) lack of 
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consideration of structural, human resource, political, and symbolic dimensions of change 
process; and, (k) significant and effective anti-bond efforts. 
The Superintendent and the two central office administrators (A1 and A2) described 
the 2013 bond process as a traditional or old school bond process that included a facilities 
needs assessment, a district Citizens’ Advisory Committee that worked on bond proposal 
development, and marketing efforts, such as presentations, to sell the school bond proposal 
to the community. The Superintendent explained: 
I would say it was very traditional. It’s what schools had always done. And, by 
that, I mean, we identified key stakeholder groups, and we put together a 
PowerPoint presentation that identified the need, and then we went out and tried to 
sell that on our soapbox, and made like 50-something presentations. From anything 
from the Rotary Club to Aunt Judy’s house down the street with the neighbors.  
Whoever we could meet with that would give us the time, we sat down and 
presented to them.  And I did, I literally made presentations in people’s living 
rooms to do that.  Or, in front of a hundred-plus people in a large auditorium.  
School Board and School District Used Existing Processes 
Facilities needs assessment. One part of the planning process was securing an 
architectural firm to do the needs assessment for the district’s facilities. CM knew there 
had been “a [facilities] needs assessment of what the district needed.” The Superintendent 
described this process: 
First, we had had an architectural firm in the district for, at that time, for about 28 
years or so. Same firm. So, we contacted them and engaged them to come in and 
106 
do a facility assessment, work with us. . . . It took a significant time for them to 
look at facilities and assess. And they, having had a pretty deep history with the 
district, they knew our facilities, and in fact, had designed most of the district’s 
facilities at that time. 
Established a bond committee. The district began a bond committee as a part of 
the school bond election planning process. The Superintendent added “as a result of that 
[doing a facilities needs assessment], we created a facilities committee.” The artifact 
review of the TFISD Bond Social Media Informational Plan for 2013 revealed that this 
facilities committee was called the Citizens Advisory Committee and was listed as 
consisting of “local citizens, business leaders, community leaders, parents, and TFISD 
staff members.” FSBP provided additional information about which groups from the 
community were recruited to serve on the facilities committee: 
The main committee, which you might call it the executive committee, we wanted 
to make sure it was people that we had two or three bankers on there. We had a 
pastor on there, we wanted people that could give an honest opinion about if this 
was something that was needed. 
 Marketing and communications. Once the school board had the bond proposal, 
and voted to seek a bond election, the school board and school district administration 
proceeded to communicate the bond proposal plan to the community in legally-
appropriate manners. In addition, pro-bond political action groups and parent-community 
member groups actively promoted the school bond proposal to the community through a 
wide variety of marketing strategies and activities. District administrators, parents, and 
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community members remembered a wide variety of communications strategies and 
activities employed by the district to share factual information about the school bond 
proposal and upcoming school bond referendum election.  
Communications activities. The district used tried-and-true communications 
methods such as presentations, flyers, and the district website to share factual information 
about the school bond proposal and election with the community. District A2 stated that 
there was “a communications plan going into that 2013 bond election. We did have a 
communications plan.” However, A2 characterized the communication plan in 2013 as 
old school and explained as follows: 
I guess we thought we would go the “old school” way. You know, “We know that 
what we’re doing is right.” We’re going to put up all the information on our 
website. We’re going to create a presentation. We’re going to take it to every 
place in the community we can possibly think of, and we did.  
Presentations were reported by multiple respondents as a key communications 
strategy used in the 2013 school bond referendum election. The artifact 2013 Bond 
Presentation Schedule corroborated the information the participants provided. The 
Superintendent mentioned presentations as the “campaigning aspect of it, which was all 
the presentations and the development, and the design of that.” A2 mentioned that the 
district administrators and school board members did about 50 presentations to parents 
and community members: 
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In our community, I think that in [20]13, I want to say we did about 50 
presentations in the community, at schools, for parent meetings. You know, all the 
different civic clubs that you go to, that kind of thing. 
FSBP referenced presentations to the community by “the superintendent and some of his 
administrators,” in addition to “some board members,” who “set up meetings with 
churches and your social [organizations like] Rotary, Lion’s club, anybody that would 
listen, PTAs, anybody that would let” them give a presentation.  
The district also utilized the district website and social media to share legally-
appropriate, factual information about the school bond proposal and school bond 
referendum election. Document review revealed a 1-page social media plan for 4 days 
during the school bond election campaign timeframe. 
Marketing activities. A pro-bond political action committee (PAC) supported the 
school bond referendum election efforts through a variety of marketing strategies and 
activities. Multiple parents and community members mentioned receiving a school bond 
election flyer in the mail (i.e., SBM1, P2). P2 said, “The first I heard about it was actually 
a mailer that they had sent out. It was front and back little three panel mailer detailing the 
rough overview of how the monies were going to be spent and where.” The pro-bond 
PAC also put posters and signs around town. P2 described the marketing: “It was about 
the same week [that I got the flyer] when I started seeing a handful of the bond posters 
appear across town.” 
On the positive side, the traditional bond process included conducting a facilities’ 
needs assessment, establishing a bond committee, and engaging in school bond election 
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marketing and communications activities. However, on the negative side, interview 
participants indicated that the traditional bond process in the 2013 school bond election 
had numerous issues that led to the failure of the 2013 school bond referendum election. 
Lack of Awareness of Change in Stakeholder Perceptions and Community Context  
The first variable that played a significant role in the failure of the 2013 school 
bond referendum election was the lack of awareness of stakeholder perceptions and the 
community context by the school district and school board. The school board and school 
district administrators’ lack of awareness included: (a) an overall assumption of 
community support; (b) a lack of awareness of stakeholder issues with the school district 
that eroded stakeholder trust and long-term relationship with the district; (c) a lack of 
awareness of negative stakeholder perceptions of prior bonds; (d) a lack of awareness of 
the impact of the current political and economic context on stakeholder support for a 
school bond referendum, and (e) a lack of awareness of the impact of community growth 
on school support beliefs among stakeholders and voters. 
Based on interview data, there were serious misperceptions of overall community 
support and relationship with stakeholders with school board and school district, as well 
as a lack of awareness of the impact of prior bonds, the political and economic 
environment, and community change on stakeholder support for a potential school bond 
referendum. The superintendent summarized the impact of this lack of awareness: 
It’s kind of easy to preach a sermon when we’re all saved, and that’s kind of what 
was going on, is we were standing up there and delivering this great message to  
advocates for the program, and had no idea what the ground swell was like 
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underneath. So, we go to the polls, thinking that it will be close, and it’s 
absolutely a massacre. 
Assumption of community support. Multiple respondents indicated there was a 
reliance on traditional school bond election and campaign methods based on an overall 
assumption of support from the community. The Superintendent said: 
 And I will tell you this, and this was a quote by one of my board members. And 
he said, “[Superintendent Name], we were arrogant in our 2013 bond. We thought 
that we could put it out there and explain what the need was to our community, 
and they would just blindly follow us.” That was a pretty powerful statement to 
me, for them to say that . . . And, really, that’s how things had typically been done 
in the community.  You showed the need, you put it out there. 
A2 echoed this theme when she said:  
We hadn’t called a bond election since 1999. So, I think that in 2013, we assumed 
. . . because . . . we operate ethically, we have integrity . . . we believed that if we 
went out and said, “Y’all, we need these things” to our community, that they 
would all rise up and support us. 
CM concurred with this assessment: 
I think everybody just thought we’ll put this out there, and everybody knows we’ll 
need it, so it will happen. That was not right. We worked so much harder because 
it was still out there that so many people did not want it to happen. 
P1 agreed that there was an assumption of community support: 
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I perceive that there was an assumption that it would pass. . . . And the 
assumption was “people will see the information.” Somebody like me would look 
at it and say, “Yeah, that's a good idea.” Not everybody’s like me, of course 
[italics added for emphasis]. 
Belief that school district had strong reputation with community. At the time 
of the 2013 bond election, the school board and school district administration thought that 
they had strong reputation and were a school district that was in touch with the 
community and its needs. The FSBP reported that: 
We were, in 2009, voted school board of the year for the State of Texas. That 
means that the administration felt that we were the best school board in the whole 
state. . . Yeah, it was a big deal. So, it wasn’t a board that didn’t have knowledge 
of how a district ought to be run.  
P2, a long-time community member and parent indicated that he thought the 
school district had a good relationship to the community: “The district I’ve felt has 
always maintained a pretty good relationship with the community. They have been in 
pretty close to it.” 
Lack of awareness of stakeholder issues with the school district. While school 
board members and district administrators believed that they had a strong relationship 
with the community, other parents and community respondents indicated there was a 
distrust of the school district for several reasons: (a) a general perception that the school 
board and school district did not want parent and community input, at the school board, 
district, and campus-levels; (b) a perception of unresponsiveness to parent issues; (c) a 
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perception of the rejection of offers of support from parents and the community; (d) a 
general perception that the school district was unresponsive, uncaring, and inconsiderate 
towards parent and community member wants and needs; and (e) a lack of awareness that 
parents and community members were voters. This impression that the school district did 
not care about parent and community wants and needs led to an overall lack of trust in the 
school district and a long-term erosion of the relationship with campuses and the school 
district in general, negatively impacting support for a school bond referendum election. 
General perception school district did not want parent and community input. 
There was a perception from parents and community members that the school district did 
not want input in general. P4 summed this idea up: “If it wasn't their idea, they didn't 
want that help.” P5 elaborated on this theme: 
It’s when you, kind of, set off parents . . . That’s what I felt in [Town-Fringe] at 
that time, in 2013 especially, is that it was very difficult to communicate with 
administration. They didn’t want your input. I have a doctorate in education. I’ve 
worked for a long time in higher education, state of Texas. I understand and asked 
to get involved, and it was very difficult to even get engaged and involved until I 
made some other connections. It’s almost like they don’t want you to get 
[involved] . . . “We want to control information a little bit more” [referring to the 
school district], and when you do that, you create distrust. 
Lack of parent representation on school board.  There was a perception by 
parents that there was a lack of parent representation in school board and district 
planning, due to a lack of parent representation on the school board itself. There was a 
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sense from parents who were interviewed that there was lack of parent representation on 
the school board that negatively impacted the 2013 school bond referendum election 
results. P4 mentioned this as one of the issues with the 2013 school bond failure, “We 
also have [in 2013] a school board full of grandparents. I think there was only one person 
on the school board at that point that had a kid in school.”  
District-level negative experiences regarding input. P5 gave a district-level 
example of an experience of the district not wanting input: 
Instead of working with the community, they work against the community many 
times. That's why I say one thing about TFISD is, even working inside the health 
advisory board, they [district administration] would push an agenda to the board 
and they really didn't want your opinion too much. They wanted you to “vote yes” 
because the health advisory board's a requirement by the state to have. They do it 
as a formality to have you there, but they didn't really want your opinion unless 
your opinion agreed with the direction they wanted to go as administration. 
Small incidents gave parents the impression that their input was not wanted or valued. P4 
recalled her experience serving on a district-level school improvement committee, where 
for her the small number of “post-its” she was given communicated a lack of value for 
her input: 
They brought forward all the stuff that we were supposed to agree to and I was 
like, “’'m not agreeing to that.” “What would you do different?” I go, “Here, here, 
here, and here.” We were supposed to do post-it notes and put post-it notes on all 
the different things, and I was sitting there with [Name of Another Parent], who’s 
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the county attorney, and he has kids in school. He goes, “What do you mean 
you’re out of post-it notes?” I go, “Give me your post-it notes.” He goes, “What 
are you doing?” I said, “They need some help, [Name]. You’re educated; I’m 
educated; we care about our kids. Get your . . . post-it notes and start getting 
busy.” He was like, “Oh, okay,” ‘cause he was on his phone. But they didn’t want 
our input ‘cause they gave us three post-it notes [italics added for emphasis]. 
Campus-level negative issues. P4 and P5 gave numerous examples of unresolved 
campus-level issues that impacted their overall level of trust and support for their 
campus, the school district, and school bond planning efforts. These issues included: 
issues with the academic needs of their own children being met; issues with the academic 
needs of other children in the school being met; the time of the daily driveline; misuse of 
campus fundraising funds; lack of children being able to access community resources; 
negative relationships with the campus principal; and rejection of financial and volunteer 
support from the community.  
P4 and P5 indicated that although they were significantly involved at their 
children’s school in various volunteer and fundraising capacities, and had an overall 
commitment and support for public education, that they believed they were not recruited 
to serve on the school bond committee because of issues with the campus principal: 
P4: Our principal didn't particularly care for us, so we would not have been asked 
to be on [the bond committee, 2013].  
P5: Yeah, I'm a little outspoken about education and things, too. Even though I 
was involved, at the time the principal then was still [Name of Principal].  
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P4: She hated us.  
Parent 5: I don’t know about “hated.” That’s a little strong, but . . . we saw things 
differently. We have two very gifted kids and . . . I spoke up about the sunburn 
thing during that same time when they were starting gifted and talented. So, she 
never was selected, and I was like, “Well . . .” It was a bad deal, but that’s a 
whole different story. Those are the kind of things. 
District perceived as unresponsive to stakeholder issues. Parents reported that 
parent and community efforts to provide support to the campus or make changes 
regarding issues that significantly impacted their personal and family lives were often 
rejected by the campus and district.  
One of these issues was a serious issue with the amount of time involved with the 
daily pickup and drop-off lines. This issue reportedly caused significant parent 
dissatisfaction and anger, and certainly could have caused negative sentiment that 
impacted a bond election. Parent 4 indicated the significant and negative impact this 
experience had on her and other parents. She also said that she had tried to offer input and 
expert consulting to the campus in order to try to help all parents by decreasing the time 
needed each day. P4’s efforts at support were rejected as she said, “Yeah, almost 13 years 
I sat out in front of [Name of Elementary] with a screwed up parking situation,” and 
“Everybody out here is mad every day.”  P5 confirmed, “Yeah, the pick-up was just. . .” 
P4 added, “Every single day, and I sat there and thought about it. I think I figured out, 
doing the math; I had sat out in front of that school for 2 1/2 weeks, 24 hours a day for 2 
1/2 weeks.” As a results, P4 “told ‘em, I said, ‘I’ll find you a traffic engineer who will 
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look at this parking issue and figure out a better way.” P5 clarified, “A better way to flow 
the traffic” but the district or campus response received was “no, we’ve always done it 
this way.”  P5 said elaborated: 
The funny thing is they built the new junior high. Now, we’re not there, but a lot 
of our friends and their kids are there. They said they’ve moved now from the 
elementary to the junior high, and they said the brand new junior high school, the 
pickup and drop off, it takes an hour to get through the line to pick up your kid. 
P4 agreed, “And they don’t care” [italics added for emphasis]. P5 added the 
following: 
They [parent friends] said it’s insane. All this, why couldn’t they have designed a 
better [pick up and drop off area]. . . . They built this whole brand-new school and 
the new driveway. All these things that they’re doing, but they can’t figure out a 
way to pick up the kids efficiently. That’s crazy. 
District perceived as rejecting offers of stakeholder support. Parents 4 and 5 
shared an example where the campus rejected parent and community efforts to beautify 
their school building at no cost to the school district and how this could have impacted 
parent and community motivation to support school bond efforts. P5 explained: 
Actually, the funny thing is, we actually had a group of people that were willing 
to all come in, donate resources, shrubberies, concrete, everything to redo the 
entire front of the school . . . At no cost to the school district, but they wouldn’t do 
it because something about the handicap ramp on that side of the building. I was 
like, “We can make all that work.” It was crazy because all these people were 
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willing to do all this free work and they said, “Nope. We’re not gonna do it.” 
They left a dirt walkway instead of paving it.  
P4 surmised the school’s excuse was because, “We need a $10,000 ramp.” 
However, P5 noted that “the handicap doors are all right there, already. The ramps are 
there; they’re here. That’s where the buses are, and all we’re talking about is doing the 
front part of the school where the kids walk from the street. They have to walk through 
dirt paths and we wanted to pave those paths.” And they said, “No, we’re not gonna do 
any of that.” It’s crazy. It’s like when the community will come together to try to do 
things, if they weren’t a part of it, they didn’t want that done [italics added for emphasis]. 
P5 explained the negative impact this type of district response had on support for school 
bond election efforts because the campus and district rejected parent and community 
help: 
Yeah, so I think those are some of the things. When you have that kind of a back 
and forth, it’s gonna be very difficult to pass a bond election because people feel 
like you don’t need the money [italics added for emphasis] ‘cause here we’re 
offering you free stuff to do it. We had contractors, and all these people that were 
willing to donate the stuff, and they wouldn’t do it. I said, “That’s crazy.” 
District perceived as unresponsive, uncaring, and inconsiderate. Parents gave 
examples at the campus and district-level where the school district was perceived as 
unresponsive, uncaring, and inconsiderate. 
Campus drive-line issue. Parents 4 and 5 referred again to the drive-time issue, 
and the principal’s lack of responsiveness to their concern: 
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P4: I talked to the principal and she's like, "Well I don't know how it is. I don't 
have to sit out there." 
P5: That's the [Name of Town], yeah. Anyway, so I think part of that is just 
how responsive- 
P4: It's about customer service. 
District bond meeting scheduling inconsiderate. There was a perception of 
district inconsideration of parent schedules and availability in scheduling bond meetings 
in the 2013 school bond election. P4 said, “Like they knew what was going on and they 
waited until the 11 1/2 hour before they even started. Did things like meetings at the 
schools at 10:00 in the morning.” P5 indicated the difficulty in scheduling: “That's 
convenient for you and the administrators. It's not convenient for the community.” 
Distrust negatively impacted long-term relationship with district and support for 
bond election efforts. Parents gave numerous examples of having their input and offers 
of support ignored at the campus and district level over many years. This lack of ability 
to impact their children’s education, their campus, and district planning eroded their trust 
over campus and district leadership over time. P5 shared how this negatively impacted 
the 2013 school bond referendum election: 
I think that ties into the whole bond thing, too [2013 bond]. As they’re going 
through this, a lot of them felt: “The less we tell people, the better off we are 
because we don’t want everybody to know what we want to do.” Then the 
community became suspect. 
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P4 believed the district’s mentality was “We don't want ‘em to ask questions. We don't 
want any questions.”  P5 added:  
I think ‘cause of all the things that have happened in these kind of experiences, 
the community started becoming very suspect of the intentions of the school 
board. The intentions of the district administration, and say, “You know? We’re 
not really gonna support this because we don’t believe that you’re gonna do 
things the right way. We want some assurances, or we want to know exactly what 
the money’s gonna go to before we just allocate money.” 
Lack of district awareness that parents and community members are voters. 
Parents suggested that the campuses and school district forgot that parents also were 
voters in the community. P5 noted the district didn’t recognize, “it’s about customer 
service. It is. It’s about being responsive, being engaged.” P4 said the district failed to 
recall that “I’m not just a parent; I’m a tax payer.” P5 added that the district didn’t show 
“caring.”  
Negative impact of prior bond election. Responses from interviewees indicated 
that stakeholder perceptions and issues from prior school bond referenda negatively 
impacted the 2013 school bond election. Based on school district information 
documenting the history of school bond elections over the past 50 years, TFISD held 
school bond elections about every 8 to 10 years between 1968 and 1999. The district had 
run five school bond elections in this time frame as follows: (a) 1968 for $1.6 million; (b) 
1977 for $2 million; (c) 1986 for $16.7 million; (d) 1994 for $14.5 million; (d) 1999 for 
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$97 million. The community passed all five of these bond elections, although with 
increasingly slim margins in the past 20 years.7 
Length of time since the prior bond. Several respondents mentioned the length of 
time since the prior bond as an issue. The prior bond passed in 1999 occurred 14 years 
before the 2013 bond election. P2 shared that not having a bond for a long time produced 
complacency in the community and a lack of community awareness of school district 
needs:  
Well, that community involvement is super key, and status quo is so dangerous. 
When people think things are running great, there’s a big amount of complacency. 
They assume it’s fine. You don’t need to put more money into it or deal with it or 
anything like that. 
 In addition, P2 shared that new parents and community members may not realize 
the importance of a school bond election: 
I think a lot of people move into the community and . . . don’t necessarily disrupt 
[sic] status quo. They moved in because things are already working in a certain 
way and they just assume it’s gonna work in that way, and they don’t get involved 
quick enough basically. 
High amount of prior bond. One of the perceptions of the prior bond from 1999 
that was a variable in the 2013 school bond election was the high dollar amount of the 
1999 school bond. The 1999 represented a substantial financial investment for the 
community at that time and a massive increase from any prior bond. Prior to the 1999 
                                                          
7 Artifact data: TFISD Bond Election History 1968-2015. 
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bond of $97 million, the largest bond had only been around $15 or $16 million dollars, 
making the 1999 bond six times larger than the previous largest bond. The 
Superintendent noted that the nearly $100 million bond package was: 
A big number at that time. Now, it seems almost insignificant, but at that time, 
that was big. And so, especially for this community hadn’t grown like it’s 
growing now, and so, it was a big investment for [Town-Fringe], Texas, to put 
that into it.  
Community perception of waste and extravagance in the prior bond. Whereas 
the district perception of the 1999 bond was one of success in building a premier new 
high school for the community, multiple respondents consistently painted a different 
picture of the community perception of the new high school built with 1999 school bond 
funds. P1 said, “Well there’s still people who are upset that they built a new high school. 
They built that extravagant new school out there on the highway.” The Superintendent 
also acknowledged the community perception of the 1999 bond being wasteful: 
In 2002, TFISD opened a new high school down on [Street Name], that was still 
being referred to as the “Taj Mahal” in the community, and seen as having, being 
this grandiose kind of structure with a lot of waste in it. If you go into the 
building, it does. It has a large, high foyer, high hallways, things like that, but the 
rest of it is really very economical and functioning. But that one component of the 
building has given it this kind of . . . symbol in the community, and the new high 
school that is the “Taj Mahal.” So, that idea of, “Well, the last time we trusted you 
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to build something, you put a lot of waste in it.” And that was a $100-million 
bond at that time, back in 2000. 
From document review of the voter survey conducted before the 2015 school bond, a 
young adult in the community (who was a former student and also a current staff 
member) said,  
Being a young adult, I went to TFISD High School and I remember all the false 
promises that came with the building of the high school. It was supposed to be 
this great building that would hold all the students plus have more room being the 
fact freshmen were not in the building. This turned out to not be the case at all, we 
were crammed in like sardines from the beginning. The fact that [Town-Fringe] 
chose a design that was glamorous on the outside but has so much wasted space 
on the inside baffles me. My parent’s taxes were raised and what was promised to 
them was a load of lies in my opinion. The fact that [Town-Fringe] was offered to 
have a stadium built for them and the board refused and chose to take out of 
savings for a football field that was never completed is another reason why I do 
not trust [Town-Fringe] with money! If you asked to raise my taxes to better pay 
our low paid teachers I might feel differently on the bond, but to build more 
buildings or renovate buildings the only thing I see in the bond is promises never 
kept by TFISD!! (2015 TFISD Voter Survey Staff Verbatims). 
Perception of school district raising taxes. Although P2 indicated that the school 
district had an overall good reputation in the community, he mentioned that the district 
might have had an issue with a community perception of rising taxes from the 1999 bond 
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which built the “new” high school. “The biggest stigma is the rising taxes in between the 
two. That was after the new high school was built wasn't it?” [P2] 
Distrust of district stewardship of prior bond funds. School district central office 
A1 and A2 thought that the district had a strong record of stewardship of public funds 
from the prior school bond election. District chief financial officer A1 addressed this 
topic: 
Since I’ve been here, [this district] has the highest rating you can get in the School 
FIRST Accountability [rating] of superior. You can’t get anything higher. I’ve 
restored [the fund] balance through prudent stewardship of the funds, and I have 
never in my career, and certainly not any of the time that I’ve been here, had 
anything less than a blemish-free external audit. 
However, responses from parent and community members indicated that there 
was a distrust of the stewardship of funds from the prior bond referendum in the 
community. The Superintendent articulated this distrust from the community, specifically 
referencing carryover from the prior bond, as community members saying:  
 “I don’t trust administration to spend the money the way that we say to spend it.” 
Well, they don’t know me from Adam at that time, you know. I’m new in the 
district and had never had the opportunity to spend their money the way they 
wanted to, or not. So, it makes you wonder, “Okay, that’s carry-over from a past 
project that we’re having to end that at this point” 
P4, a long-time and very involved parent and community member, indicated 
concern with spending from the prior bond:  
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It seems like there had been one before and we weren’t sure that we were all 
spending the money the way that it should’ve been spent. I’m not sure there were 
enough controls on that money. There was still bond money left over as I 
remember. 
 The FSBP indicated that the school board perception was that the school board 
and administration had been good stewards of public money, but that the community 
might not recognize this. 
I don’t think people remembered that the bond we had before, we did it on time, 
under budget. . . . Because I was on the tail end of them, they were in the middle 
of building the high school when I was elected to the board. So, you think, “We’re 
great stewards of the tax payer’s money. We give teacher raises. We have to be 
competitive with other school districts.” We felt that we’re doing all the right 
things. 
P1 summed up this sentiment: 
The other observation that I have is that the default response just in our culture in 
general seems to be that the school district wastes money, it’s ineffective, it 
doesn’t do a good job, and that it wastes money. And it is hard to overcome that 
narrative sometimes. 
Negative impact of the economic context. Interviews suggested that stakeholder 
perceptions of the economic context of the community impacted the outcome of the 
school bond referendum election in 2013. While information from district bond 
documentation did not include an analysis of economic indicators in 2013-2014, 
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comments from several respondents indicated that the 2008-2009 recession was fresh in 
people’s minds. Many people were still reeling from the impact of the 2008 Great 
Recession in 2013. SBM, a parent who became a school board member in the 2013 
school board election, described his perspective in 2013: 
The economy, I watched the stock market cut in half . . . I was a big Rand Paul 
fan. I would take a bullet for him. I love him and his son too. I like them, and I 
listen to their podcasts 24/7. Everyday, I’m mowing the grass, or riding to work, 
and the state of the economy’s not good. “You should start buying gold and 
silver.” I was really into this . . . I don’t know what’s going to happen with the 
economy. I don’t know what’s going to happen. I bought food stores. We had 
water. I was kind of a “prepper.” 
A1 compared the economic environment to the last time the district had gone out for 
school bond, which was 1999: “Yeah, and the economy was different in 1999, if you 
think about it too.”  
 Conservative political environment. Based on responses from interviews, the 
political environment and stakeholder political beliefs and perceptions played a role in 
lack of stakeholder support for the 2013 school bond referendum election. The political 
environment in the county where the school district is located had always been 
conservative. The Superintendent identified elements in the political environment that 
created a more challenging environment for the school district to be successful in a 
school bond election:  
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And I'm gonna tell you, [Name of County] is a strong, conservative community. 
It's about as red as you get. So, there's this small government kind of movement 
out there, there's this strongly conservative, and there's just all kinds of stuff that's 
working against us. 
P1 described the predominant political values of the area as anti-tax and anti-government: 
We have two political parties in [Name of County]. It’s Republican and 
Conservative Republican. And so all of our elections are decided in the 
Republican primary. You’re talking about somebody who’s not from here, so this 
is just . . . you see campaign signs for somebody says “so and so for this office, 
Conservative Republican,” which to me is . . . redundant. . . . It’s who can out 
conservative the other. . . . You’re in that context where there’s already a bias 
against institutional growth, taxation, all those kinds of things. 
Existing anti-tax, anti-government sentiment. Numerous respondents talked 
about the “anti-tax” and “anti-government” sentiment that had always existed in the 
community.   
We have people in this town, if it's a vote for anything - not necessarily TFISD or 
any school bond - if it's to promote something that they want, they'll vote against 
it because they don't want to pay an extra tax. Even if it will benefit them, they'll 
vote against it just to keep the taxes down [CM]. 
P1 indicated something similar when he said: 
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I think there is a contingent in the community of “no, we don't need to spend more 
money.” It seems that people move to the area to get away from higher taxes. And 
so the default response is “we don't want to pay more taxes.” 
A1 indicated that this wasn’t just a faction in the community, but “it didn’t matter 
whether we’re talking community, state or nationally, the entire overall population is 
anti-tax right now, even if it is a public school, because people feel over-taxed in 
general.” P1 recognized a general distrust of governmental institutions that transferred to 
include the school district: “I think there is a contingent in our community, and it's in our 
larger culture of a distrust of any institution. And so there’s a distrust of the school 
district.” 
Rise of the Tea Party anti-government and anti-tax movement. As a result of the 
country’s economic woes, 2013 saw the emergence of the Tea Party nationally and 
locally. Numerous respondents indicated the rise of the Tea Party as a critical variable in 
the failure of the 2013 school bond election, including its influence on local politics, 
stakeholder beliefs about government and taxes, and the recruitment and development of 
new political leaders in the community. SBM articulated the impact of the economic 
recession and the rise of the Tea Party nationally and locally, as well as personal 
involvement in political efforts. 
It was right at that time in 2010, there was a presidential election coming up. We 
were at crashes in the economy, and things weren’t necessarily good. That’s kind 
of where the Tea Party started to rise up a little bit. I got involved very heavily 
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with the local group . . . I liked the Tea Party in the beginning, and I was a big 
part of it. 
The FSBP confirmed that the Tea Party became very active at that time. 
I mean, the Tea Party was very, very active. That was when they . . . were just 
getting started. So, their big thing is “no taxes, no debt.” And it doesn’t matter to 
them whether you have to put school kids in portable buildings. 
Increase in distrust in government & anti-tax sentiment. Multiple respondents 
indicated that there was a significant increase at the time in the distrust of government, 
institutional growth, and anti-tax sentiment, and that these perceptions transferred to the 
school district, negatively impacting the 2013 school bond election outcome. The 
Superintendent reflected this when he said, “There was certainly just, ‘It’s anti-debt, too 
much government debt, lump schools into ‘government’. You know, a specific entity 
within that, and we felt it within our bond election. It was definitely a significant factor.” 
A1 referenced this same general distrust of government institutions that 
transferred to include the school district said, “but we didn’t recognize soon enough the 
new anti-tax environment, and [Name of County] is an ultra, anti-tax, conservative 
community.” The SBM also indicated that the school district was “lumped in” as a tax 
collector: 
I think that was a problem in the first time [2013 bond], is that the district allowed 
itself to just be lumped in as the big, bad tax collector. You're the government 
you’re the governor, in a town that’s 80 to 90% Republican, [and] you don’t want 
to be the government in any way, shape, or form. 
129 
Impact of community change on school support. Interview responses indicated 
that community change also impacted the mix of school support beliefs and attitudes in 
the community, affecting the 2013 school bond referendum election outcome. Unlike 
what research suggested, district and community characteristics did not remain constant. 
As new parents and community members moved into the community, school support 
beliefs and support for the school district changed. These changes impacted the 2013 
school bond referendum election. 
Existing school support beliefs. Several parents and community members 
indicated that there were community members who supported increased taxes for 
education because it supported the economic growth of the community. CM, who was in 
his 70’s, remembered the one-room school building that he went to school in and 
appreciated the investments others had made to improve his educational circumstances: 
Whenever I went to school, it was a one-room building for my first and second 
grade. Just an old, wooden building. Somebody had to buy that, and somebody 
has to buy the buildings for the kids that go to school now and I'm a strong 
believer that that's what happened. 
He acknowledged those in the community who would be against a bond due to tax 
reasons, but indicated that he supported paying more taxes for schools as a good 
investment for the economic health of the community: 
We had five different businesses on the north side of town, the poorer side of 
town. I would say, predominantly, that it would be the people that would be 
against the bond . . . Typically, that’s the way it goes. The one thing I stated: “I’m 
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gonna have to pay more for school district to be a good school district, I 
understand that. That’s part of doing business. If you don’t do that, you don’t 
have a business, because if you don’t keep your schools up, your businesses are 
not going to prosper.” 
The following Community Member (CM, who also was the Bond Treasurer in 
1999 and 2015) recognized the need for improvement of school facilities due growth of 
the community and school district.  
The people moving to [Town-Fringe] are not my age, by any means. They’re 
young people that are raising families and need a good education. They can stay 
in the [major urban area], they don’t wanna do that . . . They come here and get a 
good education. We had to provide the buildings and . . . whatever else we need 
for them to be here. If we don’t do that, they’re still going to come, but still 
they’re not going to get educated as well. That’s part of the process. 
P1 described another voting perspective.  
I was talking to [an individual] from church, and he’s a very conservative 
individual, and he on one hand would want to support the district, kids being 
educated. He would not want waste. So, he said he was driving by the new [Name 
of Middle School #1] and on the school in the brick it’s inlaid [with the initials of 
the school]. I don’t know if you’ve seen the building. He said, “I drove by there, 
and I wonder ‘well, how much extra did that cost’?” And so, it gets to that kind of 
level of questioning. There’s no frill that should be allowed. Everything needs to 
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be bare bones and basic. I think there’s that component in the community. And I 
think it’s there. I don't think it’s a majority. 
Changing stakeholder school support beliefs due to community growth. Based 
upon interview responses, the infusion of newcomers also brought changes in stakeholder 
beliefs and attitudes about public education and support for schools, taxation, and 
expectations of the school board and school district. Respondents indicated that this 
changing mix of school support attitudes impacted the 2013 school bond election.  
P1 indicated that one group moving to the community increased the anti-tax 
sentiment: “It seems that people move to the area to get away from higher taxes. And so, 
the default response is ‘we don't want to pay more taxes.’” However, P1 also indicated 
that other community members moving into the community might support increased 
taxes to support education: 
People are moving here from larger places who don't have the idea of “let’s do the 
least that we can do.” My perspective is “how much can we do? How much do we 
need to do? And how much of that can we do now?” 
P3, a parent new to the community, indicated an overall attitude of support for 
education and school bonds to support high-quality school facilities: 
I don't mind an increase in my taxes if it goes to education, ever. You're not gonna 
hear that from many people, especially not in Texas, but to me, an increase of 
$100 or whatever in my taxes, I think that's well worth it. Our children deserve a 
good education. 
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However, P3 also indicated that any school bond referendum would be critically 
evaluated to gain a “yes vote”: 
I guess I would have to see what the long-term goals were, how much of an 
increase in taxes it would be, if there would be programs affected by it, like things 
taken away from, say, arts, chorus, music, and going toward sports, because I'm 
against that. I'm all for athletics, but I'm also all for the arts. I think it should be an 
equal thing. So, it would have to be an all-around bill for me, and then just weigh 
pros and cons. . . . So, I would have to look at it on the whole and really look at it. 
. . . I'd have to know what was in it, and there would have to be lots of pluses and 
not taking away from their education as it is [italics added for emphasis]. 
Stakeholder attitudes towards change impact support for schools. In addition, 
interview respondents indicated that parent and community attitudes towards community 
growth impacted school support beliefs and the 2013 school bond election outcome. P2 
suggested that some community members simply may not have been aware of the need 
for facilities’ improvements due to growth: 
It’s almost like nostalgia gets in the way of . . . I hate to say progress, because it’s 
not like they [the school district] are actively trying to change everything. It’s 
more like maintenance. You’re trying to keep up with the changes that are 
happening. You’re not promoting it, you’re just dealing with it essentially. I don’t 
think the community as a whole recognizes the degree to which it’s growing. 
P2 added there might also have been active resistance towards change, and how 
these attitudes might have negatively impacted support for a school bond referendum 
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election. He explained the attitude of long-time residents opposed to any infrastructure 
improvements in a direct attempt to hold back change in the community: 
[Town-Fringe] is a weird mixed town where there’s a lot of old school inhabitants 
and then this massive influx of people coming to [Town-Fringe]. For the old 
timers that live in [Town-Fringe], they do not want anything to change or to grow 
and part of their means of holding back the tide is not voting for anything that 
comes up . . . The school bonds are kind of similar in my opinion. They said, “No, 
they don’t want their taxes to go up. If we just stop people will quit flooding in 
here.” 
Others suggested that some community members resisted change in order to 
preserve long-held school traditions, as exemplified by P2:   
The old high school, the old stadium and all that, they want to keep it small, keep 
it built that way. . . . Then there’s the old-time community that it’s always just 
been [Town-Fringe] High School. We’re a team; we’re one. It needs to be one 
place. We love that stadium half way down [Name of Street]. We have to keep 
that. That’s where I played. That’s where my kids are gonna play. 
The school board and school district administration lack of awareness of changes 
in the community context and stakeholder support beliefs created gaps in areas where the 
district might have mitigated negative sentiment, such as: securing expert capacity in 
school bond elections, pre-bond planning and community needs assessment, overall bond 
coordination and planning, leadership recruitment for key bond roles, stakeholder input 
and involvement, development of the bond proposal itself, and communication. 
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Lack of Expert Capacity to Support Bond Election Processes 
Multiple interview participants mentioned the lack of specific school bond 
election expertise from the architectural firm during the 2013 school bond election 
process. The Superintendent reflected on the learning from the 2013 school bond failure 
that the school board and school district needed specific bond expertise and services, and 
stated that the lack of bond expertise and services from the architectural firm was one of 
the most important variables in the 2013 school bond referendum election failure. 
Most schools in the state . . . in a superintendent’s career, you do one or two, and 
that’s probably all you do. So, we’re certainly not the experts on it. So, those 
people that are providing insight, and a lot of times, a lot of direction, are the 
architectural firms, because they have, one, a very vested interest in that and them 
being successful, but two, they’re engaged in those [school bond elections] 
constantly. Multiple ones, each and every year, . . . [and] we relied heavily on the 
direction and advice that our architect provided to us on how to approach and 
organize the 2013 bond. I had a lot of trust in them, like I said, they’d been in the 
district for a long time, had been our people, and had great relationships with 
them, but yet, they brought nothing new to the table, and it was reflected in the 
outcome there. . . . We really thought that the methodology that they brought to us 
was very archaic. 
The Superintendent explained that excellent facilities’ expertise was no longer 
sufficient support for supporting a school bond referendum election.  
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What we know is that all of the architectural firms that are major players in the 
state can design great buildings. They can do beautiful work and do great work. 
They all know MEP, they all know civil, they all know all those different things. 
Building codes, all that stuff. What they don't all do is on the front end of the 
bond. 
Whereas some architectural consulting firms offered specific expertise and extra 
capacity to support a school bond referendum election planning and implementation 
process (which could include a comprehensive school bond election planning process; 
bond election pre-planning support; bond proposal facilitation and support; and bond 
campaign implementation expertise), respondents indicated that this type of bond election 
expertise and services were not provided in 2013. The FSBP referenced the lack of 
expertise and support from the architectural consulting firm in the 2013 school bond 
referendum election: 
I think when you looked at [Name of Architectural Firm], they really didn’t have 
that piece in their organization to help a school district pass a bond. Now . . . 
another architectural firm, they have a division that just deals with school bonds. 
And if you look at their record of districts that they helped bonds, they win every 
time. They win every time. 
CM indicated that there was a gap in training and support during the process from 
the architectural consulting firm in 2013 as follows: 
136 
We went to [Architectural Firm Bravo in 2015]. They were so good at helping us 
get to a point, and they were very proactive in saying, “We will help you get 
there.” I don’t remember seeing that in the bond in 2013. 
Lack of Community Needs Assessment and Pre-Bond Planning Activities  
Another variable that respondents indicated was connected to the failure of the 
2013 school bond election was the lack of a community needs assessment and pre-bond 
planning activities. Based on document review and interview responses, the district 
administration and school board gathered limited information about district and 
community context in the 2013 school bond referendum election process. There was little 
awareness of a need for a more extensive community needs assessment process that 
would provide information about the current political, economic, and demographic 
contexts of the community and school district from multiple data sources. The 
Superintendent concluded that “there was no analysis of the community, not in 2013. 
Really, no regard given to the ‘no’ opinion.” 
Community needs assessment processes seemed to be informal and with data 
gathered from limited sources and few stakeholder groups. For example, the FSBP 
described gathering information regarding voter tolerance for the bond amount as 
occurring in an informal manner: 
Once we determined that a bond was going to be needed and the amount that we 
were going to need to have, of course, we had feelers out with the community 
[italics added for emphasis] and committees and looked at what we felt that the 
community would approve. Because initially we thought about, when we looked 
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at the cost, we were looking at $120 million. And we knew that that would 
probably not fly. . . . We came down to, I think, $108 million. I think is what we 
finally went out for. 
Limited community demographic and economic growth data. Document 
review found little document information about district and community context that was 
available to leadership, or shared with the bond committee and voters, including: 
economic development data; community growth data and demographics; no real estate 
growth data, including business and commercial growth; or more extensive information 
on tax rate implications and tax impact based upon more than one bond scenario. Some 
district demographic and overcrowding data were found in 2013 school bond documents, 
as well as tax impact data on one school bond scenario. 
Little information on voter preferences. No statistical data on voter preferences 
regarding bond proposal content, bond amount, potential bond passage rates, and 
likelihood of bond passage were found in the 2013 bond document review. What needs 
assessment regarding voter preferences did occur seemed to be informal and from limited 
sources. Although the FSBM reference did mention gathering information from 
community members, there no data-informed needs assessment was found. There was no 
information regarding the number of people that were asked regarding their opinions 
regarding a potential bond, which groups they came from, or how well they matched the 
demographic profile of the community. 
Lack of input from key influencers. In the 2013 school bond election, 
respondents reported limited meetings with key influencers, especially those with 
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opposing views. If they were interviewed, their input was not factored into bond 
planning, The FSBP mentioned a key meeting with a local influential state legislator, 
who indicated his opposition to the school bond election, which seemed to be ignored: 
When we first thought about doing this, we had lunch with . . . our state 
representative [Name of Representative]. And during the lunch, we mentioned to 
him that we were thinking about a bond, and [he didn’t ask] “Why do you need a 
bond,” nothing. He said, “I’m against it.” And didn’t know anything about it.  
When asked specifically if there was a strategy for engaging key influencers in 2013, A2 
said, “Not as much as we did in 2015.” 
Little information from other school district bond election efforts. In 2013 
there was also no mention of school district administrators or board members learning 
from school bond elections in other school districts in the area in order to see the impact 
of community and voter preferences on bond elections. 
Effective use of data by anti-bond opposition. Instead, anti-bond opposition 
groups effectively utilized state and local data to create an anti-bond, anti-district 
narrative. A1 indicated that the anti-bond opposition efforts used district data to argue 
that there was not a need for facilities improvements in the school district: 
And the other thing that I remember that they did, when I say our data, they took 
our . . . [data]. All of us, any building, any public building has a fire code number 
of occupancy. So, I by law can put X number of people in any campus out there, 
and the fire marshal will not come and say, “I'm going to shut this down.” But 
because of children with disabilities, because of a unique class that may only have 
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15 students in it, because of some advanced classes that may have [a need for 
smaller class size], . . . I don’t have data that show that I’m using those buildings 
every day to that headcount and that it’s accurate . . . And they used that [against 
us], and so I realized really quick [sic] that the average American citizen out there 
that is going to read this; they’re not going to know that. They’re not going to 
know that I can’t have 22 special children with severe disabilities in the same 
classroom. They’re not going to know that advanced physics, I may not have 22, 
but I still should be able to offer that to the elite group that actually can take that 
course and are trying to achieve. They used things like that, and it shocked us 
because we were all so ethical. 
District central administrators referred to the anti-bond opposition using district 
data in a way that they referred to as “misinformation.” A1 said: 
They would take some of our own data and take it out of context and use it 
against us . . . I mean, I looked at that website at least twice a day, and was just 
stunned at what they would do. It was . . . what’s the word, salacious? . . . it’s like 
what I’ve always said about new. If it bleeds, it reads. You couldn’t stop reading 
it. So, I knew that if others were looking at that . . . they were going to believe it, 
too, because of how it was [presented]. 
Lack of School Bond Election Plan and Processes 
Respondents indicated that lack of organization affected the outcome of the 2013 
school bond election. CM admitted, “We were just disorganized. That’s the bottom line. I 
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think everybody just thought ‘we’ll put this out there, and everybody knows we’ll need it, 
so it will happen.’”  P1 echoed this sentiment and added the following: 
I would guess that there was not that organized effort. I would guess that what 
happened was the information was just put out there. And the assumption was 
“people will see the information.” Somebody like me would look at it and say, 
“Yeah, that’s a good idea.”  
Lack of a comprehensive bond planning process. These disorganized efforts 
were consistent with the absence of an overall school bond election strategy and 
coordinated plan. Review of the documents provided no evidence that an overarching 
school bond election coordination strategy had been developed or was available to guide 
the school board, school district administrators, and stakeholders through a school bond 
election process. No overall plan for the entire bond election process was located, 
including a delineation of all the steps of the process.  
Lack of clear decision-making and communications structures. One strategy 
in a successful change process involves building culture by setting clear roles and 
responsibilities for leaders and participants in the group (Bolman & Deal, 2008). 
However, there was little evidence of decision-making and communications structures, 
such as role descriptions, procedures, and protocols used as a part of the bond process 
between district leaders, school board leaders, campus leaders, parents, and community 
members.  
From both the artifact review and interview data, no specific information 
appeared regarding the role of the Citizen’s Advisory Committee. No evidence of the 
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committee’s purpose, objectives, responsibilities, guiding principles, or values could be 
found or inferred. No written documentation of leadership roles within the Citizens’ 
Advisory Committee was located.  
The only information regarding facilitation procedures included the committee’s 
division into subcommittees, as indicated earlier. Additionally, no written information on 
committee facilitation procedures or protocols was available. There was no historical 
evidence of Citizen’s Advisory Committee meeting agendas, presentations, minutes, or 
outcomes, meeting dates and times, meeting locations, or names of committee members 
in the artifacts. No information was found about the process by which the bond proposal 
was developed and given to the school board for its final decision. The Citizen’s 
Advisory Committee’s role in making a bond proposal recommendation to the school 
board was unclear. 
Anti-bond opposition utilized effective planning and decision-making 
structures. Whereas school board and school district efforts were disorganized, 
respondents indicated that anti-bond opposition leaders developed a coordinated strategy 
and used local political decision-making and communications structures to defeat the 
school bond referendum election. The anti-bond PAC relied on local political structures 
to organize decision-making and communication, and to offer new roles and 
responsibilities to emerging community leaders. The anti-bond PAC also used school 
board election processes, protocols, and procedures to advance their leaders and 
messages. SBM discussed how the anti-bond PAC built its platform and plan: 
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There’s three of us that we decided . . . [to be] just against [the 2013 bond 
proposal]. There were others that were more strongly [against the bond proposal]. 
On a scale of one to five, I’m like a four; I don’t like it. There’s others that are a 
zero; they’re like a negative one. They hate it with a capital H. They said, “This is 
the type of thing that’s going to be put out. Let’s get rid of this board and make 
sure it doesn't happen again.” I’ve always, as an educator, I always thought, I’d 
run for school board someday, rather than city council. 
Poor Leadership Recruitment and Development 
Interview responses and review of the documents also suggested that poor 
leadership development and training of both school district staff and parent and 
community volunteers had a negative impact on the 2013 school bond election results. 
Poor recruiting of influential, experienced community leaders for key roles. 
First, the school board and school district administrators failed to significantly involve 
influential, experienced community leaders. CM, who was also the treasurer of the 1999 
bond, implied he was not approached regarding a leadership role in the 2013 bond: 
“Well, 2013, I was just asked to be a part of the ‘rah-rah’ group, I guess.” There seemed 
to be a lack influential parent and community leaders who served in roles critical to the 
school bond referendum process. P5 summarized this succinctly: “There was no 
champions.” There was no evidence that bond leadership used opportunities to reward 
and incentivize parents and community members with leadership roles and opportunities 
available through the school bond election process, such as bond committee chair or PAC 
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leadership. Document review revealed no listing of members or leaders for the Citizens’ 
Advisory Committee or the pro-bond PAC. 
Haphazard recruiting for the Citizens’ Advisory Committee. The 
Superintendent recalled that recruiting for parents for the Citizens’ Advisory Committee 
was haphazard. The Superintendent reported:  
We just kind of made a list of people that are involved in school. It could be 
parents, we might say, “Campus principals, we need some parents off your 
campus that you think are supportive of the school, that would serve on this 
committee.” 
Paradoxically, this process may have excluded active, engaged parents and 
community members who were not considered “supportive of the school” even though 
they might have been supportive of school bond election efforts. Parents 4 and 5 thought 
that they were not asked to be on the school bond committee due to disagreements they 
had with their children’s campus principal, despite having strong ties to the community 
and strongly stated support for public education and school bond election efforts. 
Lack of parent and community training for school bond election efforts. 
There is little reference to training for school district staff or parent and community 
member volunteers. The 2013 parent community had changed significantly since the 
1999 bond passage, leaving a gap in parents and community members who might have 
previously participated in or led school bond election activities. There were many new 
parents and community members in the school district and community for the 2013 
school bond referendum election that had never participated in a school bond election 
144 
before, due to community growth as well as the length of time that had passed since the 
prior 1999 school bond. Parents who might have been involved in 1999 had children who 
had most likely graduated from the school district by 2013, leaving a gap in parent 
leadership for school bond efforts in 2013. Only parents with children in kindergarten or 
younger in 1999 would have still even had children in the school district in 2013. FSBP 
provided confirmation of this assertion by saying that “a lot of those folks that were in 
high school at the [1999] time . . . aren’t involved anymore.”  
CM suggested that recruiting parents and the younger generation as community 
leaders for bond and future bonds was a gap in the 2013 school bond election efforts, as 
well as the lack of time to train parents and community members on bond proposal 
development processes and campaign activities needed to be successful in the 2013 
school bond referendum election. CM explained: 
I’m talking about young people. I’m talking people that are in their, . . . I don’t 
know how old these kids are, I don’t want to get them too old, probably in their 
20s and 30s and maybe even into their early 40s. They have not participated, 
especially in the bond that I worked with in [19]99. . . . It didn’t need to be the 
older ones who were retired. It needed to be some of the ones that still had 
children in school. We did get them started [but didn’t have time to fully train 
them like in 2015]. 
Effective “anti-bond” opposition leadership recruiting and development. 
Bolman and Deal (2008) indicated that “Stack[ing] the team with credible, influential 
team members to serve in key roles in the school bond referendum process” supported 
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political success in the change process, and that “Provid[ing] training, resources, and 
support” supported the human resources aspects of the change process.  
The anti-bond opposition utilized both of these strategies effectively. A 
significant anti-bond movement identified “credible, influential” parents and community 
members to serve in key roles in the anti-bond PAC and campaign (Bolman & Deal, 
2008, p. 395). Relying on local political structures, including the school board election 
process, the anti-bond movement leveraged the school bond election process as an 
opportunity to provide individual leadership advancement opportunities to influential 
community members. In addition, the anti-bond PAC leaders provided training and 
leadership advancement opportunities to influential parents and community members 
through anti-bond campaign activities and school board candidate support.  
The SBM who was recruited to run for school board talked about being attracted 
to the leadership opportunity inherent in the school board election process based on the 
anti-bond platform provided him: 
In 2013, that group [Tea Party] reached out to me and said, “Did you see the bond 
mailer? Would you like to maybe run? We want to try to defeat this. Would you 
like to run against it?” My initial answer was kind of “no,” but it inflates your ego 
when people ask you to run for politics. I said, “Let me think about it” . . . Then it 
was that same day, that afternoon that I got a call, and they said, “Well, did you 
see this flyer?’ I said, “Yeah.” They said, “Well what do you think?” I started 
listing the things, and the person on the other end of the phone [said], “Well that’s 
exactly what we think. We need to do two things. We need to stop this bond from 
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happening, and then we need to get you in there so that if we do this again it’ll be 
done a different way, or it’s ‘the right way’ was what they were wording it as.”  I 
agreed. I said, “Okay, I’m up for that.” . . . I was elected in 2013. I served on the 
board for 3 years and then had no opposition in 2016, so now I’m serving my 
second and final [term]. 
Lack of Input and Involvement from Representative Group of Stakeholders  
Interview responses from district administrators, school board members, parents, 
and community members who were interviewed consistently indicated that the lack of 
stakeholder input and involvement in the school bond referendum process was a major 
variable in the failure of the 2013 school bond election process. Respondents indicated 
that the school bond proposal process was ‘administratively-driven’, with little true input 
from staff, parents, or community members. 
The consistent perception from district administrators, current school board 
member, parents, and community members interviewed was that stakeholder involvement 
in the development of the 2013 bond proposal was minimal. The Superintendent said, “I 
think in 2013 [stakeholders were involved], in a minimal way. Again, I got back to that 
board member’s quote, there was a lot of arrogance in that.” P5 said, “there wasn’t a 
whole lot of involvement. There wasn’t a whole lot of community involvement in the 
[2013] bond election.” A1 noted that “our oversight on that was we didn’t ask. We didn’t 
ask others.” 
Respondents indicated that the school board and school district administration had 
decided the bond proposal. P2 said, “I’m not so sure that [the bond proposal] came from 
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community involvement. A matter of opinion, I kind of feel like it came from internally.” 
The Superintendent referenced existing board priorities that likely drove the bond 
proposal because the school board “had an eye to maybe accomplish, or maybe a 
common idea of what needed to be done, is maybe what our board or trustees had at the 
time.” P4 said, “I think it was the school board and very few who decided ‘This is what 
we need’.” 
In fact, P2 thought that lack of early community input and involvement in the 
bond conversation was one of the biggest variables that contributed to the 2013 school 
bond referendum failure: 
[One of] the biggest ones [variables that contributed to the failure of that school 
bond election], they probably didn’t have the community on board beforehand. 
The community involvement was late. After they’d already built their plan out 
and everything else they brought them in. 
Minimal engagement of key influencers. In the 2013 school bond election, 
respondents reported limited meetings with key influencers, especially those with 
opposing views. If they were interviewed, their input was not factored into bond 
planning. As referenced earlier, the FSBP mentioned a key meeting with a local 
influential state legislator, who indicated his opposition to the school bond election, 
which seemed to be ignored. 
Lack of representation from all stakeholder groups. Participant interviews 
indicated that there was a lack of input from a representative group of stakeholders, 
including teachers, parents, community members, and students, especially opposition 
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views. Although document review indicated that the Citizens’ Advisory Committee was 
supposed to represent a diverse cross-section of the community, including local citizens, 
business leaders, community leaders, parents, and staff members, interview respondents 
indicated a lack of representation from teachers, parents, community members, and 
students on the Citizen’s Advisory Committee.  
Interview responses from board members, parents, and community members 
indicated participant perceptions that the Citizens’ Advisory Committee had limited 
parent, community member, teacher, staff, and student representation. P5 indicated the 
lack of parent representation on the 2013 bond committee:  
The people that they picked to be on the advisory committee also didn’t have kids 
in school. They were business leaders or they had a lot of property. That’s all well 
and good, but you’ve got to put some parents on there. 
The FSBP seemed to confirm this when sharing about the Citizens’ Advisory 
Committee as an “executive committee” and recalled the membership as being “bankers” 
and “pastors,” and did not reference teachers, parents, other community members, or 
students as committee members.  
Stakeholders not aware of the Citizens’ Advisory Committee. Parents and 
community members indicated that they were not aware of the Citizens’ Advisory 
Committee in 2013. Parent 4 said about the 2013 bond election, “But I don’t even think 
there was a support group . . . I don’t think there was a citizen’s group. I don’t think there 
was anything.” In fact, not one interviewed participant remembered the actual name of 
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the 2013 bond committee, even district central office staff. SBM said that he was not 
aware of the Citizens Advisory Committee existing in 2013:  
Because leading up to it [the 2013 bond election], again, there was no knowledge 
of was there a community selection committee? There may or may not have been. 
I didn't know about it. Was there a demographic study? I didn’t know about it. 
Was there a financial review? Didn’t know about it.  
Interview responses indicated that the number of Citizens’ Advisory Committee 
meetings was limited and had a small number of participants. Although a larger number 
of people were invited to participate, the Citizens’ Advisory Committee was fairly small. 
FSBP offered a guess: “I would probably think somewhere around 100 folks all together 
[were invited to participate] . . . 10 or 15 [served on the committee]. People were invited; 
people were asked to volunteer. Again, most parent or community member respondents 
were not aware of these meetings, and recalled a small number of meetings. 
The superintendent indicated that the 2013 Citizens’ Advisory Committee 
included mainly pro-bond perspectives, and did not include any bond opposition people 
or perspectives as a part of the process. The superintendent concluded that this led to a 
bias in the committee. The Superintendent recalled: 
They were led by community people, and really, people who were very connected 
to the school in ways that, not that it was necessarily biased, but you look back in 
hindsight, possibly there was a built-in bias there, because they were all ‘pro’ 
people. People that were ‘pro’ for the ISD. 
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The Superintendent graphically described the impact this one-sided planning had on the 
school bond referendum election: 
It’s kind of easy to preach a sermon when we’re all saved, and that’s kind of what 
was going on, is we were standing up there and delivering this great message to 
advocates for the program, and had no idea what the ground swell was like 
underneath. So, we go to the polls, thinking that it will be close, and it’s 
absolutely a massacre. 
Community forums provided little opportunity for input or feedback. In the 
2013 school bond election process, the school board held community forums to tell the 
community about the bond referendum proposal. However, at these meetings there was 
little opportunity for teachers, parents, or community members to provide feedback. The 
feedback indicated that there were few community forums/public meetings to share the 
school bond referendum proposal in 2013. P1 referenced the small number of community 
meetings as not enough “public meetings, or at least I wasn’t aware of the public 
meetings . . . A lot of times in our community getting the news out about those kinds of 
things . . . has been difficult.” In addition, district administrators, current board member, 
parents, and community members described the community forums that the district held 
to communicate the bond proposal as forums with only one-way communication and little 
to no opportunity for stakeholders to provide input or feedback. The Superintendent 
explained: 
We had stakeholder meetings where the committee that developed the plan or the 
recommendation to the board, they developed that and put the components 
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together and made a recommendation to the board, and then the board had several 
community forums that were really one way. Where the board told the community 
what they intended to do. 
The Superintendent characterized the approach as “we’re just telling you what we’re 
gonna do” and admitted the Board said essentially, “Here’s the plan; it’s all we’re gonna 
do; come vote for it; and we’ll build you a nice building.” 
Stakeholders did not understand facilities’ needs. As a result, parents and 
community members who were interviewed indicated that they did not have an 
understanding for the need for a school bond referendum. As indicated earlier, many new 
parents had moved into the district or had become parents since the previous school bond 
election in 1999. The SBM, who was also a parent, elucidated: 
I didn’t see overcrowding. I didn’t see lack of budget monies. I didn’t see 
anything bursting at the seam, and now, I see a flyer in the mail that says, “We 
need, need, need, need, need, need, need, need, need, and then we need some 
more. You got to trust us, and it’s just all or nothing.” 
P2 mentioned “not establishing the need” as one of the biggest variables in the 
2013 school bond failure, behind only “lack of input.” P2 added the problem lay 
“probably [in] the fact they didn’t establish their need heavy enough with the people that 
needed to vote in the first place, which would be the parents.” 
Poor Framing of the 2013 Bond Proposal 
Due to the lack of involvement and input during the school bond referendum 
proposal planning process, teachers, parents, and community members did not understand 
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school district facilities’ needs, were surprised by the bond referendum election 
announcement, and ultimately, had significant issues with the final school bond proposal. 
Several parents mentioned that the framing of the bond proposal was poor. P2 discussed 
reasons why the 2013 bond failed and homed in on the belief that “the framing of the 
bond was poor.” SBM expressed dislike of the model:  
The district needs something, but I don’t know if it needs this exact bond. That 
was kind of my angle. Wasn’t necessarily the angle of everyone who supported 
me. Many of them were no bond, ever, never. I’m a teacher; my wife’s a teacher; 
we just didn’t like the 2013, the shape and size and scope. We didn’t like that 
current model. 
Parents and community members expressed confusion that the 2013 school bond 
proposal focused on expansions at the junior high and high school when stated need was 
overcrowding in elementary schools. P5 reported that the people in the community: 
Knew that the population was growing and that there’s a need for additional 
schools at the elementary school level, but you weren’t feeling that at the junior 
high or high school level. I mean, the high school had this beautiful campus and 
it’s not full. It wasn’t then. The junior highs, there’s two junior highs. They were 
getting close to capacity, but they still weren’t at capacity. 
Teachers, parents, and community members were confused about the agenda of 
the school bond proposal itself. The Superintendent and FSBP agreed that the 2013 
school bond proposal was complicated by the many moving parts that involved moving 
kids from one campus to another and from one grade configuration to another with the 
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admission of “moving kids from one campus all the way up to another and creating new 
space on that campus.  There was just a lot of movement . . . very complicated.” 
The bond proposal was perceived as “not strategic.” A1 observed the board had 
tried: “To put something for athletics, for band, for every elementary. Trying to put 
something for everybody inside the district, instead of focusing on a set of needs and then 
prioritizing what exactly [was needed].”  SBM summarized the lack of connection to the 
voters, community, parents, etc.: 
What was going on with the school? I'm a teacher. I don’t know, schools are good 
in America. I’m actually a big fan of them, but it was $109 million bond with 
front and back pages of the flyer with tons of items listed. Some of those items 
were athletic items . . . I looked at it, and I kind of said, “Okay.” Didn't really sit 
right, but I can’t say I was angry when I first got the mailer. It seemed high, it 
seemed big, kind of threw up some red flags. Didn’t really love it, but it really 
wasn’t awful. It just didn’t really excite me in any way. There was something I 
didn’t like about it. 
Bond amount was too high. Almost all of parent and community members who 
participated in interviews talked about the large size of the school bond proposal amount 
impacting the negative election results, even those supportive of the school bond election 
efforts. SBM stated: 
It was over $100 million, so there’s, I'm sure, as an ignorant American there’s 
something in my subconscious. $100 million is a lot worse than $99 million. 
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There’s something about a gas price, that’s why they put a nine at the end. It’s not 
$1.02; it’s $1 or $1.09; $100 million was a big number. 
P1 had indicated strong support for education and for both school bonds but 
called the bond “ambitious” as follows: 
I feel the 2013 bond was very ambitious . . . we moved to [Town-Fringe] in 2006, 
so I know it sounds strange to say that we were new, but in [Town-Fringe] terms, 
we were still relatively new. And so, I knew about the bond. So, for someone who 
would take the time to try to learn about it, I know that the facts were there . . . 
I’ve recognized it was ambitious, it was big, it made sense to me as . . . we moved 
here from [Nearby Suburb in Urban Center], and so from the perspective of what 
I had known, and the idea of wanting to combine, to move the ninth grade to that 
campus and to combine the campus to build a CTE Center, all those things, that 
made sense to me. 
However, P5, also a highly-involved parent and community member, thought the 
bond amount in 2013 was “unreasonable,” especially without having had stakeholder 
input and discussion because “a lot of parents knew we needed new facilities but not at 
the price tag that they were talking about. That seemed just not reasonable. We need to 
have a better discussion.” 
P1 indicated that the community perception that the bond was “bloated” was a key 
variable in the failure of the 2013 school bond referendum election: 
Yeah, it’s easy to . . .  that’s an easy narrative [district waste] to portray. It’s easy 
to say, “Well, they could get along with less money. There’s waste in spending. 
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And they’re too top heavy,” all those kinds of things. And it’s difficult to 
overcome that narrative I think. . . . So, my perception is in the 2013 bond they 
were unsuccessful in overcoming the narrative that it was a bloated bond. 
Dislike of single-proposition bond. Stakeholders almost universally indicated 
that the single proposition approach to the bond referendum proposal negatively impacted 
school bond election results.  School district administrators characterized the 2013 bond 
as an “old school” approach to try to give “something to everyone.” A1 exemplified this 
thinking as follows:  
We administratively worked on it, and we . . . did with I would call old school. 
They tried to put something in it for every group out there. We tried to provide 
every entity something that would hopefully make them want to pass the bond. 
The Superintendent characterized this effort as a “kitchen sink” approach because “it was 
everything under the sun that had been identified in the needs assessment that would fit 
into what was logical and would create the kind of plan that we had.” 
A1 indicated that the strategy to use a single proposition was a very typical 
strategy school districts had used for years to woo multiple groups in the community to 
support a school bond referendum: 
The first one [in 2013] they tried to do, they tried to entice. If you’re a baseball 
fan, if you’re a football fan, if you’re an elementary parent . . . They tried to put 
something in there that would maybe cause each individual to say, “Oh, yeah, I 
like that,” and they put it one great big [proposition] . . . and hoped it would go. 
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That was very old school, because it used to work that way. I’ve been doing this 
for 29 years. That’s how everybody did it. 
SBM indicated that the anti-bond perspective was different. They saw the single 
bond proposition as “If you don’t like one thing, vote no,” rather than “something for 
everyone.” 
 It was 50/50, but you lump it altogether, and it the train of thought is, and they 
might be right, the marketing folks, when you lump something together, they say, 
“Well, now you’re going to have something for everybody.” I saw it almost a total 
opposite. I saw it, “If there’s just one thing they don’t like in there, now they got a 
reason to vote against it, at least in our community.” 
Many respondents also the problem with one bond proposition that left voters 
with no choice. “The bond was an all or nothing bond” [SBM]. P5 said, “if they’d have 
split it out, it probably would have more success in some areas, but since it was all 
lumped together” it was difficult to get all voters interested in the entire bond. P4 
recalled: 
I don’t think they gave you several different options. It was all or nothing. That 
never goes well. No school district bond election I’ve ever been involved in, that 
went well. People don’t like to do that. Not at the city level, not at the school 
district level, at all. 
A1 said, “The first one [bond in 2013] was just one proposition, and . . . people 
don’t like that in today’s world.” Respondents indicated that voters wanted to have 
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choices. P4 said that voters “want to be able to think you can pick and choose” and noted 
the following about how TFISD voters viewed this bond such as:  
“I don’t want to vote for athletics, I think we have plenty.” Or “I don’t want to 
vote for [the bond] because I hate the teacher that my kid had.” I mean, some of it 
becomes very personal. You want to be able to just vote for the parts that you 
want to vote for. If you look at the percentages, they don’t all pass at the same 
percentage. The percentages can vary wildly and some pass and some don’t. 
P4 also said, “I think there was one [school bond election] in [another nearby 
town], they passed everything but the stadium. Nobody wants to build another freaking 
football stadium.” 
Perception that bond proposal content was not supported by teachers. While 
teachers were not interviewed in the study, respondents indicated having a perception of 
teacher support of the bond and other respondents like P1 indicated that the perception 
was that teachers did not support the 2013 school bond referendum: “I’m told that a lot of 
the teachers did not even support it [the 2013 bond].”  The school bond referendum 
proposal had significant changes for teachers, including grade reconfigurations and 
relocation that would have impacted their working environment, curriculum and 
instruction, and teaching responsibilities on a day-to-day basis. Several respondents 
reported that because teachers were not involved in the early planning, these changes 
were perceived as a loss and negative by them. A2 said the following: 
The other thing is, talking about staff, we were going to relocate a significant 
number of staff in the 2013 bond election, where they would have to move into 
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different campuses, and because they weren’t included in the beginning in the 
front side of that process, I think that their reaction was [negative] . . . It’s about 
change, and change is hard for most people. 
Parents did not support due to perceived losses. Parents were perceived to 
oppose the school bond proposal for numerous reasons but were particularly opposed to 
new grade configurations perceived as moving elementary students to middle school too 
early; potential loss of opportunities at middle school due to a proposed middle school 
consolidation; and dislike of a perceived creation of a “mega” high school. Part of the 
bond proposal created new grade configurations: the bond proposal moved ninth grade to 
the high school to create a Grades 9 to 12 configuration; consolidated two middle schools 
into one middle school for Grades 7 and 8; and created a new kind of “Intermediate 
School” for Grades 5 and 6. Parents did not like the plan of moving fifth graders into an 
intermediate or middle school. SBM recalled: 
That’s right, people were up in arms, moms and dads, they weren’t a hard sell for 
me because they’re like, “You’re going to take my fifth grader? She was just a 
fourth grader. She was just a little fourth grader last summer and now two months 
later she’s going to be in like an intermediate school or a middle school type 
setting?” That was not a hard sell to convince people to ‘vote no’ on that part of it. 
The Superintendent described how the plan to consolidate two middle schools 
into one middle school was also perceived as a potential loss of benefits to their 
child(ren): 
159 
Maybe the one thing that parents were displeased with most in that 2013 plan was 
. . . consolidating the two middle schools into one. ‘Cause we have an old high 
school down here, that can accommodate 1,500 kids or so, that we only had one 
grade level on right now, which is wasted space.  So, the idea was move that one 
grade level up to the high school, which is 10 through 12, make it 9 through 12, 
bring all those kids, and then take the two middle schools, and pull your 
elementary top two grade levels off of that [i.e., fifth and sixth grade]. So, think 
about all that movement that was going on. And then, you’re making a mega kind 
of campus, and part of the comments there, and the mega middle school, it 
wouldn’t have been that big, but it’s pretty good sized, there were a lot of 
concerns about competitions. Athletics being significant in that, in that, 
“Currently you have, for example, three 7th grade teams in football at each 
campus, so the total is six.  Are you gonna just have three whenever you bring 
them together? Now my kid has half the chance to [participate] . . .” 
Staff and parents did not support the new grade configuration to locate a new 
consolidated middle school of 800 students in an existing Ninth Grade Center. A1 noted, 
“We were going to put all middle school students in the ninth grade center down on Main 
Street, which is the center of the town, and parents and staff did not approve of that.” A2 
added “it would have been about 800 kiddos in one campus.” A1 concluded, “They just 
did not approve of it, particularly where it was.” 
Part of the plan was to move the ninth graders into the high school, which parents 
perceived as creating a “mega” high school, which they did not want. While district 
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administrators believed that they were addressing academic and safety issues caused by 
the separation of the ninth grade from the high school (where students from both 
campuses have to take shuttles or drive multiple times daily causing loss of instructional 
time and safety issues), A2 reflected that parents perceived the issued differently:  
I think the shuttle doesn’t bother the community as much as it bothers us. We run 
shuttles all day long between high school and ninth grade for current tech classes 
or for ninth grade kiddos who are in choir or band or football, or Bluebells. And 
there’s lots of instructional time for those kids every day [lost] . . . it doesn’t raise 
the red flags or concerns. They [parents] were more concerned that it would be a 
mega high school and that there would be . . . 2,400 kids . . . and how would we 
keep the ninth graders segregated. That was more concerning to the community 
than it was to us [district administration]. 
Dislike of perceived athletics inclusion. Numerous respondents indicated that 
the inclusion, or the perceived inclusion, of a large portion of the bond for athletics, was 
problematic for many voters. P5 said, “There was automatic assumption that that is a lot 
of athletics, a lot of stuff, and people were like, ‘Nope. We’re not gonna do that without 
knowing more details.’”  P5 continued noting the presence of “a lot of unknowns that 
everyone believed that it was gonna be about more athletic facilities and things, and no 
one really wanted that. They wanted their focus on the education.” 
There was a lot of confusion about the amount of athletics included in the bond. 
P1’s perception was that misinformation was deliberately disseminated about an incorrect 
amount dedicated to athletics in the school bond proposal: 
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I know there was a lot of misinformation about the bond that was spread. There 
were some people who on social media spread some information about . . . for 
example I think there was $50 million in there for upgrades at the high school for 
CTE. And part of that was to, I seem to remember, to build a softball field and 
those kinds of things. But the accusation was made that those sports things were 
the sum of that $50 million. So, there’s a lot of misinformation about that. 
In addition, SBM noted the athletics plan was perceived as destroying long-term 
efforts by athletics boosters to improve the baseball fields as follows. 
There was a big athletic component. They were going to move the baseball, they 
were going to tear down or move or get rid of the baseball field over here, and 
move it up to the high school. The baseball boosters and parents were like, 
“We’ve spent the last 40 years blood, sweat, and tears, mowing that grass, putting 
up stone, building, rake and shovel, and fundraising.” 
District’s Poor Communication and Lack of Trust 
District administrators, parents, school board member, and community members 
indicated that communication and lack of trust was a major problem in the 2013 school 
bond referendum election process. P5 remarked: 
Things happen all the time, but in that bond election, what I remember is, the 
communication wasn’t there . . . I think in 2013, there really was very little 
communication. It was, “We need this. This is how much we need and boom, 
there it is.” Just expected everybody to vote yes. 
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CM said that one of the major factors of bond failure of the 2013 election was 
that, “That we did not communicate as well. We did not communicate as well, and a lot 
of that was because of the leadership of the group that was working with us.” P5 agreed 
that the lack of communication was an important variable in the failure of the school 
bond election, “Communication was not great, as I remember, as a parent who was at the 
school every day. . . . Things happen all the time, but in that bond election, what I 
remember is, the communication wasn’t there.” 
The Superintendent reflected on having: 
A lot of support for the bond, but I think we were talking to school-friendly. So, 
we were talking to the crowd that we wanted to talk to, that was easy to talk to, 
and those that were likely to vote against us, we weren’t [giving] them any 
attention at all. 
Due to lack of communication, the announcement of the school bond referendum 
election was a surprise. SBM characterized himself as an involved citizen and was 
surprised when he received the school bond election flyer because when he received “the 
flyer in the mail. It was the first I’d heard about it. I’m not your average voter. I’d like to 
think I was fairly involved.” SBM did not provide a unique response. Even teachers and 
district staff were surprised by the announcement of the school bond referendum election. 
District leader A2 said:  
In fact, the school board . . . [voted] for the bond election at a special meeting on a 
Saturday, and it came out in the newspaper on Sunday . . . and that’s how the 
majority of our staff found out that we were having a bond election. 
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A2 had the perception that the plan was a secret and noted: 
Our staff reacted more strongly to that than anybody else, but I think that’s 
because in the process of that bond election, if it had passed, we were going to be 
moving a whole lot of staff members, you know, a whole lot of different 
campuses.  
Parents 4 and 5 specifically mentioned that there was a lack of information at the 
campus level, one of the most critical places for parents to receive information. They 
were used to having important information about the campus and school district sent 
home with their children (in their folders) but could not recall school bond information 
being sent home from the campus during the 2013 school bond referendum election. P4 
recalled: 
There wasn’t a lot of information. There wasn’t a lot of information at the school 
level. There wasn’t any [information at the school level] . . . The schools can’t 
vote for, but they can give you the information about it . . . they never even did 
that [send home factual information about the school bond election with the 
students] that I remember. 
P5 observed that “communication was not great, as I remember, at as a parent who was 
the school every day. Nobody really knew what the money was for.” 
The opposition group had a well-organized, well-funded anti-bond PAC that 
utilized significant anti-bond communications and marketing strategies against the bond 
election. A1 remarked, “We did have a very intentional anti-bond campaign that was very 
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convincing, because I fully believe that people’s perception is their reality, regardless of 
whether the facts are true or not.”  
Anti-bond groups provided funding that supported marketing and 
communications efforts for the opposition, including political ads, flyers, posters, and 
signs, and social media.  “A couple of other groups that put money in that created 
advertising that was walked through neighborhoods and hung on doors and things of that 
nature” [Superintendent].  The Superintendent talked about seeing the “political ad paid 
for by Citizens Against TFISD Bond.”  P2 mentioned an item that indicated how intense 
the anti-bond sentiment was: 
That was kind of weird. I remember [pro-bond] signs being graffitied around 
town with the word ‘no’ on them, that would be ‘vote’ and then whatever would 
be spray painted a big ‘no’ on the sign. It was pretty much a day or two after any 
sign that went up, it had been graffitied to read vote no. So, there was something 
there, but I don’t know where it was coming from. 
More importantly, the anti-bond opposition accessed and effectively utilized 
powerful, informal social communications networks. The SBM talked about informal 
communication between friends and community members in discussing the school bond 
proposal. This influential person talked about discussing the school bond proposal within 
his social circle: 
Well, I asked around to my social network, my circle of friends, who are fairly 
like-minded. We are all on the same page that this probably isn't the right time or 
place to be doing something like this. 
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A part of these informal networks was social media, mentioned by several 
respondents, including the superintendent and parents, as significant in building a 
community around the anti-bond efforts. The Superintendent recalled: 
Were very adept in social media, which was a new medium really. At least in my 
experience. 2013, Facebook is really just getting popular, there were tweets and 
information like that and all that is relatively new media at that time. And, it was 
used effectively. 
The anti-bond opposition was able to effectively use anti-tax and anti-government 
narratives to portray the school board and school district as a “bad tax collector” and 
“ineffective and wasteful” government institution. A2 reflected: 
In 2013, they said, “use the national perception of government mismanagement of 
funds and government being unethical or not truthful, or sliding something under 
the carpet,” and they brought it down to a community level and used it against us, 
and people were very quick to believe that.  
The anti-bond opposition used themes of government ineffectiveness and waste 
that were already a significant part of the context in the community to create a story of 
the district as wasteful. District administrators A1 and A2 recalled a story that was used 
by the anti-bond proponents to create a narrative of the district as a wasteful spender with 
lavish tastes, based upon a school board trip to the state capital where they stayed at a 
well-known, high-dollar hotel. While the trip was at negotiated rates, anti-bond 
supporters were able to effectively use this story to create an impression in the 
community the school board and school district as a wasteful and spendthrift government 
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institution. A1 and A2 talked about this story and how damaging it was to the school 
district’s reputation. A1 recalled remembering the situation “so well” in the following: 
Our annual school board conference that’s in Austin, they wrote and put out there 
that our school board stayed at the Four Seasons Hotel in Austin and made a big 
deal about that it was the Four Seasons, I guess, instead of Super 8 Hotel. But all 
of those were conference hotels, so they had conference rates, and I felt so bad for 
our board about that, because board members, this is not a paid position. They do 
countless hours . . . They rarely get a thank you. They get a lot of complaints: “I 
want this,” and “I don’t think this teacher did that,” and “I don’t like this,” and “I 
want this.” . . . Not only did they state all that, but they failed to say that it was a 
conference rate of $150. They also showed a picture of two women in bikinis 
lounging by the pool. It was just a random picture. It wasn’t any of our people. 
A2 noted how damaging this story was to the image of the district: 
By that point, we knew that we couldn’t refute what was going on out there, and 
by the time that [story] came out . . . it was too much, and it was too little too late, 
for us really. 
Stories like this Four Seasons episode only fed into the community’s perception of the 
negative impact of the narrative of the prior bond building of a new high school as being 
an extravagant “Taj Mahal High School” and an “extravagant new school.” District 
administrators reported negative messaging influencing the bond election outcomes. 
Within this context, it was difficult for the district to “create a hopeful vision of the future 
rooted in organizational history,” a strategy that Bolman and Deal (2008) suggested can 
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be used to support the symbolic aspects of a change process. Rather than the district 
having “short-term benchmarks or victories,” the school board and district school bond 
election campaign was continually in reactive mode, with the anti-bond campaign scoring 
short-term victories (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 395). A2 discussed the school district’s 
ineffectiveness with counteracting the anti-bond messages:  
Their communication messages beat ours every time. We very quickly got on the 
defense. Instead of telling our story, we were trying to respond to their 
accusations. I’m not saying that we weren’t trying to tell our story while it was 
happening, of course we were, and we were doing all the presentations and had all 
the information on our website. We did all those standard things that you always 
do, but it just felt like the whole time that our community was very quick to 
believe the opposition messages, no matter how outrageous they were, and very 
reluctant to believe our responses. 
A2 indicated how damaging this was to the district’s effort to build trust with the 
community: “But once that’s out there, I don’t care what you do and how carefully you 
crack your story, you can’t refute, you can’t overcome the belief that has already been 
ingrained by that first message.” 
District administrator A2 indicated that the district became after the failure of the 
2013 school bond referendum election that they community did not trust the district:  
To have lost by that landslide, it was unbelievable. It was unbelievable. It really 
did say to me, “people don’ trust us” . . . I don’t know if I was shocked. I don’t 
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think I knew what to think, but the part that shocked me is it failed three to one. 
That is a beating. That is a message that is screaming at you.  
The 2013 school bond referendum election proposal had significant changes in 
school configurations, impacting almost students, teachers, and parents at every grade 
level. Respondents mentioned the strong impact of these changes to teachers and parents 
but made no mention of strategies or activities designed to “acknowledge losses or 
changes,” strategies Bolman and Deal (2008) indicated create trust in a change process 
(p. 395). The FSBP acknowledged the significant concerns of teachers as well as the 
impact teachers votes could have on the school bond election outcome, while implying 
the school board and district administration were unable to address teacher concerns: 
You had a lot of teachers that weren’t for the bond just for that particular reason, 
that this [the bond proposal] means change. And “I love my school, I love my 
principal.” The thought of them moving fifth and sixth graders to a solo campus 
means that “we’re going to have to move. I’m going to have to do things 
different.” They weren’t in favor of that . . . And there’s no way to tell them, “No, 
you won’t be affected. Because they will be.” 
The FSBP observed the significant impact teachers could have on the school bond 
referendum election results “when you have 700 or 800 staff and you have 2[000] or 
3,000 people that vote on a bond in a district like TFISD, they could be easily the factor 
that changes the course of a bond.” FSBP implied that teachers’ concerns may have been 
a significant factor in the 2013 school bond election failure when he said: 
169 
A funny thing about it is that the staff, the teachers, those people that if they voted 
. . . They could pass the bond easily. The fear with the teachers is they’re going to 
have to move their classrooms. They’re going to be put into different settings. 
They don’t want change. They want to keep everything [the same]. 
FBSP also recognized the impact of the 2013 bond on parents but did not indicate 
strategies or actions to address parent concerns: 
When you build new elementary schools, your school boundaries change. 
Sometimes that’s more important to parents and families than the 3¢ per 100 
value that it’s gonna cost you. Just the whole idea of having to change your 
routine. I think that that’s a bigger deal than anything; [it] is just that whole idea 
that everything’s gonna change. You know? The kids are gonna have to get to the 
bus station earlier or they’re not gonna get home as early. That’s a big deal to 
voters, parents. 
 Bolman and Deal (2008) indicated that organizational leaders can utilize key 
political strategies that create trust and help ensure the success of a change process. These 
strategies to negotiate the political realm and create trust, included: “creating a map of the 
political terrain, including determining the informal channels of communication, 
identifying principal agents of political influence, and analyzing the possibilities for 
mobilizing internal and external players; networking with key players; stacking the team 
with credible and influential team members to serve in key roles in the school bond 
referendum process; and creating arenas for the discussion and negotiation of political 
issues, building alliances, and resolving opposition (p. 395). The lack of attention to these 
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variables caused distrust with teachers, parents, and community members, and enabled 
the anti-bond forces to prevail in the bond election. 
 Mapping the political terrain is one of the strategies that can be used to effectively 
navigate the political domain during a change process (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 395). 
However, during the 2013, there was little evidence of the school board or district 
administration mapping the political terrain. There were limited meetings with key 
influencers whose inputs were not factored into bond planning, especially opposition 
views. In addition, key stakeholders, including parents, teachers, and community 
members had little opportunity to provide input into the facilities’ needs assessment or 
school bond proposal planning process.  
As mentioned previously, during 2013, there was little evidence of the school 
board members or district administrators networking with key influencers. This offered 
school board members and district administrators little opportunity to build trust with key 
influencers in the community. One meeting was referenced as occurring with the local 
state legislator who stated his opposition to the bond. In addition, the 2013 school board 
and district administrators appeared not to network with the key influencers and players 
of prior school bonds, including the PAC treasurer of the successful 1999 bond election. 
As indicated earlier, limited attention was given to recruiting “credible, influential 
team members to serve in key roles” in the school bond referendum process (Bolman & 
Deal, 2008, p. 395). No data about the leaders of the Citizens’ Advisory Committee or 
the PAC were found. Although there seemed to be an attempt to identify “credible, 
influential team members to serve in key roles,” respondents indicated numerous gaps in 
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this process. The 2013 school board and district leadership did not recruit the community 
member who had chaired the 1999 PAC or the bond treasurer of the 1999 bond to serve 
in a meaningful role. Recruiting for the Citizens’ Advisory Committee was haphazard, 
recruiting mainly pro-bond committee members via principals’ recommendations. 
Moreover, recruiting efforts did not include members from the opposition. 
The school board and school district administration did not seem to be aware of 
the need to build alliances during the 2013 school bond election efforts, missing another 
opportunity to build trust with parents, teachers, and community members. As indicated 
earlier, school board members and district administrators believed that the community 
would be in support of school bond efforts. There was a lack of understanding of the 
significant anti-bond, anti-tax, and anti-government sentiment in the community that 
would need to be addressed, as well as potential parent and teachers concerns with any 
specific school bond proposal. As a result, the school board and school district 
administration were not focused on building alliances in the 2013 school bond election 
process. 
Although there was Citizens’ Advisory Committee, the committee was divided 
into subcommittees, which then reported back to the larger committee and finally the 
school board with final recommendations for the school bond election proposal. This 
essentially left the committee with no “arena” to discuss and debate critical issues, 
suggested by Bolman and Deal (2008) as a strategy to address political issues in a change 
process. As a result, the final bond proposal ended up as a kitchen sink proposal. The 
Superintendent admitted: 
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And we divided them up into [subcommittees] . . . there was like a safety and 
security group; there was a population group; and then, there was a group that 
looked at maintenance-type items that needed to be addressed, and one that 
looked at just straight facilities, and if you needed to add a new facility or an 
addition to an existing facility. So, they each took their own component, kind of 
did their own study, and that was the design of the committee. 
The Superintendent labeled the final bond proposal to be a non-strategic kitchen 
sink approach:  
And it was a kitchen-sink approach, too.  It was everything under the sun that had 
been identified in the needs assessment that would fit into what was logical and 
would create the kind of plan that we had. 
The kitchen sink approach to the bond package was mentioned by numerous participants 
as having a negative impact on 2013 school bond election results. 
The tone and content of interview responses from school board members and 
school district administrators in the 2013 school bond election indicated that they were 
shocked by the opposition to the school bond in the 2013 school bond election. School 
district administrators mentioned significant difficulties defusing the opposition. 
Interview responses from the superintendent and central office administrators indicated a 
lack of ability of the school district to defuse the opposition, and an inability to counter 
the anti-bond PAC’s messages and anticipate the anti-bond PAC’s counterstrategies. The 
Superintendent explicated: 
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We were upset that there was that anti-PAC out there, and we couldn’t believe 
they were telling all those lies . . . we had no idea how to combat it, how to 
respond to that, how to manage that, if it could be managed, or rebut it, so [it] 
grew legs. People want to believe the bad stuff. 
Organized Anti-bond Opposition 
District administrators uniformly described significant, organized opposition to 
the school bond referendum as a major variable in the failure of the 2013 school bond 
election. The Superintendent reported that “there was very organized opposition [to the 
bond proposal/bond election] . . . it was just a very well-orchestrated anti-movement.” A2 
concluded that the “most vivid memory of 2013 was that we had a pretty strong 
opposition group.” 
Statewide opposition. District central office staff characterized much of the anti-
bond sentiment as outside influence from statewide political groups. “Fast forward to 
2013, and we have significant outside influence from groups like [Statewide Advocacy 
Organization] out of Austin . . .” [Superintendent]. The Superintendent continued: 
None of those funds came from local sources. So, there was very much a 
statewide effort that targeted local public school bonds in communities across the 
state to put out what I would call “misinformation” and “detractors” from these 
local school bonds, to encourage the voter to vote in a negative way towards those 
bonds . . .We could look at what was being published, and know that it was not 
local authorship, that it was coming from an organized [statewide group] . . . even 
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though they would localize it to the specifics of our bond, a lot of the statistics 
were very statewide. 
A1, in a separate interview, concurred: “I think it came from the [Name of 
Organization] at Austin . . . I think it came from a larger organization overall, not just 
grassroots here in [Name of County].” 
Local opposition. However, P1 referenced local opposition that funded and 
supported the anti-bond efforts: 
. . . there is a very active default “no” contingent in the area. It seems to be led by 
and individual who owns a lot of rental property, and he funds the “no group” . . . 
this time I saw himself more involved. I saw how it worked. He funds the no 
group, and through social media it’s very easy to activate that. 
2015 School Bond Election 
By 2014-2015, numerous economic indicators signaled that Town-Fringe was 
experiencing a rebound after the 2008-2009 Great Recession. The community was 
projected to continue to experience significant economic growth over the next 25 years, 
as shown by indicators such as: industry employment; city and area annual sales & tax 
use trends; hotel and motel growth; new residential and commercial building permits; 
existing home sales; home values; oil prices; and business expansion in the area (2015 
TFISC FACTS Committee Meeting #2 Presentation). In fact, the town was labelled a 
“gateway business center” to the larger metropolitan area. 
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Continued Community and Economic Growth 
In 2015, community growth trends seen in 2013 were expected to continue in the 
future, with a 3.5% annual growth rate and projected population of 40,667 in 2040 based 
on NCTCOG 2013 Estimates (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #2 
Presentation). [Name of Local County] was expected to have a 66% growth rate between 
2010 and 2035, and Town-Fringe was projected to have a 50% growth rate between 2010 
and 2035 (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #2 Presentation). These growth 
estimates were conservative: the city had already surpassed the 2013 projections with a 
population of 29,969 in 2016 versus the projected population at 29,646 in 2020 (2015 
TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #2 Presentation).  
 
Figure 6. Population and demographic trends and forecasts for the city and county 
housing the school district 2000-2040. 
Growth of School-aged Children Continued 
Growth of school-aged children also continued from 2013 to 2015. In the 2015-
2016 school year, TFISD had 7,840 students and 521 teachers. In the 2015-2016 school 
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year, 68.1% of students were White, 24.5% were Hispanic, 2.4% were African American, 
2.9% were Two or more Races, and <1% of students were Asian, <1% were American 
Indian, and <1% were Pacific Islander. 41.7% of district students were economically 
disadvantaged, 8.2% of students were English Learners, 43.9% were considered at-risk, 
and 9.1% Special Education (TEA TAPR Report, 15-16). 
Demographic projections shared with the 2015 TFISD bond committee projected 
that district growth trends would continue. As seen in Figure 7, TFISD would reach more 
than 8,000 students by the fall of 2018, with a projected enrollment of 8,517 by the year 
2024/25. Total middle school enrollment was projected to grow by 5.86% in 2016. 
TFISD High School was projected to have 1,800 students by 2022 (2015 TFISD FACTS 
Committee Meeting #2 Presentation).  
 
Figure 7. Student population trends and projections by grade from 2010 to 2025. 
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Continued Pressure on Elementary School Facilities 
The school district continued to feel the effects of aging facilities and community 
growth, especially overcrowding at the elementary level. The Superintendent said that in 
2015 the school district was: 
Still feeling the pressures of overcrowding. In fact, we’ve just grown another 2 
years from that time to this time, so the factor’s even greater than it was . . . after 
the 2013 bond failed, we did end up putting up eight portables in the district to 
help us with that [overcrowding]. 
A1’s feedback confirmed that “none of those needs went away, from 2013 to 2015. They 
only increased, actually.” 
2015 School Bond Election Bond Proposals 
The 2015 school bond referendum proposal was called when the TFISD’s Board 
of Trustees voted unanimously to call a $74.9 million bond election to be held in May of 
2015 to address three main areas: 1) Existing Facility Improvements for $18.8 million; 2) 
Grade Level Realignment and Growth for $49.5 million; and 3) Safety and Security for 
$6.6 million. The bond proposal was split into three (3) separate bond propositions: 
Proposition 1.  Proposition 1 for Existing Facilities Improvement included 
upgrades and improvements for $18.8 million to: 1) Comply with current codes and 
standards; 2) Increase safety and security; 3) Make schools more energy efficient; 4) 
Extend the life of each facility. This included funding for district-wide upgrades to major 
building systems that exceeded the limits of the district’s operational budget, like heating 
and air conditioning, lighting and electrical; improvements to exterior issues, including: 
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masonry, concrete and site drainage; renovations to aging facilities for compliance with 
building code and the Americans with Disabilities Act; and safety and security upgrades: 
including, fire alarm replacements, access control systems, classroom intruder function 
door hardware and security cameras. 
Proposition 2.  Proposition 2 for was for $49.5 million to realign elementary 
schools to K-5 and middle schools to 6-8 by replacing an outdated middle school, 
renovating a second middle school, and moving sixth graders from elementary schools 
into the new middle schools. The benefits of this plan was to provide better alignment 
with age-appropriate curriculum and state accountability standards; eliminate the need to 
transport sixth graders to middle schools for advanced classes and fine arts; provide space 
for student growth over the next decade at the elementary school level; and remove 
students from portable buildings. Funding was to support the demolition and construction 
of [New Middle School #1 serving Grades 6-8] for $41.1 million and for $8.4 million to 
renovate [Middle School #22 serving Grades 6-8]. The reason that complete replacement 
was proposed for [Middle School #11], was because Addition/Renovation would cost 
$31.3 million with only a 20-year lifespan, whereas New Construction would cost $41.1 
million and provide a 50 years or more lifespan. 
Proposition 3.  Proposition 3 was for $6.6 million for Safety and Security 
included the construction of controlled entrances to improve security at all campuses 
throughout the school district. 
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2015 School Bond Election Success  
In the 2015 school bond referendum election, all three propositions passed, with a 
very close margin. Proposition 1 passed with 52.52% (2,281 votes) to 47.48% (2,062) 
with 4,343 votes cast (passed by 219 votes). Proposition 2 passed with 50.08% (2,169 
votes) to 49.92% (2,162 votes), with 4,331 votes cast – a difference of 7 votes (school 
administrators reported that 4 ballots were invalidated, so the total difference was 
actually 3 votes). Proposition 3 passed with 51.9% (2,252 votes) to 48.1% (2,087 votes) 
with 4,339 total votes, a difference of 165 votes. These vote outcomes matched very 
closely to the pre-bond voter likelihood of bond passage projections. 
Variables in 2015 School Bond Success – Modern School Bond Election 
Eleven major variables characterized the 2015 school bond success in TFISD, 
TX: (a) changed attitude and approach to the community and school bond election 
process; (b) increased awareness of stakeholder perceptions and the community context; 
(c) expert capacity to support new school bond processes; (d) extensive community needs 
assessment & pre-bond planning activities; (e) comprehensive bond election planning 
process; (f) effective leadership recruitment and training; (g) substantive input and 
involvement from a representative group of stakeholders; (h) clear, appealing bond 
proposals, including low bond amount, bond content, and multiple propositions; (i) 
improved communication and increased trust; (i) effectively addressed multiple 
structural, human resource, political, and symbolic dimensions of change process; (k) no 
“anti-bond”/opposition efforts. 
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Changed Attitude and a Modern Approach  
As a result of the failure of the 2013 school bond referendum election, the school 
board and school district administration completely changed their attitude to the 
community and subsequent approach to the school bond referendum process. Interview 
respondents reported an immediate and dramatic change of the attitudes of the school 
board and school district administration in the 2015 school bond referendum election. 
This new attitude included being humble, listening to the community, and actively 
soliciting input and diverse perspectives. The SBM indicated the humble nature of the 
school board after the 2013 election: 
[The next steps of the school board] . . . was to immediately say, “We screwed 
up” . . . “Hey, we don’t want to screw up like this again. The district is very 
humble. The district is not angry.” Behind closed doors they might’ve been, but 
they were very, “Man, we screwed up. That was an embarrassment. I can’t 
believe we did that.” 
  Another attitude of the school board and school district administration switched 
from one of “telling” to “listening.” The school board and school district began to reach 
out and listen in multiple ways. The Superintendent said:  
So, I think the board did a great job. First, they had to eat that crow, and say, "We 
were arrogant in how we approached the first one. We need to stop and listen, and we 
need to move through our community.” 
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P1 concurred when he noted, “I think that there was an attitude among the administration 
that ‘we need to do what we need to do. We need to do it well and build trust with the 
community.’” 
The school board and school district administration changed their approach to 
every part of the school bond election process. The Superintendent characterized this new 
approach as a modern bond election:  
We learned a hard lesson, and then we tried to begin taking in all those other 
variables and factors that certainly play into what I would call, “A modern bond 
election,” because it’s very different than the way you would run a bond election 
10 years ago, probably even 8 years ago. 
A1 summarized: “We changed processes, [and] we changed people to help us with that 
process, and that made all the difference” 
Increased Awareness of Stakeholder Perceptions and Community Context 
Awareness of need for voter approval. In the 2015 school bond referendum 
election process, there was a new recognition of the need to gain voter/taxpayer approval 
for a school bond referendum. A1 summed it up this way: “And a governmental entity 
such as public school district, you have all your constituents, and you have to ask a 
taxpayer, ‘Will you or will you not approve this’?” As P4 proclaimed: “I’m a tax payer. 
I’m not just a parent; I’m a tax payer. I’m gonna be a tax payer for decades.” 
The school board and district administration recognized that the community 
would not simply “blindly support” a school district initiative. The Superintendent 
concluded “people want to support their schools, that came across. But people don’t want 
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to just blindly trust that entity, government, or however we’re being viewed.” The school 
board and school administrators recognized that the environment had changed, and that 
support of school district did not necessarily mean support of school bonds or vice versa: 
School bond elections have changed significantly in the last few years, and they 
all love your school, even those that vote against you, and that’s not what it’s 
about. So, we gotta get over ourselves about, “We’re a great ISD, and our 
community loves us, and we do great things.” You do, but that doesn’t mean that 
they’re willing to send more monies to do certain things for you. 
Changes in school funding laws increased need for voter approval. A part of 
this new environment was precipitated by a 2005 change in Texas facilities’ funding law 
that had gone unrecognized in the 2013 school bond referendum election. A1 explained a 
Texas facilities’ funding law that had changed in 2005, requiring school districts to go 
out for school bond elections to secure additional facilities’ funding, where school boards 
might have previously been able to increase the tax rate a small amount without voter 
approval.  
The other critical thing to be said about addressing facilities in the environment 
that we're in, ever since the buy down of the tax rate in 2005, no school board has 
the ability to go above $1.04 without a rollback election, and even when you do 
that, you still can't go above $1.17. Our school board did that in 2010. So, we 
have been at the maximum tax rate allowed by law since 2010, and we can’t go 
up any further, and so the only way TFISD, or any other district receives 
additional funds if they’ve exercised that and their community approved it, is by 
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additional student growth and/or property value. We’re blessed at TFISD, that we 
have both . . . increasing ADA (Average Daily Attendance) and increasing 
property value, [but] that can never rake off $75 million to do a brand new school 
and the needed renovations. So, the only way any district can address this 
[facilities needs] big time, is through a bond election, and that’s new since 2005, 
because back in the day, if you needed to do a renovation on a building or if you 
needed to put a new roof on priority 2005, you could speak with your school 
board, see if they were willing to raise the tax rate a penny or two, and then they 
could take it back down after they did their project if they so desire[d]. They don’t 
have that ability anymore. 
Recognition that voter preferences impacted school bond election success. There 
was a new recognition by the school board and school district administrators that 
parent/community member preferences as voters and taxpayers figured significantly into 
the success or failure of a school bond referendum election. The FSBP expressed it this 
way: 
I mean, in order to meet the needs of the community, they [the school district] 
have to pass bonds. There’s no other way of building facilities. The state has it 
that way and you know, it’s a battle . . . if the community says that we want to 
have the biggest dad gum [sic] stadium in the state of Texas and they’re willing to 
pay for it tax-wise, then that’s what you’ll have . . . a small community like . . . 
[Name of Another Nearby Town] tried to get football passed on this last bond. 
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They rejected it. And that’s the community’s prerogative that they can do that 
[italics added for emphasis]. 
The SBM emphasized the importance of understanding and meeting voters’ wants 
and needs:  
[As a new board member] Every time there was questions or things brought up, 
there was six chairs that turned down and my seat was at the very end. “[Name of 
SBM], what do you think?” They brought me on quick, and they just picked my 
brain. They said, “Why didn’t you . . . [support the previous bond]. Why? What 
can we do different[ly]?” Ultimately it was, “Well, I know the district has its own 
needs, but really we shouldn’t put anything out there to the voter that they don’t 
want.” 
 The SBM indicated that there might be a wide range of parents and community 
(voter) preferences and expectations for education and educational facilities: 
We had a dinner conversation like three days after I was sworn in when we had a 
school board meeting . . . They asked me, they started grilling me. Everybody had 
a couple beers, you know. Now no one’s trying to be polite to [Name of SBM] 
anymore. Now they’re like, “Why the heck did you vote against this? What were 
you thinking? Why did you . . . You don’t like the kids? What are you against?” 
At one point, one of them said, “It’s the best for the children. That’s why we’re 
here.” 
I said to him, I said, “Well, you know the word ‘best’ is very subjective. 
The best thing we could have for the kids is to put a dome over that football 
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stadium. That would be the absolute best. Hands down. If you want the best for 
kids, then we got to put a dome over that stadium. But of course you don’t want a 
dome over the stadium because that’s ridiculous. You see that it’s subjective, 
right? What’s ‘your best’ might not be ‘the best’, might not be ‘my best’. Yes, we 
all want what’s ‘best’ for kids, but what’s ‘best’?” 
Oftentimes, that’s subjective and that’s what you have to find out. What is 
the subjective consensus of your community? Your community wants what’s best 
for kids. Nobody wants kids in jail, kids failing. Just look at how they yell at the 
district when you do bad on a standardized test score, right? Everyone wants your 
district to be great. But what’s ‘great’ is subjective. Some people think it’s great if 
the kids can go to school and write on a chalkboard, learn some arithmetic. They 
don’t call it math, you know the old-timers, learn some arithmetic, learn some 
science. You know they’re not bullied, they’re safe, then they get a job or they go 
to college. That’s the best we can ask for. That’s ‘great’. Other people are like, 
“Well, do they have tablets? Do they have wireless internet? Do they have access 
to international studies? How many field trips are there per semester? What’s the 
degree level of the faculty members?” Best is subjective. 
Acknowledged need to build trust through increased communication and 
transparency. After the shocking failure of the school bond election in 2013, school 
district administrators recognized the need to improve communication and build trust 
with parents, teachers, and community members.  
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Need to build trust. A2 recognized the need to build trust and better 
communication with the community, as evidenced by the results of the 2013 school bond 
election: 
My take after the 2013 bond election was our community does not trust our 
school district. That was from a communications department, that’s the message 
that I took. So then how do you start in all of your communication messages to 
build trust in what’s happening in the school district? 
Need to improve communication. The school board and school district 
recognized a need to improve communication with stakeholders and voters. A1 recalled: 
But you know, I’m a taxpayer too, but I’m inside this one, and so I really know 
and understand and believe. But there’s only a few of us that have access to all 
that, right, and so the rest, we have to be able to communicate it in a way that 
they’re like, “Okay, I think I understand the need and I believe I can support that.” 
Awareness of the impact of prior bond. The prior bond in the 2015 school bond 
referendum election was the failed 2013 school bond referendum attempt. Although some 
of the concerns about the prior bond proposal remained a concern for teachers, parents, 
and community members in the 2015 school bond election, other concerns had 
diminished or were more effectively addressed by the school board and school district 
during the 2015 school bond proposal development process. 
The length of time since the prior bond in 2013 actually proved to be a positive 
variable in the 2015 school bond election. The 2013 was close enough for the issues to be 
fresh in the community’s memory, but a long enough time for the community to feel like 
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there had been a substantive planning process that was not rushed. P2 indicated this when 
he said: 
It just seemed like it moved at a slower [pace]. It went on for a longer period. I 
guess you could say it moved at a slower pace, but it was because they started 
campaigning earlier. They took more time into getting it out there than the first 
time. I remember the first bond it seemed like beginning to end it was a pretty 
short period. You are advertising voting within a month or so. The second time, it 
seemed like it was more of a 2 or 3 month campaign. It was a lot more involved. 
Actually, if I think really hard back to it, it was almost like the campaign started 
the day after the first one failed [2015 bond]. 
The voter survey results showed that bond amount was still a significant concern 
in the 2015 school bond election. This held true even for teachers and staff members. A 
report from a staff member from the staff member survey of the voter survey said, “That 
is a lot of money for any school district to have control of. I don’t think that the 
community is ready to see that kind of dollar amount in a bond” (TFISD Staff Verbatims, 
[Name of Survey Firm]). 
The possibility for district waste and poor stewardship of bond fund remained a 
concern in the 2015 school bond election campaign environment. District administrators 
suggested that the district improving trust regarding the district stewardship of bond 
funds in the 2015 was still an important variable. The Superintendent said:  
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That was another factor that was in it, and that came out in that survey as kind of 
a trust thing. “You’re gonna have to show us that you’re gonna do what you say 
within reason, and do it on time, and within the budget that we give you.”  
Respondents specifically mentioned a distrust of the motive of the architectural 
firm’s potential “mixed motives” in guiding the process. Both a parent who was very 
supportive of the school district and both bond efforts (P1), as well as a parent who was 
more critical of bond efforts talked about the concern of cost overestimation (SBM). [P1] 
said: 
You never really know [about how much things really cost]. They tell you it’s 
going to cost $46 million dollars to build a building. I don’t have the capacity to 
go through a detailed analysis of that and know whether they’ve padded that or 
not. 
[SBM] also indicated a lack of trust for the architectural firm to accurately 
represent facilities’ needs, and felt this created an urgency to negotiate a savvy business 
deal: 
Another piece of advice is, in this day and age I think probably throughout the 
state, is your marketing arm unless you’re an enormous district and have your 
own huge PR department, but your marketing arm is going to be that of the 
architecture firm. Use them, but do not . . . not subjugate. What would be the 
word? Do not release or relinquish power to them. They’re for-profit entities. 
They’re in it to make money. Ultimately, there will be an overlap where there’s 
goodness that happens, but there's money that they're trying to do too. We’re 
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trying to save money. This Venn diagram, kind of weird thing, but the overlap is 
we're trying to do good, and we’re going to meet in the middle, but the sacrifice is 
we might want to save some money so they got to lose profit, or maybe they 
won’t even make profit. You can’t just trust the architecture firm to tell you what 
your needs are. They’re going to tell you what their wants are. [italics added for 
emphasis]. They might be some of your needs, ironically, happily, hopefully if 
you’ve got the right architecture firm. You need to tell them what your needs are, 
and you got to filter out their wants from your needs.  
A1 also mentioned this risk as a natural part of the facilities construction process, 
but also that it was a valid concern:  
Some of those things all look small and insignificant, but that’s no different than 
when you and I go to Walmart, we’re going to go in there, we’re just going to get 
a couple of things, and we come back out $150 later. 
Responses from the voter survey indicated that stakeholders wanted a detailed 
bond plan. A teacher responded in the voter survey, “I need more details on where and 
how the money will be utilized to see if I personally agree that it would be a need for the 
district or simply cosmetic” (2015 TFISD Voter Survey Staff Verbatims).  
Addressed concern through detailed facilities needs assessment and facilities’ 
tours. Interview reports suggested that the school board and school district more 
effectively addressed this concern in the 2015 school bond referendum election. One of 
the ways that the school board and school district administrators more effectively 
addressed this concern was through the detailed facilities’ needs assessment that provided 
190 
assurance regarding accuracy of bond facilities’ estimated costs. The facilities’ needs 
assessment was also “tiered,” which provided reassurance to stakeholders regarding the 
prioritization and equity of facilities’ costs and projects. A specific facility needs 
assessment report was created for each and every school building and facility in the 
district, in order to achieve equitable treatment. The facilities’ needs assessments were 
extensive: respondents reported large binders of information and summaries of the needs 
assessments were available online. This provided information that led to stakeholder trust 
that estimated bond costs were accurate.  
In addition, the school board and school district held facilities’ tours during the 
school bond proposal development process, where parents and community members 
could “see and feel” facilities’ issues directly, so that they could verify that facilities’ 
issues were real. The Superintendent shared the purpose of meeting at different schools 
and giving facilities’ tours was to give teachers, parents, and community members 
exposure to facilities across the school district: 
If you’re in a community that has seven elementaries, you might never go across 
town to that one elementary. If I live over here in this neighborhood, why would I 
go over there? . . . So, we intentionally met at a number of different campuses that 
we knew had needs, so that they could look at that, and live it, and see, and really 
rationalize or justify to themselves that, “Yeah, it is a need, and we need to 
address that.” 
In addition, the final bond plan provided a detailed facilities’ plan for each facility 
in the district, so that stakeholders could see the plan for proposed facilities’ renovations 
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at every building in the school district. These plans were available throughout the process 
on the district website. In addition, the architectural firm provided multiple versions of 
bond proposal options throughout the process, so that stakeholders could see that a 
thorough financial analysis had occurred. 
In addition, long-term financial planning was prioritized in the planning process, 
to provide voters with options that cost more initially, but were long-term more fiscally 
conservative. For example, a compelling argument for the replacement (rather than 
renovation) of the middle school was the long-term financial benefits. P1 recalled: 
To refurbish it and bring it [the old middle school] up to speed was like $36M. So 
when people heard that. When you say “we can refurbish this and it will last 20 
years. You can build a new building and it’ll last 50 years,” that was point in 
favor for most people.  
The concern about increased taxes remained an important variable impacting the 
potential success or failure of the 2015 school bond election. This concern about 
increased taxes included parents, community members, and staff members. “I also would 
need to see how it would affect my personal costs, because let’s face it, I’m a teacher and 
finances are always rather tight” (2015 TFISD Voter Survey Staff Verbatims). However, 
in 2015, there was district acknowledgement of the validity of personal concerns with 
higher taxes. A1 showed a shift in perspective from the 2013 school bond election, 
acknowledging the validity of real financial pressures on community members that 
increased taxes might show: 
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People feel taxed. To me, they were getting a brand new . . . beautiful, shiny 
building, and it passed by three votes, and I believe it’s because it was the biggest 
number on the page . . . I think it comes down to money and the world that we’re 
all living in today. I don’t believe people don’t care about kids, they do. It’s their 
own lives . . . they’d like to have a new house too, but maybe they can’t. 
Awareness of the impact of the economic context. By 2015, the economic 
context had improved markedly, and this was not mentioned by respondents as an 
important variable in the passage of the school bond referendum in 2015.  
However, this may also have been because the concern was better addressed in 
the 2015 school bond election process. School board and school district, parents, 
teachers, and community members were provided extensive information on community 
and economic growth that may have forestalled concerns in this area. During the FACTS 
Committee process, committee members were provided extensive community growth and 
economic development information, including: population growth of the city; population 
growth of the surrounding county; industry employment; city and area annual sales and 
tax use trends; hotel and motel growth; new residential and commercial building permits; 
existing home sales; home values; oil prices; and business expansion in the area. This 
information shared with large, diverse, representative community group, as well as was 
available online for all community members to access. All of the community economic 
development indicators showed massive economic growth in the surrounding area and 
town over the next 20 years. In addition, extensive district demographic growth and 
change data, including district enrollment history and cohort analysis and district 10-year 
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forecast was provided to the FACTS committee. Extensive information on the tax rate 
and tax impact based upon multiple bond proposal scenarios was also shared. This 
information included: I & S tax rate projections, district comparisons, and debt service 
requirements. All of this information was available to any voter on the district website. 
Awareness of conservative political environment. The political environment 
remained largely the same in the 2015 school bond election environment. Significant 
anti-tax, anti-government sentiment remained, impacting the environment for the school 
bond referendum election in 2015. P2 shared this perspective of the community: 
I really felt like it all came down to taxes. I feel like that’s how everything moves 
in [Town-Fringe], if I don’t want my taxes to go up vote no. It could be anything 
really. We’re going to put in a shuttle service that’s gonna take you everyplace 
you want to be, for free. They’re gonna raise my taxes, yes. “No. I don’t go 
anywhere. No.”  
CM concurred with this assessment: 
It was all about money, it was not about serving the kids. If it cost 20 million 
dollars to do one thing, and then that was too much, “Can we do it for half a 
million?” . . . It’s all about money when you get into these things. 
There was also a recognition of the need to activate the “pro-bond” contingent in 
the community that would support increased taxes to support schools. P1 referenced the 
need to activate the pro-bond community to counteract the “anti-tax” group in the 
community: 
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I think there’s that component in the community [vote no contingent]. And I think 
it’s there. I don’t think it’s a majority. So the question then is “how do you 
activate the rest of the community to rally around something.” 
Awareness of changes in school support attitudes within the community. 
There was a recognition that voter/taxpayer school support attitudes may have changed, 
and that the new mix of voter perspectives would play an important role in the outcome 
of the school bond referendum election. A2 talked about the change in community 
support for school bond initiatives: 
We had one person on our FACTS Committee who also was on the PAC, and he 
said, “I’m going to always vote for a school bond, because it’s right thing to do 
for kids. Someone took care of me when I was growing up. The community voted 
and approved bonds so that I had good schools and good facilities to go to, so I’m 
always going to do that.” But he is the outlier. People don’t feel that way anymore 
[italics added for emphasis]. 
However, in 2015 there was a heightened awareness among parents and 
community members of the need for facilities’ renovations and school bond referendum, 
as well as the need for parent and community involvement to support passage of a school 
bond referendum. P2 talked indicated the loss of the 2013 school bond election increased 
urgency and the level of parent and community involvement in 2015 as a variable that 
supported the success of the school bond referendum in 2015: 
I also think, too that by not passing the first time, the groups who were voting for 
it initially, because they had investments into it, students in the schools, and 
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whatnot, things that they wanted to take care of. They probably got a lot more 
involved and got out and brought more community members in, too. 
Awareness of resistance to change leading to use of symbolic, ceremonial 
events. In 2015, Town-Fringe still contained those resistant to change, as well as those 
who wanted to preserve long-held school traditions. In addition, the bond proposals still 
contained significant potential changes in grade configurations and school district 
buildings. However, the school board and school district were able to honor these 
changes more effectively through the use of symbolic and ceremonial activities (Bolman 
& Deal, 2008). Ceremonies and activities that acknowledged these changes were 
mentioned by respondents as supportive to the passage of the 2015 school bond 
referendum.  
Part of the potential bond proposal included completely replacing [Middle School 
#1] that had been named after a local champion and longtime proponent of education. 
The Superintendent recalled that: 
 We had to assure people that the [Name of Person Middle School/Middle School 
#1], name would live on, and it was amazing, that was an eye-opener. Whenever 
we ever started talking about replacement of [Name of Person Middle 
School/Middle School #1], how quickly that issue came to light, that, “Well, wait 
a minute, you can’t do that. She provided service.” . . . And even to the point 
where in the presentation that was made we took pains to say that it would still be 
named [Name of Person Middle School #1]. In our FACTS Committee meeting, 
there was a comment made that [Name of Person] was a venerated person in this 
196 
community, and people would not stand for her school to be torn down. And she’s 
still alive in a nursing home in [nearby urban city]. And I said, “Well, bring her 
over here and roll her in a wheel chair through that school, and I bet you, she’ll be 
the biggest proponent of building a new one.” She would be horrified to see what 
represents her name. But we took pains to say this is still going to be [Name of 
Person Middle School #1]. 
The Superintendent indicated the importance of this gesture when he said that this was 
“something they did right:” 
We were trying to close it, so we could get on to the new. And really, the 
community has embraced the new building, they love the fact that we’ve carried 
on the name, and I think that might be one thing we did right. 
 Ground-breaking and ribbon cutting ceremonies for new middle school. The 
Superintendent explained that the school board and district administrators used multiple 
ceremonial activities to celebrate this venerated community member: 
So, as we planned, the name, [Name of Person Middle School #1], we involved 
her family in the ground-breaking ceremony, in the ribbon-cutting ceremony. I 
think three different times we had significant events that had her family there, so 
that we could assure our community that we were going to continue to honor her 
legacy [italics added for emphasis]. 
Ceremonies to acknowledge and celebrate changes of the middle school. A 
significant part of the bond proposal(s) was to replace one of the district’s middle schools 
[Name of Middle School #1]. As a way to acknowledge and celebrate this change, the 
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school district planned and held a very successful ceremonial “One Last Stroll Down the 
Hall” vent to close old building. This event attracted former students, teachers, and 
principals, and community members. It became like a “mini-reunion” for community 
members, and even attracted those who didn’t normally attend school events. The success 
of this event surprised the Superintendent who reflected that: 
 But, in my simple mind, that never crossed my mind that that was going to be a 
huge issue for people. We held a “One Last Stroll Down the Hall” event at [Name 
of Middle School #1], for ex-students who went to [Name of Middle School #1], 
and we had people who went there in the 70s and 80s show up to go. They could 
go to their locker, and say, “This is where we used to do this,” it was just all this 
romanticized, probably bigger than it really was in their mind, though, 
remembrances of what life like at [Name of Middle School #1], and they were 
great memories for these people. And we invited principals that were still around 
that had been principal at that campus over time, and they were there. . . . You 
might have a 45-year old walking the building, and “There’s my principal,” and 
he’s 80, you know? Yeah, it was an interesting thing. 
He talked about the symbolic significance that the demolition of the old middle school 
had for community members: 
So, you really learned that you are tearing down, ‘cause we demolished that 
building, you were tearing down these memories that these people had, [italics 
added for emphasis], and they had to go and say good bye to it, which just still 
kinda blows me away. We had to do that. And, I thought it was a very smart move 
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on the district’s part to have an event like that, ‘cause I didn’t need people out 
there bashing the school . . . Because asbestos abatement and all the other things, 
they all wanted a brick, or they wanted something, and I couldn’t let ‘em get in 
the construction zone to get that, so we gave them one last chance to walk down. 
It was amazing. I had people trying to steal lockers out of the building, I had, I 
mean, you name it, they were trying to do it.  
Secured Expert Capacity to Support New School Bond Processes 
One of the first steps the school board and school district took was to re-assess the 
services needed from an architectural consulting firm to secure the expert capacity 
needed to support a successful school bond referendum election process. Prior to the 
2015 school bond referendum election, the school board and district administration went 
through an RFP process to identify an architectural firm to work with for a potential 
future school bond referendum election. The Superintendent said, “In 2015, we had a 
very different approach. I said, ‘Let’s go look at some others. Let’s, at least, make the 
guys compete,’ whenever we go out and do an RFP. So, we did.” The SBM stated it like 
this: 
We fired our architecture firm at the next board meeting. Well, maybe not the 
next board meeting; it was Christmastime, I think.  We put out an RFQ for a new 
one. That was the first thing we did after the bond. 
As a part of the Request for Proposal (RFP) process, the school board and school 
district were exposed to different kinds of school bond election planning expertise and 
services from potential architectural consulting firms. One of the first things the 
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Superintendent mentioned during his interview was discovering the extensive bond 
election “pre-bond advising and planning” expertise some architectural firms offered: 
So, go to 2015, and the approach is entirely different. We do an RFP for 
architectural firms . . . do a great job interviewing those, and we discovered 
something in that process. What we know is that all of the architectural firms that 
are major players in the state can design great buildings. They can do beautiful 
work, and do great work. They all know MEP, they all know civil, they all know 
all those different things. Building codes, all that stuff. What they don’t all do is 
on the front end of the bond. They don’t all do the pre-bond advising and planning 
. . . at the time, [Name of Firm] was the firm that we chose, and the reason they 
were chosen was because of the pre-bond services that they had. 
The Superintendent went on to explain the power of a pre-bond needs assessment 
and voter survey in being able to predict the potential likelihood of a potential school 
bond referendum election success: 
So, when they come in and do their pitch to the board of trustees, they’re talking 
to them about [Voter Survey Firm], and their surveys that they can do, and 
climate surveys, and how they will test, and they came just that short of 
guaranteeing whatever the outcome would be, based on the outcome of this 
survey. So, they said, “We’ll tell you, once we conduct this study, whether or not 
you can have success with this or not.”  And their belief was, “We wouldn’t be 
talking to you right now if we didn’t think it could happen, but we’ll tell you with 
a pretty high degree of certainty that it will after we do this survey.” 
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Hired architectural firm with extensive bond election expertise. As a result of 
the RFP process (Figure 8), the school board and school district increased capacity and 
support for the overall school bond election process by hiring an architectural firm that 
had both facilities and school bond election expertise. Document review indicated that 
the new architectural consulting firm utilized a comprehensive school bond election 
planning process that included: bond election pre-planning, bond election facilitation and 
planning processes, and bond campaign implementation expertise (2015 TFISD Bond 
Presentation). 
 
Figure 8. Background on 2015 school bond election process. 
Bond consulting services key variable in school bond success. Respondents 
indicated that the bond consulting expertise played a significant role in the success of the 
school bond referendum election success. CM listed bond consulting support as one of 
the most important variables in the success of the 2015 school bond election efforts 
because it increased his effectiveness as a community leader [as FACTS Committee Co-
Chair and PAC Treasurer]: 
The architects. The [Name of Firm] group. I think they were so proactive. It’s 
their livelihood, too. If the bond fails, they don’t gain a thing. They have people 
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set just to help us promote things. They did. They helped us. They had one lady, I 
can’t remember who . . . I talked to her almost every day. She’d call me or text 
me, have you done this today, has your group done this? I’d say, “I’m working, I 
don’t have time . . . Would you text the other people on the committee?” I didn’t 
have the time to do that, because I was still employed. 
CM reiterated that the bond consulting staff from the architectural firm not only 
provided outstanding support during the bond planning and facilitation process but 
increased support from other parent and community members: 
This second group [in 2015], they had one or two ladies that’s all they did was 
help us, help us from local community. They had other people, the architects and 
all that type of people. They were the ones who helped the community people, 
which we are, to learn how to present it to the community and how to get the 
young kids, the high school kids, involved and wanting to be a part of it. 
The Superintendent referenced the impact on support for bond election communications: 
. . . but their communications department . . . the people that they have working in 
that are amazing. They can craft hefty messages, and interpret data, and they work 
with us, where our prior architectural firm didn’t even have, they didn’t even have 
an understanding that that was going on. 
Extensive Community Needs Assessment and Pre-Bond Planning Activities 
Interview responses and document review indicated that the school board and 
school district administrators utilized several pre-bond planning and needs assessment 
methods to solicit input from key influencers and stakeholders (voters). Respondents 
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identified these as key strategies that led to the successful outcome of the 2015 school 
bond election. Early input from key stakeholders and potential voters allowed the school 
board and school district administration to better understand voter and taxpayer 
preferences regarding bond proposal content, bond amount tolerance, and likelihood of 
passage --- before a decision to pursue a school bond referendum even occurred. 
The Superintendent emphasized: “You can’t just gather data on your facilities. 
You have to gather data on the community too.” The Superintendent explained the two 
methods that were most critical in the 2015 school bond election success were (a) face-to-
face interviews with 100 key influencers and (b) a pre-bond voter survey: 
I’m telling you, really, I think the two key things that we did differently [in 2015], 
were [1] having those face-to-face meetings with those key stakeholders, and key 
stakeholders being . . . could be the guy that has all the rental property in town 
that didn’t want his property taxes going up, so he’s against it. So, gotta hear that 
voice, and you gotta make sure that you hear the opposition. Don’t just stack your 
back with those guys that are for you. You better go out and seek that opposing 
voice . . . And then, [2] the pre-bond survey that was done, I think was invaluable 
too. That’d be my two. If I ever do another one, and I certainly hope I don’t, but if 
I ever do another one, that’s what I will make sure that I do. 
Extensive input from face-to-face interviews with 100 key influencers. 
Respondents mentioned that face-to-face meetings between school board members and 
100 key influencers in the community was an important variable in gaining key 
information leading to the success of the 2015 school bond referendum election. The 
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Superintendent explained that one of the first things that the school board and school 
district did after the failed 2013 school bond election was to have the school board 
members hold face-to-face interviews with 100 key influencers in the community to 
understand their opinions about the failed school bond election, on the recommendation 
of a prominent state legislator in the area.  
The purpose of these conversations was to (a) gain feedback on the last bond 
election; (b) gain information about what a successful bond proposal might look like; and 
(c) determine whether or not to pursue a future bond election. The Superintendent 
recalled: 
[Name of State Rep] maybe had the best advice, and I don’t know that [Name of 
State Rep]’s a huge supporter of TFISD, I don’t know that he works for us or 
against us, he’s just [Name of State Rep]. But, his advice was, “You need to 
target. Make you a list of about a hundred people and go talk to them one-on-one. 
Face-to-face. Don’t email ‘em. Don’t have a big meeting. Go visit with them face-
to-face and talk to them about what they liked about the last bond, what they 
didn’t like about the last bond, what they would do different. And, you need to 
have, in that group, people that voted for and people that voted against. You need 
to hear both sides of the argument. And, take the time to do that, and then come 
back and then use that information to determine whether or not you go forward 
and maybe even what this might look like as you do that. [italics added for 
emphasis]. 
204 
In the 2015 election, the school board followed the advice of the state legislator. The 
Superintendent described the process: 
So, the board and I created a list, asked each board member to submit 12 names, 
and we kinda merged all that together, and where we had overlap, we would go 
ahead and get others, and we really targeted a hundred people in the community. 
And assigned each board member those folks to and interview, and kind of gave 
them an outline of an interview, but didn’t dictate what the question was, just kind 
of generally kept it to, “What’d you like? What’d you not like?” That sort of 
thing, and, “Let’s just have a conversation about it.” 
The Superintendent reported that these face-to-face interviews with key 
influencers provided valuable information from key influencers in the community, 
including how to structure a future school bond referendum proposal: 
And we got valuable information back from that. And maybe, most especially 
from those people who were in opposition. The guys that were being funded by 
the outside resources, or that were being supplemented by the outside resources. 
A lot of it was this kind of anti-government spending kind of thing, but it was also 
things like, “Well, you asked for a $100 million, and the economy’s in a 
downturn, and we’re struggling to pay the grocery bill, and you’re wanting more 
monies out of us, and you could have asked for something smaller to get you 
started, and that’s what you should’ve done.” So, they’re telling you how to 
structure the next bond, if you choose to go out and do that [italics added for 
emphasis]. 
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Document review indicated that the interviews represented a structured “Face to 
Face Conversations Process,” with specific staffing support and expertise for conducting 
this kind of interview. Board members received a written packet outlining the interview 
process, including background and interview questions to use, listening tips, key 
messages, scripts, and a feedback form to record responses. Interview responses were 
recorded and compiled for use by the school board (2015 Board F2F (Face-to-Face) 
Binder Contents). 
Document review revealed interview participants included a wide variety of 
business and community leaders and executives including: realtors, insurance agents, 
landlords, doctors and dentists, ministers, business and retired business owners, police 
and public safety, bankers, judges and lawyers, city council members and city 
government leadership, higher education, former school board members, state legislators, 
non-profit leaders, media, and marketing firms. 
Substantial information obtained about voter preferences through a voter 
survey. The second pre-bond needs assessment strategy used in 2015 was to gain input 
from stakeholders and potential voters through a professional, scientifically-designed pre-
bond voter survey, which provided input on community thinking on broad parameters for 
the bond proposal including, such as bond amount tolerance and preferred bond proposal 
content. 
The reason the pre-bond voter survey was so critical is that it provided predictive 
capability for the likelihood of success of a potential school bond election. The 
Superintendent described the significance of the pre-bond voter survey: 
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And then, the use of the firm, [Name of Voter Survey Firm] which does that 
public opinion polling as part of the pre-bond services that were offered there. 
That gave us . . . They were very spot-on, it doesn’t get much closer than seven 
votes. And when they said, “It’s gonna be very difficult to pass this bond, but it 
can be done, but it’s gonna be extremely close,” they were as accurate as you 
could be, and I don’t think I would ever run another bond elections without 
having that kind of information in advance of calling an election. 
Numerous respondents interviewed mentioned the pre-bond voter survey as a 
variable in the successful outcome of the 2015 school bond election. P1 recalled being a 
part of the voter survey: 
Well there was a survey done . . . I got the call of the survey, so I participated in 
it. And then I know that data was used in our discussions. It was used by the 
board . . . There was a telephone survey. I forget the details of how many people 
were surveyed. So that data was collected, and I think that that was all parents and 
community members. 
SBM also mentioned the survey: 
But I’ve not done research on it. Actually, we did, I think. We did poll people 
after the fact on “What did you like about it? What did you not like about it? 
What did you want to see? Would you rather see one with options or not options? 
The voter survey was a random sample telephone survey of a representative 
sample of 400 voters in the community conducted by an outside research firm during 
November of 2014, with a margin of error of plus or minus 4.9%. Survey respondents 
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were distributed across the city as North and West at 21%; Central at 38%; and South and 
East at 41%. The survey was composed of 30 questions regarding tolerance for various 
bond amounts ($50 million, $75 million, $100 million); school configuration preferences; 
and preferences regarding athletics (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 
Presentation). The objectives of the survey were “to assess support and opposition to a 
$100 million bond proposal, as well as various amounts of bond proposals with the 
associated tax impacts; determine preference for various options for schools; and to 
measure the correlation of informative statements on support/opposition to a bond 
proposal” (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation).  
 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of telephone survey interviews. 
Interestingly, 74% of survey respondents indicated that they voted in all or most 
of the “local elections dealing with bond issues, taxes and local development projects.” 
Race/ethnicity of survey participants was 87% Anglo or White; 1% African-American or 
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Black; 4% Hispanic or Latino; 1% American Indian; 4% Other; 1% Unsure; 2% Refused. 
Regarding income levels, 16% of survey participants were below $30,000; 18% between 
$30,000-$59,999; 22% between $60,000-$99,999; 29% $100,000 and above; and 14% 
Income Unknown. Regarding political party affiliation, voters identified themselves as 
63% Republican; 12% Democrat; 20% voting independent of party; 4% unsure or refused 
to answer. Genders of survey participants were 48% male and 52% female (2015 TFISD 
Voter Survey Top-Lines). Voter survey results suggested that, with an informed 
electorate, the district might reach a slim margin to have a successful school bond 
election result. Voter survey results projected a close scenario with 49% in favor; 44% 
against; with 7% depends or unsure. 
Overall results from the voter survey regarding the success or failure for a 
potential school bond referendum indicated that for an Initial Ballot (survey respondents 
not having additional information, asked about a $100-million bond), 35% were in favor 
(20% strongly in favor, 15% somewhat in favor); 47% were opposed (32% strongly 
opposed, 15% somewhat opposed); with 18% depends or unsure. With extrapolated 
results moving the depends or unsure into yes or no categories, the results were projected 
to be 43% in favor with 57% against. After survey respondents were provided additional 
information (Informed Ballot); 49% were in favor; 44% against; with 7% depends/unsure 
as seen in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Comparison of initial and informed ballots. 
The pre-bond 2015 voter survey results gave the school board and school district 
administration an overall potential for success or failure of a future school bond 
referendum election as seen in Figure 11. The Superintendent shared the importance of 
these results for the school board and school district administration in pursuing the 2015 
school bond referendum election: 
Just, there’s some good information from that, but what we got, or what the board 
got out of that, was a sense that it was gonna be a very difficult thing to do. The 
climate, at the time, was that it would be difficult, but not impossible. 
The results of the 2015 voter survey provided data about the reasons voters might vote 
against a future school bond referendum election as seen in Figure 12. 
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Figure 11. Four major conclusions to the 2015 voter survey. 
 
 
Figure 12. Why voters would not be in favor of bond in 2015. 
The survey revealed key voter tolerances regarding total amount of a proposed 
school bond referendum as seen in Figure 13. For a $50 million bond, voter tolerances 
showed 43% in favor; 45% against; with 11% depends unsure. For a $75-million bond, 
33% were in favor; 56% opposed, with 11% depends/unsure. For a $100-million bond, 
24% were in favor, with 66% opposed; with 11% depends/unsure. P1, a parent very 
supportive of the school district and both school bonds said this about bond amount: 
I think it was interesting in the survey that was done, when I got the call, one of 
the questions early on was what level would you support? And it was $50 million, 
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$75 million, $100 million . . . the report that we got was that most people 
responded saying they would not support a bond that went over $100 million. But 
then they started asking specific things. “Would you support this? Would you 
support this?” And the collective answers were yes. And if I recall they asked if 
this put the bond over $100 million would you still support it? And I think what 
got lost in the conversation was that when you say to somebody “would you 
accept a $100-million bond?” Well, that’s overwhelming for everybody. 
 
Figure 13. Results for three potential bond referenda amounts. 
These data matched with district administrator, school board member, parent, and 
community interview feedback from the 2013 school bond. The 2015 voter survey 
predicted the potential school bond amount that would potentially have success in 
passing. Having needs assessment data on the potential amount the community would be 
willing to fund was an important variable in the success of the 2015 school bond election. 
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What the results of the 2015 voter survey told the Superintendent is that the school board 
and administration “had to be very smart and strategic about dollar amounts on the 
bond.” A2 relayed the value of the voter survey in the success of the 2015 school bond 
election: 
So, for the 2015, the [Name of Survey Firm]’s Community Survey was invaluable 
on a whole lot of levels, because not only did it tell us what needs our community 
thought we had, it told us what threshold they would support in a dollar amount. I 
think that was probably the most critical piece of that. 
A1 said, “Yeah, we kind of knew where the break was” and agreed that this 
reasoning led to the eventual 2015 school bond election proposals totaling under $75 
million. A1 agreed that the $10-million proposal that the 2015 school bond committee 
recommended was not viable: “Yes, we knew it wasn’t passable in the environment we’re 
in.”  In addition, the results of the 2015 voter survey showed voters more likely to 
support the following: 
 Bond packages that will save taxpayers money because it is less expensive to 
expand and renovate existing facilities now than to wait and do it 5 or 10 
years from now 
 Improvements that will make schools more energy efficient and save on utility 
costs in the long run 
 Bond that will allow for improvements to technology within the district in 
order to provide better instructional tools that expand 21st Century learning 
opportunities for students; 
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 Efforts to show that senior citizens who file their exemption will not have to 
pay any additional property taxes associated with this bond proposal. (2015 
TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation) 
The Superintendent highlighted feedback from the voter survey that indicated not 
to use a “single proposition” approach and to give voters choices:  
Don’t come at them with a kitchen-sink approach like you did the last time, and 
that you need to do propositions.  In 2013, it was an all-or-none kind of effort. In 
2015, there were three propositions. So, people wanted choices. 
The survey asked multiple questions about voter preferences regarding potential 
grade configurations. This provided information to the school board, school district 
administrators, and the future bond committee about the likelihood of school bond 
passage with various grade configuration alterations. Figure 14 displays the voter survey 
results in 2015. 
 
Figure 14. Exhibit provided regarding solutions for Kindergarten through Grade 8 
configurations based on 2015 voter survey results. 
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The results of the 2015 voter survey showed that including athletics in a facilities 
bond would lead to very close in an election as seen in Figure 15. At 40%, voters 
indicated that they would only vote for school bond referenda that improved school 
buildings and did not include athletics facilities; 37% indicated they would vote in favor 
of bonds that improved both school buildings and athletic fields. Information from 
participants indicated that athletics was difficult for parents and non-parents in the 
community to stomach. The Superintendent stated, “People did not want athletic 
facilities.” A2 agreed: “They [voters] don’t want to use bond dollars to fund athletic 
improvements generally.” A staff member surveyed said, “How are the funds to be used. 
I don’t want to see the addition of any athletic purchases or improvements. I am tired of 
my classroom leaking while we have nice turf” (TFISD – Staff Verbatims – [Name of 
Survey Firm]). 
 
Figure 15. Data regarding favorability of funding for school buildings versus athletic 
fields in 2015. 
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Information obtained from staff responses to voter survey. The voter survey 
also specifically surveyed staff members, which provided the school board and school 
district administration detailed information from their teachers and staff regarding 
support for a potential school bond referendum election. Comments from staff echoed 
themes previously identified as significant to voting preferences, including: bond amount 
and concern about high property taxes/increase in taxation and the economic context; 
need for a specific proposed bond plan, including athletics and grade configurations; 
preference for multiple propositions and choice in bond propositions; and equitable 
distribution of fund between schools. 
Extensive community demographics and economic growth data. As indicated 
earlier, the bond proposal development process included: 
 Community growth and economic development data, including: population 
growth of city, population growth of surrounding county, industry 
employment, city and area annual sales and tax use trends, hotel and motel 
growth, new residential and commercial building permits, existing home sales, 
home values, oil prices, and business expansion in the area; 
 Real estate growth data, including: housing market, new home ranking 
report, active and future subdivisions and townhomes; 
 District demographic growth and change data, including: district 
enrollment history and cohort analysis and district 10-year forecast; 
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 Tax rate and tax impact data, including interest and sinking tax rate 
projections, district comparisons, and debt service requirements based upon 
multiple bond proposal scenarios. 
Facilities needs assessment. An extensive facilities needs assessment was also an 
important part of the pre-bond planning process. A review of the documents revealed the 
goals of the needs assessment: 
 to provide the basis for the ongoing planning for the operation and 
maintenance of district facilities; 
 to evaluate and establish a detailed report card for each facility in the district 
based on 25 component areas; and, 
 to provide the necessary data that will support decisions about future facility 
additions, renovations and new construction at every building in the district in 
both educational and adequacy and facility integrity. (BoardF2F Binder 
Contents) 
The A1 talked about the detailed facilities needs assessment that the architect 
conducted, and that it took some time to do this. 
We changed architectural firms. They had a complete department that came out 
and it took a period of time to do a needs assessment on every facility in this 
district, every building in our district, and that’s how we started with our FACTS 
Committee by presenting that and helping them understand where the needs are 
and organizing the end to things that needed to be renovated, versus things that 
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were archaic, such as our old [Name of Middle School #1] that we’ve now 
demoted. 
“Tiered” set of facilities’ needs. The facilities needs assessment was divided into 
“tiers” of needs in order to facilitate project prioritization. The Superintendent talked 
about how the facilities needs assessment laid a factual foundation for proposed projects 
in the bond proposals.  
As soon as we hired [Name of Architectural Firm], . . . they began a detailed 
facility assessment of every facility . . . we had three tiers . . . Tier One was things 
that you really needed to address, Tier Two were if you could, then it would be 
nice, and Tier Three, your more cosmetic kind of things. So, they identified 
everything . . . under the sun that might could be improved upon facility-wise, 
they documented it and have a record of it. So, that’s kinda what drove the big 
number to begin with [total amount of facilities’ needs], knowing that we 
wouldn’t address all of that, but that’s what we started with, with the facts. The 
assessment has been done, you all go through this, and you look at this 
information, and then let’s start working our way back. 
Extensive review of every school building in the school district. The facilities 
needs assessment included an extensive review of every school building in the school 
district, which laid the foundation for “equity” in school facilities’ projects in the school 
bond proposal. A1 remarked on the extensive nature of the school facilities’ needs 
assessment: 
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Because our new architect firm has a complete department dedicated to that and 
an entire team. It took months to go through that assessment, and there was a 
binder built, both electronically and a paper binder. It took two huge binders for 
that to get assembled, and there’s one on every campus and every building. It 
talks about capacity, and of course, the condition of everything from HVACS to 
your roof, all the way down to the concrete joints in your parking lot and your 
sidewalk and things of that nature. 
The wealth of accurate data on school facilities’ needs created transparency in the process 
and built trust with stakeholders. The SBM said: 
Yeah, the second time it was an information campaign . . . There was not a lot of, 
“Vote yes,” on my Facebook page, or a lot of, “We need this,” or “It’s for the 
kids,” there was no pictures of children. I wasn’t going to placate anybody. I 
understood the people who follow me and who listen to me, they’re very skeptical 
of the district and almost all of them voted no the last time. What my mission on 
Facebook, and a lot of what the architects did a good job this time also, it was a 
lot of just, “Hey, here’s a graph. Look at how much our income has gone up, but 
look how much our usage has gone [up].” . . . Or, “Here’s some photos of the 
schools.” It was very quantitative. . . . We were trying to go after hard, irrefutable, 
“You can’t argue with this. You cannot argue with this. This is how much we 
have to spend and this is how much is devoted to teachers.” 
Information from other school district bond election efforts. In addition, 
district administrators mentioned intentionally learning from the school bond referendum 
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elections in nearby school districts. It was apparent in the 2015 school bond election that 
district administrators paid close attention to school bond election referenda dynamics in 
surrounding communities to inform their approach. A2 referenced other nearby 
opposition to a single proposition approach: 
[Name of Nearby Town] is a very small school district nearby. I think their bond 
election was about $13 million. The majority of that was for a football stadium. 
When I went and read comments . . . when it didn’t pass, [I] went and read and 
searched out comments and kind of made a mental note, people were saying, “We 
understood the facility and safety needs that were presented, but it was all 
packaged into one bond, so one proposition, and I voted against it because I didn’t 
support the football stadium.” 
This confirmed [Name of School District] learnings that indicated against a single bond 
proposition and against inclusion of athletics in the bond proposal(s). 
A2 indicated that this change in the environment was not an anomaly, but a sea-
change for surrounding districts as well, calling it “a new time for bond elections.”  
We watch all those schools’ bond elections that happen [in nearby communities], 
and so we’ve just had some that didn’t fail, near us, and of course, one of things 
we do in the communication office is we go look at it, and we explore. We look 
and listen to the reasons why. So, I think it goes back to reinforce what [A1] said. 
It’s a new time for our communities with bond elections [italics added for 
emphasis]. 
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Comprehensive Bond Election Planning Process 
Responses from interviews as well as document review indicated that the school 
board and school district adopted a transparent planning process for the 2015 school bond 
referendum election with the support of the architectural consulting firm. The process 
was a coordinated and comprehensive process that included all aspects of school bond 
election planning and implementation, including: pre-bond assessment planning and 
demographic review; an extensive facilities needs assessment process; bond proposal 
development support and planning; bond committee facilitation support; and support for 
bond campaign marketing and communications activities (2015 TFISD Bond 
Presentation; 2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation). Figure 16 
highlights the process. 
Coordinated school bond planning process. Review of the documents provided 
evidence that a comprehensive school bond election coordination plan was put into place. 
It was clear there was an overall plan for the entire bond election process, including a 
delineation of all the steps of the process. These steps included pre-bond needs 
assessment planning and demographic review; a facilities needs assessment process; bond 
proposal development support and planning; bond committee facilitation support; and 
bond campaign marketing and communications activities (2015 TFISD Bond 
Presentation; 2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation). This presence 
of a coordinated school bond election plan and processes laid the foundation for 
organized and effective pro-bond efforts. 
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Figure 16. Bond process flow chart provided at TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 
Presentation in 2015. 
Clear decision-making and communications structures. There was strong 
evidence of a comprehensive school bond election plan, as noted earlier. There were also 
clearly established decision-making and communications structures between district 
leaders, school board leaders, campus leaders, parents, and community members through 
the FACTS Committee and PAC. There was a clearly delineated process for the FACTS 
Committee to develop and provide a bond proposal recommendation to the school board. 
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Written information documenting meeting dates and times, meeting locations, and names 
of committee members was readily available. Meeting agendas, presentation information, 
and meeting minutes were also readily available online, and were available throughout 
the 2015 school bond referendum election process (TFISD FACTS Committee Meetings 
#1-#7). The committee was facilitated in a large group [Superintendent]. The “Objectives 
& Responsibilities of the FACTS Committee” defined the bond recommendation process: 
 Represent the entire community in the bond planning process; 
 Review and prioritize the facility needs of TFISD; 
 Bring forward a plan to the TFISD Board of Trustees that will include 
recommendations as to what should be included and how much money should 
be requested in a possible May 2015 bond election. (2015 TFISD FACTS 
Committee Meeting #1 Presentation) 
Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the FACTS committee. There were 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the FACTS Committee, which were 
communicated at the first and subsequent committee meetings to develop a shared 
understanding of decision-making structures and roles and responsibilities. The 
committee was defined as: “A group of community members that come together to study 
the facility needs of the school district and recommend a package to the TFISD Board of 
Trustees to put before voters in a bond election.” A key purpose of the committee was 
stated as input: “We want you to have input. FACTS participants reflect larger 
community values, needs, and desires – YOU are TFISD!” (TFISD FACTS Committee 
Meeting #1). 
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The FACTS Committee also had clearly established policies and procedures, 
including Purpose, Objectives & Responsibilities; Guiding Principles; Values; and 
delineation of the Bond Process & How School Finance Works. The Guiding Principles 
were established at the first meeting as: Growth, Safety & Security, Aging Facilities & 
Campus Equity, Technology, Career & Technical Education (Vocational), and Grade 
Alignment (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation).  
In addition, information about the district’s finances and taxes were defined and 
explained from the first meeting, including the overview of maintenance and operations 
versus interest and sinking spending; district’s budget; need for a bond election; capital 
debt funding; and TFISD tax rate and history. Detailed information was also provided 
about district academic requirements and how to build a bond budget to the FACTS 
Committee (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #4). 
Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for committee leadership. The FACTS 
Committee had clearly delineated community co-chair leadership roles and 
responsibilities. The FACTS Committee was led by two community co-chairs. The role 
of each of the FACTS Committee co-chairs was to:  
 Lead each committee meeting according to the agenda provided by TFISD 
Administration;  
 Make adjustments to meeting agendas when needed;  
 Facilitate large group discussion on all information provided;  
 Make sure that all ideas and/or positions are heard and given equal time;  
 Make sure group stays focused and on track; 
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 Give formal presentation to Board of Trustees with FACTS Committee’s final 
recommendations. (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation) 
Effective Leadership Recruitment and Training 
Interview data and review of the documents suggested that effective leadership 
recruitment and training of parent and community volunteers had a positive impact on the 
2015 school bond election results.  
Strong recruiting of influential, experienced parent and community leaders 
for key bond leadership roles. Bolman and Deal (2008) found that “identifying and 
recruiting credible, influential team members to serve in key roles” can significantly 
support a change process (p. 395). Interview data and document reviewed showed that 
considerable attention was given to identifying and recruiting “credible, influential team 
members” to serve in key roles in the school bond referendum process, including: (a) the 
intentional recruiting of credible, influential community members to serve as FACTS 
Committee Co-Chairs; (b) purposeful recruiting of a diverse, cross-section of FACTS 
Committee Members, including representation from teachers, staff, parents, community 
members, students, and the opposition; and (c) deliberate recruitment of key community 
leaders to serve as leaders for the pro-bond PAC and other parents/community pro-bond 
support groups. Importantly, recruiting also included involving key community bond 
leaders who had significant experience and expertise with prior bond referendum 
elections. 
Recruitment of FACTS committee community co-chairs. District administrators 
recruited the former Treasurer of the 1999 school bond referendum as one of the 
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community co-chairs of the FACTS Committee, ensuring his experience and expertise 
would be brought to bear on the bond election efforts. CM, who was the former Treasurer 
of the 1999 school bond, reported: 
When we got to the next bond [2015], I was actually asked to be the chairman of 
the group that when we had our meetings, when we brought the community of 
people in to be a part of that, I was a co-chair with [name of another community 
member]. 
Recruitment of influential community members reassured and motivated other parents. 
P1 explained: 
I was so excited when [Name of Treasurer] was here. That’s really not my 
specialty. I feel like a fish out of water most of the time when we had our 
meetings. I think it was a lot to process in a short amount of time. I never felt like 
I was even in the curve. Every meeting we had I felt like I was still processing the 
information from the previous meeting. So, it was a huge undertaking. 
Document review confirmed intentional recruiting of credible, influential 
community members to serve as FACTS Committee Co-Chairs. Document review 
revealed clear and readily available names of the community co-chairs for the 2015 
school bond election, as well as their roles and responsibilities within the FACTS 
Committee (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 Presentation).  
Their role was clearly communicated to the FACTS Committee at the first meeting: 
 Lead each committee meeting according to the agenda provided by TFISD 
Administration 
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 Make adjustments to meeting agendas when needed 
 Facilitate large group discussion on all information provided 
 Make sure that all ideas and/or positions are heard and given equal time 
 Make sure group stays focused and on track 
 Give formal presentation to Board of Trustees with FACTS Committee’s final 
recommendations” (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 
Presentation). 
The Superintendent mentioned the effectiveness of the FACTS Committee Co-Chairs: 
We had co-chairs for that committee, and they would ask the architect or the 
district for specific information, and we would provide that. We would assist them 
in presenting it if they needed it, or they would present it themselves. So, they did 
a great job of walking through that, leading that [process]. 
Recruitment of PAC leadership. A1 described PAC committee involvement as 
improved in the 2015 school bond election: 
The one last thing I will say is we had a lot of very active parent involvement in 
the 2015, through the PAC. You know the PAC can do what we [the school 
district] can’t. We had active parent participation in 2013, but the PAC itself was 
so much more organized in 2015, and I think they had lessons learned from it as 
well. Just having gone through, and I think we all thought, I think the whole 
community thought the same thing, that people just show up and vote because it’s 
the right thing to do for kids. So, I think we were all shocked into reality and into 
the new way of thinking, parents included. 
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Recruitment of the PAC Treasurer. CM highlighted the unique and important 
role of the school bond election Treasurer. He described the significance of the role, as 
well as the characteristics needed in strong bond treasurer. 
The only name out there anywhere on anything, even in your advertisement, it’s 
not [Name of Superintendent]. It’s the Treasure’s name, which is my name. 
Whoever is the Treasurer has to have a tough skin and has to be prepared to 
answer the questions truthfully and honestly. Give a reason why you think it’s so 
important. If your treasurer is not positive, that’s another key thing. The Treasurer 
has to be a very positive person because every sign that’s there, every 
advertisement in the paper or magazine, or wherever it’s out there, it has nobody’s 
name except the treasurer’s name. There’s a way of them to find out your phone 
number, even though your phone number might not be there, or your address may 
not be there, but your name is there. They will call you and they will tell you what 
you think. You have to be very diplomatic at times. I think that’s so important . . . 
They have to be a positive person for the bond, period. They have to be educated 
or at least, understand what you’re trying to do. They have to have a real good 
knowledge of every aspect . . . [of] whatever you’re building, if you’re building a 
building or whatever you’re doing, they have to have a pretty good knowledge of 
what you’re doing. If it’s building a ramp or building all of the security stuff that 
we did, you have to understand it so that if someone calls you, you can give them 
a truthful, positive answers towards the bond. That may be the most positive thing 
that you get. 
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You’ve got to have a lot of common sense. I was in business here for a 
long time. Every time we had a bond of any kind, if it’s city, if it’s county, when 
we did the transportation bond and we put the loop in, it affected me, bottom line, 
every time we did that . . . I don’t care what it is, the people that are putting that 
on are most normally not doing it for themselves, they’re doing it to help the 
community. 
CM indicated that the strength of the bond treasurer was a major deciding element in the 
success of school bond elections. 
I've done this twice, and the two times I did it, we had passing bonds. That has 
nothing to do with me, but I think it’s still important that who the board chooses 
to be the treasurer is so important . . . truly believe that. I watch all these towns 
around us. Whenever it comes out, I look and see who their [bond treasurer is]. I 
know too many people in the county, not necessarily just this community, and see 
who their treasurer is and see why they were chosen. If I know them, that’s fine. 
If I don’t, then why . . . Are they somebody new? Like [Name of Person], when 
[Nearby District] went in and got the bond to build the new high school, then 
came in and built the new football stadium and then they got the football and all 
that. I knew, nearly every time, who that person was that was [the treasurer for the 
school bond election]. 
Intentional recruiting for FACTS committee members. There was deliberate 
recruiting of a diverse, cross-section of community members to become FACTS 
Committee Members, including representation from teachers, staff, parents, community 
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members, students, and the opposition. Document review revealed readily available 
names of committee members (2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting #1 
Presentation). The Superintendent reference this intentional recruiting as a variable 
impacting the success of the 2015 school bond referendum election: “On that committee 
we did, we had a great cross-section, where the last one was probably 20 people, this was 
closer to 80 people. It was a big, big group.” 
 Numerous respondents mentioned the importance of purposeful inclusion of the 
opposition to the bond planning committee. Recruitment for the committee deliberately 
included influential members of opposition to the prior school bond referendum. P1 
mentioned the inclusion of influential members of the opposition being recruited to the 
FACTS Committee: 
The chairman of the Republican Party was on the FACTS Committee. She only 
came to one or two meetings to my knowledge. But there were some people . . . 
there were places on that FACTS Committee that would be seen as dissenting 
voices. 
Recruitment of retired community members and educators.  CM indicated 
that there was a large group of retired community members and educators in the area that 
he recruited to support 2015 school bond referendum election efforts to positively impact 
the election results. He said that the retired community members group had time, and that 
they could be persuaded to support bond efforts to support grandchildren and get younger 
people out to vote: 
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I know I was much younger then [1999], but still the ones that worked on it, 
basically, are in their 60s and 70s. They have time. We persuaded them that if you 
have time, you need to be a part of it. It may not affect any of your children. By 
the time we get it built, they may be already out. It’s gonna affect your 
grandchildren or some of your nieces, nephews, or your neighbor’s kids. You 
have to be a part of it because you have to be the ones to get these young people 
out to vote. 
CM also suggested that recruiting retired educators was a key leadership group for 
the 2015 school bond efforts because of their commitment and expertise: 
The older group is gonna be here, and they’re gonna help you. Especially the 
retired teachers, they’re so good at helping and we have a lot of retired teachers 
living in this community. They’re a very strong group.  They meet once a month, 
and they talk about [TFISD]. Even though that’s a county-wide retired teacher’s 
group, they talk about all the communities and how they're trying to get buildings 
built and things done. The teachers are such an asset, especially the retired 
teachers. 
Training for school bond election efforts.  Bolman and Deal (2008) suggested 
that training efforts support integration of human resources factors in a change process (p. 
395). There was also evidence of training of district leaders and parents and community 
members in the 2015 school bond election process. From document review, the pre-bond 
process included leadership development and building exercises for the guiding team that 
included district visioning and facility options development, as indicated by visioning and 
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“designing change” agendas (2015 Designing Transformation Meeting Debrief; 2015 
TFISD Visioning Agenda). These discussions, led by the architectural firm, included 
early discussions and research on best school structures, grade alignments and building 
capacities as well as the strategic planning process (2015 TFISD Visioning Agenda). CM 
had a keen awareness of the need to train new parents and community members in the 
school bond referendum election process: 
Mainly with the young people. I’m talking about young people. I’m talking 
people that are in their . . . I don’t know how old these kids are, I don’t want to get 
them too old. Probably in their 20s and 30s and maybe even into their early 40s. 
They have not participated, especially in the bond that I worked with in [19]99. 
CM said that others began to see this need after the 2013 school bond failure, and 
began to try to bring up younger parents and community members in the 2015 school 
bond election: 
I think after that bond failed in 2013, they wanted it to happen but they didn’t 
want to put the time in. Once they saw that happen [the bond fail in 2013], then 
some of the meetings we had trying to organize some of these kids . . . whatever 
they are. They’re 30, 40 years younger than me, 50 years younger. They begin to 
realize that it’s going to take the younger group to get this done. 
Numerous respondents saw the strong support from the bond election planning 
consultants from the architectural firm as a variable positively impacting bond pre-
planning and planning efforts. Specialized bond election staff from the architectural firm 
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provided extensive resources and support to FACTS Committee and community 
leadership. The Superintendent said:  
Well, they helped us tremendously, and they, again, we have to understand that 
we may know our community, or think we do, but these people are, you know, 
they may be engaged in 10 different bond elections across the state, and are 
managing all these different things. They know. They’re doing 100 to our 1. 
Substantive Input and Involvement from Representative Group of Stakeholders 
Interview respondents indicated that significant stakeholder input and 
involvement in the school bond referendum planning process was a key variable in the 
success of the 2015 school bond election. As mentioned earlier, the school board and 
school district administrators had a new commitment to listening to the community and 
actively soliciting input and diverse perspectives. The school board and school district 
administrators adopted multiple pre-bond strategies to gain community input, including: 
extensive interviews with key influencers and surveying a representative, random sample 
cross-section of voters through a voter survey.  In addition, the school board and school 
district added FACTS Committee meetings that solicited input from teachers, staff, 
parents, community members, students, and the opposition and held well-publicized 
Community Meetings to share bond proposal and gain teacher, parent, and community 
input on proposed plan (2-way communication). 
Multiple interview respondents indicated that increased stakeholder input and 
involvement was one of the main reasons the 2015 school bond election succeeded: 
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The community had better input on it. That was what led to it getting through. I 
also think, too that by not passing the first time, the groups who were voting for it 
initially, because they had investments into it, students in the schools, and 
whatnot, things that they wanted to take care of. They probably got a lot more 
involved and got out and brought more community members in, too [P2]. 
The perception from the community was that they had meaningful input in 2015. P2 
described that stakeholders were willing to support and promote the bond if first, they 
understood the need, and second, if they had input on the bond proposals. As a result, 
they were willing to support and promote the bond proposals because they had helped 
“decide what was important.” 
I do remember a general consensus being a feeling like “well, we helped them 
decide what was important.” Then, people admitted that “yes, there was a need,” 
and then, they went and passed [the bond]. “There was a need, and we helped 
them make sense of how to spend the money.” I guess was kind of this weird idea 
that had come out of it. 
SBM referred to inclusion of the opposition being important in unifying the community: 
“Yeah, well in the second [2015] one, I think we did a lot better job of including the 
community even those that were against us rather than making it an ‘us versus them.’” 
Only after the extensive community needs assessment and facilities’ needs 
assessment process did the school board and school district administration begin a formal 
bond proposal planning process with the community. The school board and school 
district administration began a public, transparent facilitated process to develop a 
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potential school bond referendum election proposal recommendation for the school board 
that involved substantive input and involvement through a large, representative, highly-
visible bond committee. Based on feedback from the 2013 bond failure, the school board 
and district administration created a large, diverse, highly-visible bond planning 
committee. The Superintendent reported “then, the board created what we ended up 
calling the FACTS Committee . . . Facility Assessment of Citizens, Teachers, and 
Students. F-A-C-T-S. Is what the acronym was.” 
The FACTS Committee in 2015 was mentioned by numerous respondents as a 
strategy that supported the success of the 2015 school bond referendum election by 
intentionally seeking input and soliciting diverse perspectives from teachers, staff, 
parents, community members, and students, as well as providing what Bolman and Deal 
(2008) call an “arena for discussion and negotiation of school bond priorities and final 
projects” (p. 395).  
Intentional recruiting of large, diverse stakeholder group. Intentional 
recruiting of diverse, cross-section of FACTS Committee Members, including 
representation from teachers, staff, parents, community members, students, and the 
opposition, improved input into the bond proposal development process that respondents 
indicated positively impacted the bond outcome in 2015. A1 recalled, “When we got to 
the 2015 [school bond election], we focused in on ‘all right, we’re going to pull in staff, 
teachers, community members, we’re going to see what those voices say.’” 
The committee had a very clearly branded name that intentionally represented the 
inclusiveness of the committee, as well as the commitment to work from the “facts” of 
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facilities’ needs. Most of the participants interviewed remembered the name of the 
committee. Document review revealed readily available names of committee members. 
The Superintendent recalled: 
On that committee we did, we had a great cross-section, where the last one [2013 
bond] was probably 20 people, this was closer to 80 people. It was a big, big 
group. And they didn’t stay with us all throughout the whole process, but initially, 
when we met, it was a large, large group. 
A2 seconded the importance of this committee: 
The other piece that I think was real significant in the 2015 bond election was that 
from the get-go we had a FACTS Committee. It was Facilities Advisory 
Committee of . . . Citizens, Teachers, and Students. We had two high school 
students on there. They actually went through all of our facility needs . . . [and] 
the [Name of Survey Firm] survey. [Committee members] looked at that very 
thoroughly, looked at demographics, and then tried to blend all of that together 
into a proposal that they submitted to the school board, and ultimately the school 
board determined what they would take forward to a bond election. But because 
we had communities so heavily involved in the process from the beginning, it was 
a little different in the 2013 bond election, that process. I think that really it gave 
about . . . I think there were about 25 people on that committee. 
SBM reported that the FACTS Committee was highly visible in the 2015 school 
bond election efforts: 
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The second time, you would’ve had to have really been under a rock to get that 
flyer in the mail like [SBM] did 2013 and not know there was going to be a bond. 
It was the buzz around town. We didn’t try to hide it or anything. It was just, 
“Everybody, we want your input. Show up at this meeting. Show up at that 
meeting . . . We’ll also have phone interviews.” 
Impact on the bond proposal development process. Several respondents 
mentioned that the FACTS committee process created transparency by communicating 
key information to the community along the way. The Superintendent communicated this 
priority by keeping “the community involved all along the way, by putting information 
out on the website from pictures to progress reports.” P1 also mentioned that information 
from the FACTS Committee resulted in transparency: 
There was a website that was dedicated to the appropriate information and a very 
transparent understanding of the entire process. And so all of our deliberation on 
the FACTS Committee were on that website. All of our decisions on the board 
deliberations were on that website. A full run through of the entire process was on 
the website. 
A2 also mentioned how the FACTS Committee contributed to transparency 
through the process: 
So, we’ve tried to be real transparent. That bond wing on our website . . . I 
haven’t looked at analytics on it, I’m not sure how often or frequently it’s clicked, 
but it’s there. So you can’t say we’re not being transparent with this whole 
process. You can go back to the very first FACTS Committee agenda, 
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presentation and minutes on that. You can take it all the way back, and it’s really 
kind of nice for us that that history is there, too. 
Symbolic shift in leadership role of school board members to ‘listening’ role. 
The board of trustees, rather than leading the bond proposal development process, was 
involved in the facilities needs assessment and bond proposal development process but 
played a “listening” rather than a “leading” role. The Superintendent said the following: 
On that we also assigned three of the board members to be kind of just “flies on 
the wall” [on the FACTS Committee]. They were there, they weren’t to 
participate unless asked a question. They weren’t certainly there to influence or 
anything. They stayed back, and it was really driven by [the community co-
chairs].  
School board member and superintendent attendance provided visibility for the 
school board and superintendent, as well as allowing them to hear discussions and key 
concerns, without losing community direction and leadership. CM explained: 
The board was able to be there at those, especially the superintendent [Name of 
Superintendent]. He was there. Most of the school board members were there. I 
think some of the school board members, when we started out needed some 
persuading, too. 
Stakeholders understood school facilities’ needs. An important variable in 
gaining support from stakeholders was having them understand the school district 
facilities’ needs. The school board and school district intentionally used multiple 
strategies to demonstrate the facilities’ needs to teachers, parents, and community 
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members. Respondents indicated that there was improved stakeholder understanding of 
district needs in the 2015 school bond referendum election, and that this positively 
impacted the school bond referendum election outcomes. P2 said, “Then people admitted 
that ‘yes there was a need’ and then they went and passed [the bond]. ‘There was a need 
and we helped them make sense of how to spend the money.’”  
The architectural firm conducted an exhaustive facilities’ needs assessment of 
every building in the district, which led to data on facilities’ needs for each and every 
building in the school district. In addition, an important component mentioned by several 
interview respondents were the facilities’ tours that were held during bond proposal 
development process. Facilities’ tours were held during the FACTS Committee process 
for teachers, parents, community members to “see and feel’ facilities” needs. In addition, 
FACTS Committee meetings held at different school buildings so that teachers, parents, 
and community members would be able to experience the needs at different buildings 
across the district that they might not normally access. 
Facilities tours and holding FACTS Meetings at different schools. One of the 
issues of the 2013 school bond was that parents and community members were unaware 
of district facilities’ needs. In 2015, one of the strategies that the school board and school 
district administrators used to show the need to teachers, parents, and community 
members was by holding FACTS Committee meetings at different schools across the 
district, as well as facility tours. A review of the FACTS Committee planning 
presentations and agendas showed that these meetings were held at different schools 
across the district. CM noted, “We had meetings in every school in this last election.” In 
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addition, the school district hosted tours of all the districts’ facilities, and as said by the 
Superintendent, “We toured every facility.” CM also mentioned tours of the buildings: 
When we got it going . . . We took all the tours. We invited the community to 
come in and do the tours of every place that was going to be affected by the bond. 
We brought the community in, the ones that would come, and the people from 
[Name of Architectural Firm] would show us the things that they saw that was 
wrong with the stuff or that could be updated or needed to be. 
Showed specific needs, e. g. accessibility. Holding FACTS Committee meetings at 
different schools and having facilities’ tours was a way to have parents, teachers, and 
community members “see, feel, and touch” facilities needs in order to establish facilities’ 
needs in the district. The Superintendent related a significant story about accessibility and 
access as an example of how important it was for community members to experience 
school facilities’ issues, and the impact that had on support for the school bond efforts: 
This campus right down the hill from us, it’s [Name of Elementary], it’s on a hill, 
and there’s a series of steps that go up to the front door, but there was no 
wheelchair access. And so, children in wheelchairs, or that have ambulatory 
issues that they’re dealing with, all had to come around to the back to come into 
the building. So, that was one of the significant views, or lenses, I guess, that 
maybe that committee looked at whenever they started touring buildings. And, 
that’s why we met at different campuses, so that they could live it, for at least that 
short period of time. 
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Issues with old middle school. Numerous respondents mentioned the significant 
issues with the Middle School #1 that eventually were included in the bond proposal.  
[Name of Middle School #1] was really the one that was . . . A blind man could 
see what was wrong there. You could smell it. It was a building that had outlived 
its usefulness. I’ve been in the new one, probably half-a-dozen times during the 
process of building and since it’s been open. The kids are going to get so much 
more out of it [CM]. 
P1 addressed the issues affecting Middle School #1: 
And anyone who had anything to do with [Name of Middle School #1] knew the 
state of that school. They knew that the band flooded. They knew that the back of 
it flooded. They knew all that. Now they might complain that the school district 
hadn’t kept up maintenance with it. That was a common complaint. But they 
knew. 
Even P3, a parent new to the community who was not there before the school 
bond election, said: 
But none of the parents that I kind of know in passing have really said much about 
it. . . . It was time. I mean, I went into [Name of Middle School #1], the old one, 
last year for something, and that place was old. It needed to be torn down. It had a 
lower level, but it wasn’t two levels, if that makes sense. It had stairs going down 
to something, and they were from the 50s. I mean, the place was old. And it 
smelled bad. It smelled really bad. So, yeah, I mean, I don’t even want to know 
what was going on in there. 
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P1 added that parents in the district were ready to move their children out of the 
district if the middle school wasn’t fixed:  
I knew people who said, “If this doesn’t pass to build a new [Name of Middle 
School #1], then I’m going to put my kids in private school.” Cause they weren’t 
going to send their children to [Name of Middle School #1]. So because they 
knew what the state of it was, they could afford to put their kids in private school. 
They just weren’t going to put [their child into the school] . . . well, this individual 
had already put one child through [Name of Middle School #1]. The next child’s 
coming up. And he said, “I’ll just put her in private school,” because of the state 
of the building. Now the faculty, everybody agreed that everything about [Name 
of Middle School #1] is good; it’s just the building was horrible. 
Bond committee addressed multiple political variables. Bolman and Deal 
(2008) indicated that key strategies in a successful change process involve negotiating the 
political environment, including “creating arenas [where political issues can be discussed 
and negotiated]; building alliances; and defusing opposition (p. 395). Interview responses 
from participants indicated that the FACTS Committee was significant in building 
alliances, creating an arena where political issues could be discussed, as well as a place to 
defuse opposition. 
Deliberate efforts to build alliances in the school bond referendum process. The 
school board and school district administration had become aware of the need to build 
alliances during the 2015 school bond election efforts in order to overcome negative 
sentiment. There was a deep understanding of the significant anti-bond, anti-tax, and anti-
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government sentiment in the community that would need to be addressed, as well as 
potential parent and teacher concerns with any specific school bond proposal. Inclusion 
of “opposition” perspectives was a deliberate attempt to build alliances throughout the 
bond planning process.  
Recruitment for the committee deliberately included members of opposition to the 
prior school bond referendum. The Superintendent conveyed that this reflected the 
district’s new commitment to listening to diverse perspectives in the community: 
That included those folks that were outwardly opposed to the last bond election. 
They wanted a voice at the table, and that’s what it was. We brought them in and 
gave them a chance to go through the entire process, and we really wanted that 
voice in there. We wanted to hear it. The board wanted to hear it. So, we had that 
large group. 
The SBM shared that inclusion of the opposition worked in multiple ways. First, 
opposition members could say they were invited to the table. 
Then we invited the FACTS Committee, of which was mostly . . . Well, you 
know, I say we invited a lot of “vote no-ers,” not a ton showed up. I think there 
was probably up to . . . How many people are on the FACTS Committee? 12, 26, 
18, something like that? I think maybe we had five or six, but that’s not how 
many we invited. We did try to invite a lot. Even by just doing that, the ones that 
didn’t show up, we now had a little bit of a, “Hey, we invited you. We tried to 
bring you in on the process.” That quieted them. [Invited opposition members 
would say:] “Eh, I just couldn’t make it this time, but I understand. I heard some 
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good things about what you’re doing. Yeah, I’m okay with it this time around.” 
We got a lot of that. 
Second, the SBM shared how including opposition members on the FACTS 
Committee was a way of showing respect for the oppositions’ viewpoints, an important 
part of building alliances: 
The other thing that we did, another piece of advice for future groups is, our 
FACTS Committee, or our groups that we had in the beginning, we invited as 
many, or very many, a lot of the recognized “vote no” people. We put them right 
on the committee and we let them have the loudest, largest mic to just rip apart 
everything. And then, we had people in the room that could say, “Well, I respect 
that you just said that. Do you mind if I show you something?” They pull up a big 
slide that says, “Your taxes have actually gone, [down]. Now, I know that’s the 
perception [that they have gone up]. I’m glad you’re here, [Name]. I’m glad 
you’re here, but the taxes have gone down. Do you think if we marketed this 
better maybe people would understand?” You could see the “vote no-er” be like, 
“Yeah, I didn’t really know that. Can you email that to me? I don’t know if I trust 
that, but if that’s true, that does change my opinion.” Now you’ve got them softer. 
FACTS committee created an arena to discuss and negotiate. The FACTS 
Committee created a natural arena to discuss and negotiate a wide variety of options in 
the school bond proposal. Meeting presentations show numerous options that were costed 
out and discussed by the committee, before the FACTS Committee provided a final 
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recommendation to the school board (TFISD FACTS Committee Meeting Presentations 
#3-#7).  
CM shared the positive impacts that the inclusion of the opposition had on the 
bond planning process. First, it allowed committee members to address opposition 
concerns that could have derailed school bond election success: 
We had community people come in, mainly school parents, and it was about a 50-
50 deal where the parents would ask negative questions or would want a negative 
answer. Most of the time, we had enough people there to isolate some of them and 
talk to them and really give them more information. I think that was really 
important. I don’t know if we persuaded them, but we tried to. . . . Every meeting 
we had with the community, we had people there that would sit down and talk to 
groups. Sometimes there would be several in a group, sometimes it would be just 
one individual. We’d have our meetings, they’d get loud and say that’s wrong, 
you’re doing this wrong. You overcome that and try to talk to them as individuals 
and try to explain the outbursts and try to explain the questions and the answers, 
so everybody will understand. 
CM expressed that opposition members may have changed their beliefs and 
become more positive about the school bond referendum as they participated in the 
process: 
I think through the process of what we went through, I know that some of them 
became very positive about it. Starting out, they may not have been as positive but 
as we went along, I think they got more positive about it.  
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 This encouraged opposition members to communicate bond planning efforts back 
to their social networks, as said by CM: 
Not all of them were for the bond. That was a positive thing, too, that you don’t 
go in and just fill your committee with everybody that says “yes.” You had to 
have some negative, so you can help persuade some of the negative voters 
through that committee. I think we did that, I think we took some of the people 
that were on that committee and persuaded them that this is the right thing to do. 
They went back and told their people that, “yeah, they’re going the right way. 
They’re trying to do this right.” 
Ability to defuse opposition and anticipating counterstrategies. Interview 
responses also suggested that the school board and school district were able to 
significantly “defuse opposition and anticipate counterstrategies” as opposition concerns 
were heard and addressed throughout the FACTS Committee bond development process 
(Bolman & Deal, 2008, -. 395). The SBM explained: 
The main mission was not to turn the “vote nos.” It was just to soften them, quiet 
them, or turn them into a maybe just nothing, just a “not vote.” Let sleeping dogs 
lie. You’re not going to go out there and get the angry person. When I say we 
invited a lot of the “vote no-ers,” it was strategic, but we wanted some in there 
that we felt would be helpful and that would let us know. They learned a lot I 
think from me, like, “Why did you vote against it?” “Oh, I never even thought of 
that.” 
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Community forums offered opportunities for two-way communication. In 
addition to the FACTS Committee, the school board members held community forums 
regarding the school bond referendum in 2015 once the bond election had been declared. 
Parents, teachers, and community members were able to hear about the bond, as well as 
provided input and engaged in in two-way communication about the school bond 
proposal at these meetings. P1 said: 
Then there were several public presentations made that were open to the 
community. Community members could come and hear the presentation. The one 
that I attended was done by the school board president and then he entertained the 
questions, so people were able to ask questions. 
Appealing Bond Proposals 
Respondents consistently referenced “reframed” school bond proposal(s) as an 
important variable in the success of the 2015 school bond referendum election. A1 
indicated that a restructuring of the bond proposal made the bond referendum more 
“appealing and palatable” to individual voters: 
The other thing that was very different is we restructured what we packaged in the 
bond fund from 2013 to 2015, and I do believe that made it more appealing and 
palatable to individual taxpayers, and we had a significant committee group, a 
PAC group, that helped us lead the community through that. It made all the 
difference in the world. 
Reflecting stakeholder input. P2 described that stakeholder input and 
involvement resulted in a more appealing set of bond proposals: 
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It was different the second time around that I recall (2015 versus 2013). . . . When 
it failed the first time, they didn’t really ask for the money because they just 
wanted to improve these things. You ask out of need basically. When it failed the 
first time, they were put in a pinch. Then they came back, they developed, they 
actually had a lot more community involvement [italics added for emphasis] and 
sort of reframed and rebuilt it and decided what was important and ran it again. 
SBM expressed the restructuring as follows: 
You can tell by the bonds, in theory, the idea of the bond, and this is because the 
district has any idea, the bond didn’t really change. Let’s try to relieve capacity 
issues at the elementary schools. But the execution, how are you going to do that 
was much more palatable to the people because we asked them what they could 
digest. “Okay, well maybe sixth graders can move up, but you’re not taking my 
fifth-grade baby.” “Well, the district needs some athletic improvements up at the 
high school. Okay, well let’s address that through fund balance. Let’s remove it 
from the bond because that’s what the people think.” . . . We need to improve 
Career and Tech: “Alright, well let’s put that on a 5-year plan, and let’s just not 
really worry about that right now.” . . . The district needs improvements and 
upgrades. . . . Then let’s do safety and security.  
P2 called reframing a “better expression of meaning” that “was definitely better 
community involvement, better expression of meaning, and then sort of a means of 
showing that the funds that are being asked for are being spent wisely.”  
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Bond proposal met the identified need of elementary overcrowding. CM 
stressed that the bond proposals met the district’s greatest need of elementary 
overcrowding: 
By also doing that, and taking and re-doing [Name of Middle School #2] so we 
can bring the sixth grades up into the junior high level and opening up our 
elementary, so we can buy some time on elementary. To me, that was a key thing. 
We have to have elementaries, probably in the next . . . 5 to 7 years. If we don’t 
have elementaries, we’re going to be right back in the same boat, even with the 
first through five [grades] or kindergarten through five [grades], we’re going to 
have to have the portables back in. I think that’s so key that we’re buying a little 
time. 
Community-driven priorities. A1 explicated: 
It became a very prioritized list, and it really wasn’t driven by administration, 
because if you compare the two bond packages you can see the differences of 
what we would have probably chosen to do versus what the group as a whole 
shows as priority. 
The SBM indicated how the new 2015 bond proposals addressed the major 
concerns that had caused the bond election failure in 2013: 
The second time it really wasn’t about the kids. It wasn’t about, “Do this for your 
children.” No, it was more like, “Our bricks are falling down on this one building. 
Look what’s going on at some of these schools as far as safety and security. We 
know we can’t stop it all, but let’s at least change the entryway so we get 
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somebody going to the office rather than entering Ms. Jones’ kindergarten class 
the first thing when they go in the building.” As far as the new middle school, it’s 
like, “Well, yeah you told us you didn’t want a brand new wing on the high 
school, and you didn’t want all this combination, so let’s not move anybody 
except let’s just get the sixth graders aligned with their academic performance. 
Let’s do very little. You didn’t want a lot of stuff, so how about we just move one 
grade? You didn’t want two grades, and two middle schools, but would you be 
okay with, . . .what if we told you we could just move one and accomplish the 
same exact thing?” You saw on social media, and in person, people go, “I can 
take that. That’s palatable. I can do one move” [italics added for emphasis]. 
Parents and teachers accepted proposed grade configurations. The change in 
grade configurations to include only sixth grade into middle school was still a concern, 
but a re-configuration that most parents could approve. The SBM recalled that only 
changing one grade level was an important factor for parents: “The theory is let’s get one 
grade out of the elementary schools. Actually, we changed it to only one grade out of the 
elementary schools. That was a big factor . . . [for] parents.” 
P3 reflected on perceived teacher reaction to the change: “They [the teachers] 
seemed receptive. They seemed positive. Nobody seemed apprehensive about it, to my 
understanding.” Human resource issues due to changes had been addressed through 
providing additional training and benefits to sixth grade teachers who would move into a 
middle school environment. P3 continued, “The teachers were all for it. My 
understanding was they had all had lots and lots of training about how this integration 
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was gonna work. Workshop days and that kind of stuff. And so they were looking 
forward to it.” 
Parent 5 summarized the impact of teachers support on parent support for the 
school bond election: 
And it has to come from the inside out, too. If the teachers don’t believe there’s 
value in it, the parents aren’t gonna believe there’s value in it and there’s no way 
it’s gonna pass. Your biggest sales force is really word-of-mouth through the 
teachers initially and then back to the parents [italics added for emphasis]. 
No athletics. Respondents consistently mentioned that an important variable of 
successful bond passage in 2015 was that athletics were taken out of the bond proposals. 
P1 said, “It didn’t include anything related to sports.” P2 recalled: “Seems like there was 
an athletic chunk that they cut between the first and the second if I recall. A big one.” P2 
surmised about why including athletics might have been a difficult option to include: 
I think there are a couple of different groups in every single district really; it’s not 
just a [Town-Fringe] thing that feels like athletics is a luxury, not a necessity to 
the school district. I also feel like that nostalgic group in [Town-Fringe] thinks 
that, “That stadium’s perfect, don’t touch it, don’t change it.” There’s something 
there that holds it up. So there’s two different motivations. They’ll both have the 
same reasons basically: “Don’t spend money on this.” One [person/community 
member thinks] “It’s extra.” One [person/community member thinks] “It’s great 
the way it is.” I don’t necessarily agree all the time. I think you gotta grow to 
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meet the needs. That said you don’t have to go build an $18-million stadium 
either for your high school football team. 
Lower bond amount. The lower bond amount was listed as an important variable 
in the passage of the 2015 bond by multiple respondents. The total of all three bond 
proposals in the 2015 was a significantly lower bond amount than in the 2013 school 
bond referendum election. The total for the 2015 school bond proposals was $74.9 
million, just under the $75-million level that the voter survey indicated would still be 
possible to pass a school bond referendum. The FACTS Committee recommendation 
came in at around $100 million dollars, but the school board went with a revised final set 
of bond proposals that came in at $74.9 million dollars. The Superintendent recounted 
this process: 
Then they [the FACTS Committee] made a recommendation to the board of, and I 
think it was somewhere over . . . a $100 million . . . as far as a recommendation 
for that 2015 bond, and they had a lot in there. And, the board said, “Thank you, 
but no thank you,” which I thought was interesting. “We don’t think that, after 
what we’ve been through, and after what we’ve learned in our conversations, we 
don’t think we can pass that bond in [Town-Fringe], Texas, in this climate. Not 
right now.” So, they backed it down, and the target was something less than $75 
million, and so they passed a $74.9 million bond. And, according to the [Voter 
Survey Firm] study, that had a slim chance of passing. It had a chance, but it was 
slim. 
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P2 said regarding variables that were important in the success of the 2015 school bond 
referendum election: 
The biggest was the reduction of the funds I’m sure . . . I remember the budget 
numbers - the bond shrank if I remember right, too. The original was about 25 to 
30% higher than the second one. Then in the second one it was a slimmed down 
version that still covered things that they were wanting, technology updates, some 
security bits, and a hand full of other facilities things that had to be taken care of, 
and it did a lot better. 
The Superintendent said: 
The board looked at it and said, “We can’t do all of that.” . . . I think the last one 
was like [$]109 or [$]107 or something like that, we know there’s no tolerance for 
that. We know that. So, let’s don’t even talk about that. We will use this [$]200 
million that you’ve identified as, “Okay, that’s the long-range plan, that’s how we 
need to eke this elephant, now what do we think we’ll do?” We had some board 
members saying, “$50 million,” we had some that said, “Somewhere north of 
[$]75,” and they finally worked it back to something less than [$]75 million.  
Multiple propositions offered choice to stakeholders. Offering voters choice 
through multiple propositions was also mentioned by respondents as an important 
variable in the success of the 2015 school bond election. SBM attributed the success of 
the school bond referendum election to both a lower amount and multiple propositions: 
The architect and their marketing arm, which was very smart, real nice people, 
they said, “Well, that doesn’t give us as good a chance to pass it.” I said, “That’s 
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regardless. That doesn’t mean anything to me. They [voters] already said no to 
this style [single proposition]. They said no to a large bond, all encompassing, no 
options, no choices, athletics included. Let’s do it differently. Let’s see if the 
citizens are going to support the district but do it in a way that’s maybe more 
comfortable.” We reduced the size by about 40 million. We broke it up into three 
propositions. It almost didn’t [pass], . . . one passed by three votes. 
SBM described multiple propositions as “a la carte” options for voters: 
In the second time around, the vibe in the community was very like “a la carte.” 
People were talking about, “You know, I’m not voting for that stupid security 
thing, but yeah, let’s get a new middle school up there.” There were actually 
people on the west side of town, were like, “Yeah, let’s get a new school. I don’t 
know if we need all these upgrades in security measures.” Even when the bond 
passed, I had arguments, discussions, some pleasant some not, with our architect, 
with the board members. I said, “I’m not putting my hand up for a yay unless this 
is at least divided up. I don’t even care if you try to go out for the same exact size. 
These people, they want to be able to have a choice and a say in what it is. If you 
want to put athletics on there, you need to isolate it.” 
Several district and community respondents listed the idea of multiple propositions as 
important to increasing the likelihood of school bond referendum passage in 2015. A1 
said: 
So, in the new world of 2015, we gathered all this feedback . . . everybody was 
highly involved, and we broke it up into three props, knowing full well we might 
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get one, two or none. I think all of us were thrilled that we got all three, but one of 
them by the . . . by three votes. 
A2 also agreed that multiple propositions was important. “The other thing that 
helped us was breaking it into propositions.”  
SBM indicated that he believed this structure was one of the most important 
variables in the passage of the 2015 school bond referendum: 
I’d like to believe, and I’ll take it to my dying day that that was the reason why it 
did pass is because they had the options . . . To the average voter, I don’t really 
think there was much different from bond [2013] to bond [2015]. It was the size, 
and it was the fact they got to be in there an a la carte it, and pick and choose. 
That’s the anecdotal feedback I got from lots and lots of folks. By separating that 
one [safety & security], that was a big thing too. It was telling the community, 
“Alright, if you want it, you want it. If you don’t, you don’t. It’s here. It’s on the 
side. It’s a little cup of mayonnaise. You don’t want to dip in your mayonnaise? 
Maybe you do, maybe you don’t. It’s on the side. We’ll let you do that.” I think 
that went a long way. We got very good feedback on that. I think the safety and 
security one passed by the highest margin. The middle school was only three 
votes. 
P4 said the following: 
I would allow people to vote for the things that they cared about. You don’t want 
somebody to vote no for the whole thing if they just have some sort of axe to 
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grind about FFA [Future Farmers of America] or football or whatever. If you 
want to vote against that part, then you can vote for the parts that we really need. 
Improved Communication and Trust 
Interview respondents indicated that improved communication played a key role 
in the success of the 2015 school bond referendum election. P4 commented on several 
aspects of the improved communication: 
I remember there were lots of meetings. They had lots of, “This is what’s going 
on.” They did a lot better informationally and it may have been ‘cause our 
daughter was older at that point. It may have been ‘cause I was on the PTA board. 
It may have been a lot of reasons, but I do think they did a better job. 
P2 also commented on the increased level of communication in 2015: “It [school bond 
planning and campaigning] was heavier the second time around. There were more 
community meetings. There were still the flyers and the advertising.”  
In the 2015 school bond election, districts communications efforts were 
embedded throughout the process during the pre-bond planning and needs assessment 
process, FACTS Committee meetings, and Community Meetings. The FACTS 
Committee participation created natural ambassadors who could spread the word about 
bond election issues. A detailed District Bond Election Communications Plan was 
developed & implemented by district administration, including a specific Social Media 
Plan. This plan provided clear and focused messaging about the bond proposal; the 
benefits of the bond proposal to every student, parent, and school; clear bond amounts 
and tax impacts shared. Messaging was supported by architectural firm’s bond election 
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planning team, and social media efforts to disseminate information and “Get Out the 
Vote” efforts were effective. The school bond efforts utilized targeted school bond 
campaign plan used specific “Get Out the Vote” strategies; focused on people most likely 
to vote, and focused on the “over-65” age group. PAC support was also significantly 
increased from 2013 bond efforts. 
Reflected voter preferences. Improved communication resulted from 
understanding stakeholder and voter preferences. A1 stated: 
In [20]15, there was a very intentional process put in place to where we really 
paid attention, studied and understood who are the people that actually do come 
and vote, and those were certainly very targeted communications to those folks, 
and then trying to get our parents, which we were very successful at. 
Long-term district communications and community engagement strategies. 
After the 2013 school bond election failure, A2 believed that increasing long-term 
communications activities to reach parents and community members with positive 
messages about the school district on an on-going basis was important. She began new 
communications strategies and activities to build better communication immediately 
following the failure of the 2013 school bond election and believed that this foundation of 
communication built trust and positively impacted bond election outcomes in 2015. 
A2 indicated the communications plan was much more detailed in the 2015 
school bond election.  
I think that what I would say for the communications plan, we had one both times. 
The second one was much more developed, much more targeted to voters. People 
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who were likely to vote, we were much more . . . instead of blanket-mailing our 
community, we focused on those people who are most likely to vote, and that’s 
only . . . it’s less than 10% of your community. 
A2 also indicated the importance of the district staying “on message” during the 
school bond referendum election campaign: 
The overall difference for the communications department in 2015 was that no 
matter what was said, we stuck to our message. We didn’t get in the weeds of 
trying to fight an opposition message. We stuck with our message, and we had a 
very clear, specific message that we gave. 
A1 concurred with A2 indicating the district “didn’t go off on the rabbit trails. We 
stayed with our very focused mission and spoke to who we knew were our voters and not 
just the one naysayer over there that was making a lot of loud noise.” Several respondents 
indicated that an improved use of social media positively impacted the 2015 school bond 
referendum election results, by reaching teachers, parents, and community members. A2 
discussed the following:  
We had a more developed social media plan for messaging. Really, just as an 
aside to all of the bond election, what we have seen over the last, probably, 3 or 4 
years is that people go to our Facebook page. We reach more people with our 
Facebook page than we do with any other medium, so it was really important to 
have a well-developed plan of communication in 2015 for Facebook. I mean, we 
get on Twitter, but Twitter, our audience is different. Our community and our 
parents and our staff are all on Facebook.  
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Presentations were also used in the 2015 school bond referendum election 
communications efforts, but the perception was that it was a better presentation.  
The presentation that was made, I thought, was very good . . . It was very 
convincing. I made it twice to faculty groups. I watched it presented a couple of 
times. At the Rotary club, and then at the ministerial alliance. I think it laid out 
the case very well [P1]. 
Social media effectiveness. CM talked about using social media during last-
minute “Get Out the Vote” efforts: 
At the time of the election, my daughter. . . living in the [Another Town in the 
Area] area and was not able to vote. She was on Facebook, trying to help promote 
that [the 2015 school bond election]. Facebook was a big thing. . . . This new 
media stuff, which I’m not a part of . . . I know the younger group, that’s what 
they live off of. They’re not going to come to me, necessarily, but they live off of 
that media stuff. I think that was so important that you include that. 
The school district website was also used much more effectively in 2015 to share 
FACTS Committee information throughout the bond proposal process, which created 
transparency in the process. P1 shared that: 
There was a website that was dedicated to the appropriate information and a very 
transparent understanding of the entire process. And so, all of our deliberation on 
the FACTS Committee were on that website. All of our decisions on the board 
deliberations were on that website. A full run through of the entire process was on 
the website.  
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The online presence was intentional on the part of the school district 
administration. The Superintendent recalled that: 
So, board settled on that [the bond proposal and amount], and we kept the 
community involved all along the way by putting information out on the website, 
from pictures to progress reports. 
P2 mentioned the increased effectiveness of the communications materials, like 
the flyers:  
They did a great job advertising those bonds with promotional flyers and all that 
came out. The extent of the growth and the problems that were presenting 
themselves that they need to deal with. 
 Improved PAC advocacy and marketing. A1 talked about the increased parent 
and community involvement through the pro-bond PAC. A1 said: 
The one last thing I will say is we had a lot of very active parent involvement in 
the 2015, through the PAC. You know the PAC can do what we can’t. We had 
active parent participation in 2013, but the PAC itself was so much more 
organized in 2015, and I think they had lessons learned from it as well.  
P1 talked about how organized the PAC marketing and communications activities 
were, especially in regard to “Get Out the Vote Efforts”: 
It was well organized. The movement was well organized in terms of getting 
people to make phone calls, putting out signs, letters to the editor. I feel like that 
piece of it was well organized . . . Well, we were asked to take sheets, lists of 
potential voters and make phone calls asking people to vote for the bond. I don’t 
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know how many people did that. The consulting group we worked with helped 
organize that. And then the chairs of the campaign would distribute those. And we 
would be given a list and we would make as many calls as we could. Encourage 
people to vote for the bond. 
A2 and CM mentioned that communications and marketing efforts were targeted 
to “Get Out the Vote” and to an “Over 65” group. A2 recalled: 
We focused on our over-65 group more heavily. Not that we didn’t focus on that 
in [20]13, we did, but more heavily, because in our community that’s the 
population that has the greatest number of turnouts at the polls. So, we focused a 
little more on that. 
CM indicated that efforts were targeted to Get Out the Vote: 
Well, people coming out to vote. When you win an election by three votes, that is 
so important that the people that you have spoken to, that they say they’re for it, 
you make sure they’re going to be there. I know the groups that are against it are 
doing the same thing. They’re talking to their people. We talk to everybody that 
we knew, as far as just me and my family making sure that they got there and 
voted. 
The Get Out the Vote campaign was regarded positively. “I went to the kick off where 
they had signs that were given out” [P1].  “Seems like the popular hot spots to eat around 
town had postings up. It was pretty well covered” [P2]. 
Increased trust. [P1] suggested that the school board and school district did a 
better job of building trust in the 2015 school bond election: 
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There is a contingent in our community, and it’s in our larger culture of a distrust 
of any institution. And so there’s a distrust of the school district. When the district 
asked for a bond the default response is “well I wonder how much of that they 
really don’t need?” And so, I think institutions need to work harder to build trust. 
It may be that in the 2015 bond we did a better job of building trust.  
Although communications and marketing was a part of this, there were numerous 
activities throughout the process that built this trust, including: an attitude of listening on 
the part of the school board and school district administrators; significant efforts to 
understand stakeholder preferences; active efforts to ensure input and involvement of a 
diverse group of parents, community members, teachers, and students; clear planning and 
decision-making processes; strong parent and community leadership; information-sharing 
throughout the process; showing stakeholders facilities’ needs; incorporating stakeholder 
input into the bond proposals during the planning process; and providing the community 
detailed information on facilities’ needs and providing detailed bond proposals. 
No Anti-bond Opposition Efforts 
Due to the significant efforts to involve the community in the 2015 school bond 
election, especially the opposition, an anti-bond/opposition group never formed in the 
2015 school bond election process. The Superintendent talked about the lack of an 
opposition in the 2015 school bond election process: 
Of course, there was a political action committee that formed, there was a “pro” 
PAC, and we did not have and “anti” PAC form in 2015, and I just kept waiting 
and waiting, for that to develop, and it never did.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative single-case study was to investigate and analyze 
the perceptions of a representative group of district and community stakeholders 
regarding variables that contributed to the failure or successful passage of school bond 
referenda in Texas. Using qualitative methods, this study was conducted to update, 
enhance, elaborate, and clarify previous bond passage models developed by recent 
quantitative and qualitative studies, and to illuminate issues and factors influencing 
school bond passage. This in-depth qualitative case study of a representative school 
district that experienced success after a prior bond election failure was used to develop a 
greater understanding of the variables associated with overcoming negative sentiment. 
Document review, as well as the perceptions of a representative group of stakeholders 
including the superintendent, current and former school board members, chief financial 
officer, chief communication officer, parents, and community members in the target 
district and community, were analyzed. This chapter concludes the study and addresses 
the summary of the study and findings, discussion, conclusions, implications for practice, 
and recommendations for future research. 
Summary of the Study and Findings 
The data gathered for this research study addressed the perceptions of a diverse 
group of district and community stakeholders in the target district and community 
including: the superintendent, current and former school board members, chief financial 
officer, chief communication officer, parents, and community members. Data were 
gathered from semi-structured interviews with 11 district and community stakeholders. 
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Additional data were gained from a review of documents from the 2013 and 2015 school 
bond referendum elections in the selected district and community, including: district 
strategic planning documents related to school facilities and bond planning; school 
district bond referendum information documents; newspaper articles on the school bond 
election; internal and external communication documents related to the school bond 
election; meeting minutes or notes from school bond advisory group meetings; and any 
relevant school bond referenda documents. 
2013 School Bond Failure: Research Question 1 
This question asked: What variables contributed to the failure of a school bond 
election? Eleven major variables characterized the 2013 school bond failure in Town-
Fringe Independent School District (TFISD), TX. Eleven major variables characterized 
the 2013 school bond failure in TFISD, TX. These variables included: (a) the school 
board and school district used existing processes; (b) an assumption of community 
support and lack of awareness of changes in stakeholder perceptions and community 
context by the school board and school district; (c) a lack of expert capacity to support 
bond election processes; (d) a lack of community needs assessment & pre-planning; (e) a 
lack of overall comprehensive school bond election planning process (f) poor leadership 
recruitment and development; (g) a lack of input and involvement from a representative 
group of stakeholders, especially parents, teachers, and the opposition; (h) poor 
communication and lack of trust; (i) a weak bond proposal, including high bond amount, 
bond content, and single proposition; (j) lack of consideration of structural, human 
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resource, political, and symbolic dimensions of change process; and, (k) significant and 
effective anti-bond efforts. 
The first major variable that impacted the 2013 bond election failure was the 
school board members and school district administrators used existing processes. The 
Superintendent and central office administrators (A1 and A2) described the 2013 bond 
process as a traditional or old school bond process that included the facilities needs 
assessment; a district Citizens’ Advisory Committee to work on bond proposal 
development; and communications and marketing activities that included presentations, 
flyers, and signs/posters to sell the school bond proposal to the community. Bolman and 
Deal (2008) indicated an effective strategy from the structural frame for leaders to use to 
support a change process was to “remove or alter structures and procedures that support 
the old ways”; TFISD did not do this in the 2013 school bond election (p. 395). 
 The second variable in the 2013 school bond election failure was an assumption 
of community support and lack of awareness of changes in stakeholder perceptions and 
community context by the school board and school district. Multiple respondents 
indicated that there was a general assumption of community support by the school board 
and school district administration that did not accurately stakeholder support in the school 
district and community. The school board and school district were unaware of parent and 
community member distrust and dissatisfaction with the school board and school district. 
The school board and school district administrators also were unaware of important 
factors in the political and economic environment, including a sudden increase of anti-tax 
and anti-government sentiment that made passing a school bond referendum in 2013 
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difficult. In addition, school board members and school district administrators were 
unaware of perceptions of school district waste and high bond amount of prior bond 
efforts, as well as the negative impacts of the long length of time since the previous 
school bond election had been held. Moreover, the school board and school district 
administrators were unaware of the impact that community growth and change had on 
parent and community member support for a potential school bond election referendum. 
The findings showed school board and school district lack of awareness of the changes 
within the district and community context was an important variable in the failure of the 
2013 school bond referendum election. 
The third variable that negatively impacted the outcome of the 2013 school bond 
election was a lack of expert capacity to support bond election processes. In the 
traditional bond process, the district secured an architectural firm with strong facilities 
expertise and deep history with the district, but the architectural firm lacked the capacity 
to effectively provide bond election expertise and support throughout the school bond 
election process. Numerous respondents mentioned the lack of school bond election 
expertise from the architectural firm as a variable that negatively impacted the outcome 
of the 2013 school bond election. This lack of expertise included lack of expertise in pre-
bond planning processes; lack of a comprehensive bond process to structure the process 
for the community; a less detailed facilities needs assessment; and insufficient support to 
parent and community volunteers during the bond proposal development process.  
The fourth variable represented in the 2013 school bond election failure was a 
lack of community needs assessment and pre-planning on the part of the school board and 
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school district administration. Based on document review and interview responses, the 
district administration and school board gathered limited information about district and 
community context in the 2013 school bond referendum election process. There was a 
lack of input from key influencers in the community prior to bond planning efforts, and 
input that was given was ignored. The 2013 bond election process was characterized by a 
lack of a community needs assessment or voter survey to assess voter preferences for 
bond proposal content or voter tolerances regarding potential bond amounts. The 2013 
school bond election process used only limited community demographic and economic 
growth data. School board members and school district administration did not utilize 
information from other school district bond election efforts. Instead, anti-bond opposition 
groups effectively utilized state and local data to create an anti-bond, anti-district 
narrative. 
The fifth variable of the 2013 school bond election failure was the lack of an 
overall comprehensive school bond election planning process. The 2013 school bond 
referendum election findings showed the lack of an overall coordinated school bond 
strategy, lack of clear decision-making processes and structures, and failure to clarify 
roles and responsibilities explicitly negatively impacted the effectiveness of the 2013 
school bond process. Respondents indicated that lack of organization negatively affected 
the outcome of the 2013 school bond election, and these disorganized efforts were 
connected to the lack of an overall school bond election strategy and coordinated plan. 
There also was little evidence of decision-making and communications structures, such as 
role descriptions, procedures, and protocols used as a part of the 2013 bond process, 
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indicated by Bolman and Deal (2008) as a strategy from the structural frame necessary in 
successful change processes (p. 395). In this environment, motivated anti-bond group 
leaders generated and implemented a coordinated strategy that had decision-making and 
communications structures. The anti-bond group also used local political and school 
board election leadership roles and responsibilities to their advantage. The “anti-bond” 
PAC relied on local political structures to organize, provide decision-making and 
communication structures, and offer new roles and responsibilities for emerging leaders. 
Finally, the anti-bond group utilized the school board’s election processes, protocols, and 
procedures to advance its leaders and messages. 
The sixth variable of the 2013 school bond election failure was poor leadership 
recruitment and development. The district’s lack of attention to leadership development 
and training had a negative impact on the 2013 school bond election results. There was an 
overall lack of attention to recruiting strong leaders and to developing individuals for key 
roles in the school bond election process, including for the pro-bond committee. Parents 
reported that the “champion” for the bond effort was missing, and multiple participants 
reported a lack of parent and community leadership in the 2013 school bond efforts. The 
lack of attention to leadership recruiting included failing to involve key individuals from 
the prior 1999 bond who had significant expertise in the bond process in an environment 
where most parents were new to the process without any experience or training in leading 
and supporting a school bond election process. In addition, the 2013 bond lacked 
involvement of a competent expert consultant would could fill in the gaps of knowledge 
that parent and community volunteers might have lacked. 
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The seventh variable impacting the 2013 school bond election failure was the a 
lack of input and involvement from a representative group of stakeholders, especially 
parents, teachers, and the opposition. Interview responses from district administrators, 
school board members, parents, and community members who were interviewed 
consistently indicated that the lack of stakeholder input and involvement in the school 
bond referendum process was a major variable in the failure of the 2013 school bond 
election process. Respondents indicated that the school bond proposal process was 
“administratively-driven,” with little true input from staff, parents, or community 
members. In the 2013 school bond election, respondents reported limited meetings with 
key influencers, especially those with opposing views. Participant interviews indicated 
that there was a lack of input from a representative group of stakeholders, including 
teachers, parents, community members, and students, especially opposition views. 
Community forums that the district held to communicate the bond proposal provided only 
one-way communication with little to no opportunity for teachers, parents, or community 
members to provide input or feedback. As a result, parents and community members who 
were interviewed indicated that they did not have an understanding for the need for a 
school bond referendum. 
The eighth variable that negatively impacted the 2013 school bond election was a 
weak bond proposal, including high bond amount, bond content, and single proposition. 
Due to the lack of involvement and input during the school bond referendum proposal 
planning process, teachers, parents, and community members did not understand school 
district facilities’ needs, were surprised by the bond referendum election announcement, 
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and ultimately, had significant issues with the final school bond proposal. Respondents 
mentioned that the framing of the bond proposal was poor, not strategic, did not match 
the stated need, was complicated, and did not connect emotionally with stakeholders. In 
addition, the bond amount was too high. Voters disliked a single proposition bond 
proposal, feeling that it left them [voters] no choices. The anti-bond opposition efforts 
turned the single proposition message into: “If you don’t like one thing, vote no.” In 
addition, teachers and parents did not like new grade configurations in the 2013 school 
bond proposal. Teachers were reported to dislike proposed grade reconfigurations and 
relocation that would have impacted their work environment, curriculum, and teaching 
responsibilities on a day-to-day basis. Parents opposed the school bond proposal due to 
new grade configurations perceived as moving elementary students to middle school too 
early; potential loss of opportunities for students at the middle school level due to a 
proposed middle school consolidation; and dislike of a perceived creation of a “mega” 
high school. Numerous respondents indicated that the inclusion, or the perceived 
inclusion, of a large portion of the bond for athletics, was problematic for many voters. 
The ninth variable in the failure of the 2013 school bond referendum was poor 
communication and lack of trust. District administrators, parents, school board members, 
and community members indicated that communication and lack of trust was a major 
problem in the 2013 school bond referendum election process. Due to lack of 
communication, the announcement of the school bond referendum election was a surprise 
to district administrators, teachers, parents, and community members. There was a lack of 
information at the campus level, one of the most critical places for parents to receive 
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information, and an overall sense that teachers and campus staff were uninformed about 
the school bond. Instead, the opposition group had a well-organized, well-funded anti-
bond anti-bond PAC that utilized significant anti-bond communications and marketing 
strategies against the bond election, including political ads, flyers, posters, and signs. 
More importantly, the anti-bond opposition accessed and effectively utilized powerful, 
informal social communications networks, including social media, to build a community 
around the anti-bond efforts. The anti-bond opposition was able to effectively use anti-tax 
and anti-government narratives and found stories to portray the school board and school 
district as a “bad tax collector” and “ineffective and wasteful” government institution. 
Interview responses indicated a lack of ability of the school district to defuse the 
opposition, and an inability to counter the anti-bond PAC’s messages and anticipate the 
anti-bond PAC’s counterstrategies. District administrators reported this negative 
messaging decreased trust in the school district, negatively affecting the 2013 bond 
election outcome. Within this context, it was difficult for the district to “create a hopeful 
vision of the future rooted in organizational history” as a strategy that Bolman and Deal 
(2008) suggested can be used to support the symbolic aspects of a change process.  
The tenth variable was an overall lack of consideration of structural, human 
resource, political, and symbolic dimensions of change process. The lack of attention to 
these variables caused distrust with teachers, parents, and community members, and 
enabled the anti-bond forces to prevail in the bond election. Structurally, the school board 
and school district used existing processes, did not use a comprehensive bond planning 
process, and had a lack of decision-making and communications structures. The lack of a 
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defined process and communications structures created a lack of transparency in the 
process and decreased stakeholder trust. In a combination of the human resources and 
symbolic frames, the 2013 school bond referendum election proposal had numerous 
significant changes in school configurations, impacting students, teachers, and parents at 
every grade level. Parents, teachers, and community members had little opportunity to 
provide input into the facilities’ needs assessment or school bond proposal planning 
process. As a result, parents, teachers, and community members did not like the 2013 
school bond referendum proposal and the impact it would have on their children, 
families, and work environments and voted against the 2013 school bond referendum 
(human resources frame). While the school board was aware of some of these perceived 
losses, the findings suggested that little was done to acknowledge or ameliorate these 
issues among the voters and parents (symbolic frame). Politically, school board members 
and district administrators failed to map the political terrain, network with key players, or 
recruit credible and influential team members to serve in key roles in the school bond 
referendum process. The failure to create arenas for the discussion and negotiation of 
political issues meant there was a lack of opportunity to build alliances, negotiate issues, 
and resolve opposition concerns (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 395). 
The eleventh variable was significant use of effective anti-bond efforts. District 
administrators uniformly described significant, organized opposition to the school bond 
referendum as a major variable in the failure of the 2013 school bond election, as 
described earlier. Lack of transparency led to this effort. 
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2015 School Bond Success: Research Question 2  
This research question asked: What variables contributed to the success of a 
school bond election? Eleven major variables characterized the 2015 school bond success 
in TFISD, TX: (a) changed attitude and approach to the community and school bond 
election process; (b) increased awareness of stakeholder perceptions and the community 
context; (c) expert capacity to support new school bond processes; (d) extensive 
community needs assessment and pre-bond planning activities; (e) comprehensive bond 
election planning process; (f) effective leadership recruitment and training; (g) 
substantive input and involvement from a representative group of stakeholders; (h) clear, 
appealing bond proposals, including low bond amount, bond content, and multiple 
propositions; (i) improved communication and increased trust; (i) effectively addressed 
multiple structural, human resource, political, and symbolic dimensions of change 
process; (k) no “anti-bond”/opposition efforts. 
The first major variable that impacted the 2015 bond election success was a 
changed attitude and approach to the community and school bond election process. The 
2015 operated as a “modern” school bond process, with a completely changed bond 
approach and process. Interview respondents reported an immediate and dramatic change 
of the attitudes of the school board and school district administration in the 2015 school 
bond referendum election. This new attitude included being humble, listening to the 
community, and actively soliciting input and diverse perspectives. Another attitude of the 
school board and school district administration switched from one of “telling” to 
“listening.” 
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The second major variable that impacted the 2015 bond election success was an 
increased awareness of stakeholder perceptions and the community context. In the 2015 
school bond referendum election process, there was a new recognition of the need to gain 
voter/taxpayer approval for a school bond referendum. The school board and district 
administration recognized that the community would not simply ‘blindly support’ a 
school district initiative, and there was a recognition by the school board and school 
district administrators that parent/community member preferences as voters and 
taxpayers figured significantly into the success or failure of a school bond referendum 
election. After the shocking failure of the school bond election in 2013, school district 
administrators recognized the need to improve communication and build trust with 
parents, teachers, and community members.  
The school board and school district administrators became aware of important 
factors in the political and economic environment, including the impact of anti-tax and 
anti-government sentiment. In addition, school board members and school district 
administrators became aware of perceptions of school district waste and high bond 
amount of prior bond efforts and used multiple strategies to address stakeholder 
dissatisfaction and distrust. Findings indicated that the school board and school district 
adopted new practices that positively impacted the likelihood of the 2015 school bond 
election success, including: (a) an overall recognition of the need to gain voter approval 
in a changed environment; (b) a commitment to listening to the community; (c) actively 
soliciting input and seeking diverse perspectives; (d) using multiple methods to gain 
awareness of stakeholder preferences of stakeholder perceptions of prior bonds, changing 
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school support beliefs due to the political and economic environment, and the 
diversification of school support beliefs due to community growth; (e) intentionally 
building trust through increased communication and transparency.  
The third major variable that impacted the 2015 bond election success was expert 
capacity to support new bond processes. Respondents indicated that the bond consulting 
expertise played a significant role in the success of the school bond referendum election 
success. The school board and district administrators secured expert capacity for school 
bond processes early on in the process by hiring a new architectural firm that had 
extensive school bond election planning expertise in addition to school facilities’ 
expertise.  The school board and district administration utilized an RFP process to 
identify an architectural firm to work with for a potential future school bond referendum 
election. As a part of the Request for Proposal (RFP) process, the school board and 
school district discovered different kinds of school bond election planning expertise and 
services from potential architectural consulting firms. As a result of the RFP process, the 
school board and school district increased capacity and support for the overall school 
bond election process by hiring an architectural firm that had both facilities and school 
bond election expertise.  
Document review indicated that the new architectural consulting firm utilized a 
comprehensive school bond election planning process that included: bond election pre-
planning, bond election facilitation and planning processes, and bond campaign 
implementation expertise (2015 TFISD Bond Presentation). Numerous respondents saw 
the strong support from the bond election planning consultants from the architectural firm 
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as a variable positively impacting bond pre-planning and planning efforts. Specialized 
Bond Election Staff from the architectural firm provided extensive resources and support 
to FACTS Committee and community leadership. Respondents indicated that the bond 
consulting staff from the architectural firm provided outstanding support during the bond 
planning and facilitation process and increased support from other parent and community 
members. The architectural firm also conducted an exhaustive study of all school district 
facilities and provided a report with “tiered” sets of needs.  
The fourth major variable important in the 2015 bond election success was an 
extensive community needs assessment and pre-bond planning activities. Interview 
responses and document review indicated that the school board and school district 
administrators utilized several pre-bond planning and needs assessment methods to solicit 
input from key influencers and stakeholders (voters). Respondents identified these as key 
strategies that led to the successful outcome of the 2015 school bond election. Early input 
from key stakeholders and potential voters allowed the school board and school district 
administration to better understand voter and taxpayer preferences regarding bond 
proposal content, bond amount tolerance, and likelihood of passage before a decision to 
pursue a school bond referendum even occurred. The community needs assessment 
included a voter survey and face-to-face interview with 100 key influencers. The voter 
survey documented voter preferences regarding potential bond content, voter tolerances 
for bond amount, and likelihood of school bond passage. Voter survey results suggested 
that, with an informed electorate, the district might reach a slim margin to have a 
successful school bond election result. Voter survey results projected a close scenario 
276 
with: 49% in favor; 44% against; with 7% depends/unsure. Numerous respondents 
interviewed mentioned the pre-bond voter survey as a variable in the successful outcome 
of the 2015 school bond election. Face-to-face interviews with over 100 key influencers 
provided feedback on the last bond election; information about what a successful bond 
proposal might look like; and whether or not to pursue a future bond election.  
Extensive community and district growth and demographic information was 
utilized in the bond planning process, including community and economic development 
growth; real estate growth data; district demographic growth and change, and tax rate and 
tax impact reports. In addition, during the bond proposal development process, multiple 
bond proposal options and combinations were costed out and returned to the committee 
before a final recommendation was made, allowing the committee to compare and 
contrast possible bond options. An extensive facilities needs assessment was also an 
important part of the pre-bond planning process. The facilities needs assessment included 
an extensive review of every school building in the school district and was divided into 
“tiers” of needs in order to facilitate project prioritization. The wealth of accurate data on 
school facilities’ needs created transparency in the process and built trust with 
stakeholders. This laid the foundation for transparency of proposed costs and “equity” in 
school facilities’ projects in the school bond proposals. 
In addition, district administrators mentioned intentionally learning from the 
school bond referendum elections in nearby school districts. It was apparent in the 2015 
school bond election that district administrators paid close attention to school bond 
election referenda dynamics in surrounding communities to inform their approach. The 
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pre-bond needs assessment and planning process allowed the school board and school 
administration to gain an understanding of voter preferences and the community context. 
This understanding significantly informed the bond planning process and led to school 
bond election success. 
The fifth major variable affecting the success of the 2015 school bond election 
process was the comprehensive bond election planning process. Responses from 
interviews as well as document review indicated that the school board and school district 
adopted a transparent planning process for the 2015 school bond referendum election 
with the support of the architectural consulting firm. The process was a coordinated and 
comprehensive process that included all aspects of school bond election planning and 
implementation, including: pre-bond assessment planning and demographic review; an 
extensive facilities needs assessment process; bond proposal development support and 
planning; bond committee facilitation support; and support for bond campaign marketing 
and communications activities.  
This presence of an overall school bond election strategy and coordinated plan 
seemed to result in organized and effective pro-bond efforts. There were also clearly 
established decision-making and communications structures between district leaders, 
school board leaders, campus leaders, parents, and community members through the 
FACTS Committee and PAC. There was a clearly delineated process for the FACTS 
Committee to develop and provide a bond proposal recommendation to the school board. 
Written information documenting meeting dates and times, meeting locations, and names 
of committee members was readily available. Meeting agendas, presentation information, 
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and meeting minutes were also readily available online, and were available throughout 
the 2015 school bond referendum election process. There were clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities for the FACTS Committee, which were communicated at the first and 
subsequent committee meetings. The FACTS Committee also had clearly established 
policies and procedures. The FACTS Committee also had clearly delineated community 
co-chair leadership roles and responsibilities.  
The sixth variable positively impacting the outcome of the 2015 school bond 
election was effective leadership recruitment and training. Significant to attention 
leadership development and training of school district staff and parent and community 
volunteers had a positive impact on the 2015 school bond election results. Considerable 
attention was given to identifying and recruiting credible, influential team members to 
serve in key roles in the school bond referendum process, including: the intentional 
recruiting of credible, influential community members to serve as FACTS Committee 
Co-Chairs; purposeful recruiting of diverse, cross-section of FACTS Committee 
Members, including representation from teachers, staff, parents, community members, 
students, and the opposition; and deliberate recruitment of key community leaders to 
serve as leaders for the pro-bond PAC. Importantly, recruiting also included involving 
key community bond leaders who had significant experience and expertise with prior 
bond referendum elections. By installing strong school bond parent and community 
leadership, these leaders were able to network and recruit other parents and community 
leaders, such as retired educators, to support school bond referendum election efforts. 
Training for district administration as well as parent and community volunteers was 
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important in the 2015 school bond election process. The pre-bond process included 
leadership development and building exercises for the guiding team that included district 
visioning and facility options development. Experienced community volunteers, such as 
the FACT Committee Co-Chair and PAC Treasurer, intentionally focused on developing 
and training new parent and community leaders as a part of the school bond referendum 
election process. 
The seventh variable that impacted the success of the 2015 school bond election 
was substantive input and involvement from a representative group of stakeholders.  
Interview respondents indicated that significant stakeholder input and involvement in the 
school bond referendum planning process was a key variable in the success of the 2015 
school bond election. Respondents also indicated that the 2015 school bond proposal 
process was a community-driven process, with multiple opportunities for meaningful 
input and involvement from a diverse group of representative stakeholders, including 
from teachers, parents, community members, and students, and that this was an important 
variable in the 2015 school bond referendum success. Based on feedback from the 2013 
bond failure, the school board and district administration created a large, diverse, highly-
visible bond planning committee in order to create substantial stakeholder involvement in 
the bond development process. Intentional recruiting of diverse, cross-section of FACTS 
Committee Members, including representation from teachers, staff, parents, community 
members, students, and the opposition, improved input into the bond proposal 
development process that respondents indicated positively impacted the bond outcome in 
2015. FACTS Committee meetings were an opportunity to build a shared understanding 
280 
of school facilities’ needs, and the school district utilized multiple strategies to for 
teachers, parents, community members to “see and feel” facilities’ needs, such as 
facilities’ tours and holding each FACTS Committee meeting at a different school in the 
district. Respondents mentioned that the FACTS committee process created transparency 
by communicating key information to the community along the way. In addition to the 
FACTS Committee, the school board members held community forums regarding the 
school bond referendum in 2015 once the bond election had been declared. Parents, 
teachers, and community members were able to hear about the bond, as well as provided 
input and engaged in in two-way communication about the school bond proposal at these 
meetings. 
The eighth variable that impacted the success of the 2015 school bond election 
was clear, appealing bond proposals, including low bond amount, bond content, and 
multiple propositions. As a result of significant parent and community input and 
involvement in the 2015 school bond referendum election process, the bond proposals 
that were developed were clear and appealing bond referendum proposal. The bond was 
split into multiple proposals to offer voters choices, and the total bond amount was 
significantly lower. The bond proposals were restructured to meet parent and community 
needs, as well as the stated needs of overcrowding at the elementary level, safety and 
security, and overall facilities’ renovations needs. Proposed new grade configurations 
were palatable to both parents and teachers.  Athletics was removed from any bond 
proposition. 
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The ninth variable in the 2015 school bond referendum election success was 
improved communication and increased trust. Not surprisingly, communication was 
significantly improved in the 2015 school bond election efforts. Interview respondents 
indicated that improved communication played a key role in the success of the 2015 
school bond referendum election. Improved communication resulted from understanding 
stakeholder and voter preferences, as well as ongoing district communications activities 
to build long-term relationships with parents and community members. Marketing and 
communications efforts were embedded throughout the process during the pre-bond 
planning and needs assessment process, FACTS Committee meetings, and Community 
Meetings. The FACTS Committee participation created natural ambassadors who could 
spread the word about bond election issues. A detailed District Bond Election 
Communications Plan was developed & implemented by district administration, 
including a specific Social Media Plan. This plan provided clear and focused messaging 
about the bond proposal; the benefits of the bond proposal to every student, parent, and 
school; clear bond amounts and tax impacts shared. The district Communications Officer 
indicated that the school district focused on key messages and stuck to them. The school 
district website was also used much more effectively in 2015 to share FACTS Committee 
information throughout the bond proposal process, which created transparency in the 
process. Messaging was supported by architectural firm’s bond election planning team, 
and social media efforts to disseminate information and “Get Out the Vote” efforts were 
effective. The school bond efforts utilized a targeted school bond campaign plan and 
specific “Get Out the Vote” strategies; focused on people most likely to vote, and focused 
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on the “Over-65” group. PAC support was also significantly increased from 2013 bond 
efforts. 
Respondents also indicated that the school board and school district did a better 
job of building trust in the 2015 school bond election. Although communications and 
marketing was a part of this, there were numerous activities throughout the process that 
built this trust, including: an attitude of listening on the part of the school board and 
school district administrators; significant efforts to understand stakeholder preferences; 
active efforts to ensure input and involvement of a diverse group of parents, community 
members, teachers, and students; clear planning and decision-making processes; strong 
parent and community leadership; information-sharing throughout the process; showing 
stakeholders facilities’ needs; incorporating stakeholder input into the bond proposals 
during the planning process; and providing the community detailed information on 
facilities’ needs and providing detailed bond proposals. 
The 10th variable impacting the successful outcomes of the 2015 school bond 
referendum election was that the school board and school district administrators 
effectively addressed multiple structural, human resource, political, and symbolic 
dimensions of the change process. In terms of the structural frame, the school board and 
school district adopted new systems and processes to meet the new environment, 
including adding pre-bond planning and community needs assessment processes. The 
school board and school district adopted a comprehensive planning process, as well as 
decision-making and communications structures that resulted in organized and effective 
pro-bond efforts. Regarding the symbolic frame, the school board and district 
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administrators incorporated a number of ceremonies that “acknowledged and celebrated 
losses or changes” in the community, such as the demolition of the old middle school 
(Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 395).  
School district administrators admitted they were surprised that ceremonial 
activities that honored the legacy community champions and school district traditions 
were so important, but indicated that they were “something they did right.” Numerous 
strategies from the political frame were utilized to increase success in the 2015 school 
bond election. As indicated earlier, mapping the political terrain is one of the strategies 
that can be used to effectively navigate the political domain during a change process. 
During the 2015 school bond election, the school board and district administration did 
extensive mapping of the political terrain through meetings with key influencers, voter 
survey, and input through the FACTS Committee process.  
Deliberate attention was given to recruiting credible, influential team members to 
serve in key roles in the school bond referendum process, and the school board and 
school district administrators effectively recruited credible, influential team members to 
serve in key roles. The school board and school district administration had become aware 
of the need to build alliances during the 2015 school bond election efforts in order to 
overcome negative sentiment, and inclusion of “opposition” perspectives was a deliberate 
attempt to build alliances throughout the bond planning process. The school board and 
school district were able to significantly defuse opposition and anticipate 
counterstrategies through several strategies. The FACTS Committee was significant in 
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building alliances, creating an arena where political issues could be discussed, as well as 
a place to defuse opposition. 
The 11th variable in the 2015 school bond referendum election success was the 
lack of opposition efforts. Due to the significant efforts to involve the community in the 
2015 school bond election, especially the opposition, an anti-bond/opposition group 
never formed in the 2015 school bond election process. Inclusiveness and transparency 
benefitted the election’s success. 
2013 vs. 2015 School Bond: Research Question 3 
This research question asked: What relationships existed among these variables 
with regard to selected characteristics of the school district? Rather than find 
relationships between the variables in the two bond referenda to answer the research 
question, contradictions between the two bond referenda emerged instead. Table 3 
provides the characteristics of each bond education side-by-side for ease of 
understanding. 
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Table 3 
2013 versus 2015 Bonds’ Variables 
2013 School Bond Key Variables 2015 School Bond Key Variables 
 Used existing bond processes 
 District assumption of community 
support; lack of awareness of 
stakeholder perceptions and changes 
in community context 
 Lack of expert capacity to support 
bond election processes 
 Lack of community needs assessment 
& pre-planning 
 Lack of overall comprehensive school 
bond election planning process 
 Poor leadership recruitment and 
development 
 Lack of input and involvement from 
representative group of stakeholders, 
esp. opposition 
 Weak bond proposal – bond amount, 
bond content, number of propositions, 
athletics 
 Poor communication and lack of trust 
 Lack of consideration of structural, 
human resource, political, and 
symbolic dimensions of change 
process 
 Significant and effective anti-bond 
opposition efforts 
 Changed attitude and approach to 
community and bond process 
 Increased district awareness of 
stakeholder perceptions and 
community context 
 Secured expert capacity to support 
new school bond processes 
 Extensive community needs 
assessment & pre-planning, including 
1-1 interviews and voter survey 
 Comprehensive school bond election 
planning process 
 Effective leadership recruitment and 
development 
 Substantive input and involvement 
from representative group of 
stakeholders, esp. opposition 
 Clear, appealing bond proposal – bond 
amount, bond content, number of 
propositions 
 Increased communication and trust 
 Effectively addressed multiple 
structural, human resource, political, 
and symbolic dimensions of change 
process 
 No “anti-bond”/opposition efforts 
 
Discussion of the Findings 
Research findings in this study were consistent with many of the bond and 
election characteristics and some of the district and community characteristics identified 
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as impacting the likelihood of school bond election success in prior quantitative research. 
Findings of this study were consistent for the Bond Characteristics: (a) bond amount and 
(b) long-term debt. Findings were also consistent for Election Characteristics: (a) tax rate, 
(b) voter turnout, and (c) timing. Findings were consistent with District Characteristics 
for: (a) district locale (town/rural), and consistent with Community Characteristics: senior 
citizens.  
However, this study’s findings also had important differences from prior 
quantitative research in Bond Wording: athletics and Election Characteristics: number of 
propositions. Findings suggested that a single proposition bond was a negative variable in 
the school bond referendum success, as opposed to earlier quantitative research which 
recommended single proposition referenda (Bowers & Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 
2013). Bowers and Lee (2013) specifically recommended the use of a single proposition; 
whereas, respondents in this study heavily cautioned against the use of a single 
proposition. In addition, inclusion of athletics was perceived as a variable negatively 
impacting the likelihood of success of a school bond referendum election. This finding 
for athletics differs from prior quantitative findings in which athletics was included in 
early statistical models but eliminated as a statistically-significant negative factor 
(Bowers & Lee, 2013). Table 4 shows a detailed comparison of prior quantitative 
research into factors influencing the likelihood of school bond passage compared with 
findings from this study.  
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Table 4 
Case Study Findings in Relation to Prior Researchers’ Quantitative Factors 
Variable(s) 2013 2015 
Bond Characteristics 
Bond Amount 
(Consistent 
Negative 
Correlation) 
Research Finding: Consistently 
reported as a significant and negative 
variable 
 Confirmed Quantitative Factors 
Research (Bowers & Chen, 2015; 
Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers, 
Metzger & Militello, 2010a, 
2010b; Theobald & Meier, 2002) 
Research Finding: Consistently 
reported as a significant and negative 
variable 
 Confirmed Quantitative Factors 
Research (Bowers & Chen, 2015; 
Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers, 
Metzger & Militello, 2010a, 2010b; 
Theobald & Meier, 2002) 
Long-Term Debt 
(Mixed Findings) 
Research Finding: Mentioned as a 
potential negative factor by 
respondents 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research showing Long-Term 
Debt as a Negative Factor 
(Theobold & Meier, 2002) 
 Inconsistent with Bowers, 
Metzger & Militello, 2010b) 
Research Finding: Mentioned as a 
potential negative factor by respondents 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research showing Long-Term Debt 
as a Negative Factor (Theobold & 
Meier, 2002) 
 Inconsistent with Bowers, Metzger 
& Militello, 2010b) 
Bond Wording 
Athletics 
(Negative 
Correlation) 
Research Finding: Consistently 
reported as a significant and negative 
variable 
❖ New Information to Quantitative 
Model which did not find 
Athletics significant in final 
model (Bowers & Lee, 2013) 
Research Finding: Consistently 
reported as a significant and negative 
variable 
❖ New Information to Quantitative 
Model which did not find Athletics 
significant in final model (Bowers & 
Lee, 2013) 
District Characteristics 
District Local: 
Town/Rural 
(Mixed; Negative 
Correlation) 
Research Finding: Respondents 
consistently reported small town 
locale as a negative variable due to 
anti-government/anti-tax sentiment 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research (Bowers, Metzger & 
Militello, 2010a, 2010b) 
Research Finding: Respondents 
consistently reported small town locale 
as a negative variable due to anti-
government/anti-tax sentiment 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research (Bowers, Metzger & 
Militello, 2010a, 2010b) 
table continues 
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Table continued. 
Variable(s) 2013 2015 
Community Characteristics 
Senior Citizens 
(65+) 
Research Finding: Mentioned as a 
negative variable by respondents 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research (Bowers & Chen, 2015; 
Bowers & Lee, 2013; Hickey, 
2008). 
Research Finding: Mentioned as a 
negative variable by respondents 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research (Bowers & Chen, 2015; 
Bowers & Lee, 2013; Hickey, 
2008). 
Election Characteristics 
Number of 
Propositions 
Research Finding: Single proposition 
Consistently reported as a significant 
and negative variable 
 New Information - Opposite of 
Quantitative Research (Bowers & 
Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013) 
Research Finding: Multiple 
propositions Consistently reported as a 
significant and positive variable 
 New Information - Opposite of 
Quantitative Research (Bowers & 
Chen, 2015; Bowers & Lee, 2013) 
Voter Turnout Research Finding: Bond failure and 
mention of high voter turnout by 
respondents 
 Consistent with Quantitative 
Research (Bowers & Chen 2015; 
Bowers, Metzger & Militello, 
2010b; Gong & Rogers, 2014) 
Research Finding: No findings in this 
area in the 2015 school bond election. 
Note.  indicates that this study’s findings were consistent with prior research.  indicates that this study’s 
findings were inconsistent with prior research.  indicates this study’s findings revealed new information. 
Discussion of Theoretical Models Application to Findings 
 Three theoretical models guided this study. The findings in relation to their 
application to those models are discussed in this section. First, Olivárez’s (2011) 10 
Functions of the School District Model will be discussed. Second, Bolman and Deal’s 
(2008) four frames are connected to the findings. Third, Bowers and Lee’s (2013) 
mediated model is addressed. 
10 Functions of the School District 
Dr. Olivárez at the University of Texas at Austin developed the 10 Functions of 
the School District Model to provide an administrative, instructional, and political 
289 
leadership theory for superintendents and school district leaders seeking to more 
effectively perform executive leadership roles in public schools. In the 10 Functions of 
the School District Model, the leadership responsibilities of the superintendent:  
encompass ten distinct but overlapping functions that provide definition to the 
ongoing activities of school districts: 1) governance & operations; 2) curriculum 
and instruction; 3) elementary and secondary campus operations; 4) instructional 
support services; 5) human resources; 6) administrative, finance, and business 
operations; 7) facilities planning and plant services; 8) accountability, information 
management, and technology services; 9) external and internal communications; 
and 10) operational support systems: safety and security, food services, and 
transportation. (Olivárez, 2011, p. 5) 
Findings from the study indicated that Facilities Planning and Plant Services; 
Governance & Operations; Administrative, Finance, and Business Operations played 
important roles in the failure or passage of school bond referenda. Particularly significant 
to the success of the school bond referendum election was the connection between 
Curriculum and Instruction and Facilities Planning and Plant Services in the role of the 
superintendent and school board members to “continually address the learner-centered 
values and ethics and maintain the district culture and vision with community support in 
relationship to facilities planning and plant management (Olivárez, 2013, Purcell, 2017). 
In addition, Internal/External Communications was an important variable in the 
success of school bond passage, particularly to have structures to incorporate community 
input: 
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The district must have advisory structures to actively incorporate community 
voices in the design and implementation of facilities maintenance, renovation, and 
construction projects. The superintendent shares the vision of the district’s and the 
community’s learner-centered values that is reflected in the design and use of 
facilities system-wide. (Purcell, 2017, p. 45) 
 Elementary and Secondary Operations was also mentioned as a key variable 
impacting the failure or success of the school bond referendum election. In the 2013 
school bond election, participants mentioned the lack of knowledge of campus staff 
regarding the school bond election. Parent perception that staff viewed the 2013 bond 
proposal negatively significantly impacted parent views of the bond proposal. This 
confirms Hickey (2006)’s findings that teacher and campus support is a significant 
variable in school bond referendum election success. 
The Bolman and Deal (2008) Four Frames Offers Substantive Bond Process Insights 
Findings from the study indicated that Bolman and Deal’s (2008) four frames 
provide significant insight about the variables that influence the success and failure of 
school bond elections. Bolman and Deal provided a method to “match frames to 
situations” (p. 317). By applying the four frames to the school bond referendum, all four 
frames could be seen in operation in the data about a school bond election as seen in 
Appendix H. For example, the following characteristics of a bond process could be 
matched to the frames: (a) individual commitment and motivation are essential to success 
(VOTER); (b) the technical quality of the decision is important (FACILITIES); (c) there 
are high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty in a school bond referendum planning 
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process (MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS); (d) conflict and scarce resources are 
significant in the school bond referendum planning process (TAX DOLLARS); and (e) 
the process is working from the bottom up (COMMUNITY PROCESS). Table 5 displays 
the connection between the bond process and the four frames. 
Table 5 
Matching Frames to Situations by Applying Bolman and Deal (2008, p. 317) with 
Permission from the Authors 
Question Applied to Four Frames Yes No 
Are individual commitment and motivation essential to 
success? (VOTER - YES)  
Human Resource  
Symbolic  
Structural  
Political  
Is the technical quality of the decision important? 
(FACILITIES - YES)  
Structural  Human resource  
Political  
Symbolic  
Are there high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty?  
(MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS - YES)  
Political  
Symbolic  
Structural  
Human Resource  
Are conflict and scarce resources significant?  
(TAX DOLLARS - YES)  
Political  
Symbolic  
Structural  
Human Resource  
Are you working from the bottom up?  
(COMMUNITY PROCESS - YES)  
Political  Structural  
Human Resource  
Symbolic  
 
Insights into the success and failure of school bond elections via Bolman and 
Deal’s four frames appear in Tables 6 and 7. First, the 2013 failed school bond election 
reflected an overall lack of consideration of structural, human resource, political, and 
symbolic dimensions of the change process. Second, the 2015 school bond election 
incorporated multiple elements from each of the four frames with a successful outcome. 
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Table 6 
2013 School Bond Election via Four Frames Analysis from Bolman and Deal (2008, p. 
395) with Permission from the Authors 
Structural Political Symbolic Human Resource 
Lack of coordinated 
strategy 
Lack of decision-making 
structures to support 
change 
Did not align structure to 
new culture 
Lack of expert capacity 
Data-poor 
Lack of mapping the 
political environment 
Lack of networking 
with key players 
Lack of an arena for 
negotiation 
Lack of a compelling 
story 
Failed to address 
losses and change 
Failed to install 
commanding officer 
on guiding team 
Lack of input & 
involvement 
Poor leadership 
recruitment & 
training 
Lack of consideration 
of human resource 
impacts on parents & 
teachers 
 
Table 7 
2015 School Bond Election via Four Frames Analysis from Bolman and Deal (2008, p. 
395) with Permission from the Authors 
Structural Political Symbolic Human Resource 
Secured expert 
capacity early 
Overall coordination 
strategy 
Decision-making 
structures supported 
change process 
Re-aligned structure 
to new culture 
Data-rich 
Extensive mapping of 
the political 
environment 
Deliberate networking 
with key players 
Highly-visible arena 
for negotiation 
Told a compelling 
story 
Acknowledge and 
celebrated losses and 
change 
Installed commanding 
officer on guiding 
team 
Substantive input & 
involvement 
Effective leadership 
recruitment 
Attention to human 
resource impacts on 
parents & teachers 
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The Bowers and Lee (2013) Mediated Model of School Bond Passage is Insufficient 
Based on a synthesis of results of earlier work on voter preferences as well as on 
recent work on district and bond characteristics, Bowers and Lee (2013) proposed a 
mediated model of school bond passage with district, community, bond, and election 
characteristics as key factors that impacted school bond election outcomes. Bowers and 
Lee (2013) provided a mediated model of school bond passage that is the most 
comprehensive theoretical model to date and indicated their model still only accounted 
for up to 44% of the variation in bond outcomes, leaving a significant amount of variation 
as due to other, unnamed factors. In fact, Bowers et al. (2010b), recommended 
conducting additional qualitative research “to describe and understand the complex work 
and interrelationships of district and community actors during the bond election phases” 
(p. 394). Bowers and Lee (2013) believed “significant malleable factors in a bond 
election” to be “under the control of school district administrators” (p. 759), but they also 
placed these areas of impact under bond and election characteristics. 
The findings from this case study of a district with a failed 2013 bond and a 
passed 2015 bond show the weaknesses in the Bowers and Lee (2013) mediated model of 
school bond passage, specifically in relation to district and community characteristics, 
school support beliefs, and voter preferences. Two issues of discussion include examples 
about how the complex interrelationships found in this case study were missing from the 
mediated model and should be considered in developing the next iteration of a 
comprehensive theoretical model on school bond referendum elections. First is a contrast 
of the factors described as constant by Bowers and Lee. Second is the concern that factors 
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identified by Bowers and Lee as isolated represent in reality systems of relationships that 
affect bond passage. 
Constant Factors vs. Change Over Time 
First, the Bowers and Lee (2013) mediated model showed district and community 
characteristics as constant factors [italics added for emphasis], or rather factors 
unchanging over time. This case study’s findings suggest that district and community 
characteristics experience significant change over time [italics added for emphasis] and 
between bond referenda. The district and community changes in Town-Fringe 
represented a significant set of variables impacting school support beliefs and voter 
preferences. P2 articulated this changing nature of district and community characteristics 
as follows: 
A weird mixed town where there’s a lot of old school inhabitants and then this 
massive influx of people coming to [Town-Fringe]. For the old timers that live in 
[Town-Fringe], they do not want anything to change or to grow and part of their 
means of holding back the tide is not voting for anything that comes up . . . The 
school bonds are kind of similar in my opinion. They said, “No.” They don’t want 
their taxes to go up. If we just stop, people will quit flooding in here. 
As discussed earlier, changes in the district and community as new people moved 
into the community created a constantly shifting environment of school support beliefs 
with parents, community members, and teachers and district staff. One of the key 
variables in the 2013 school bond failure was due to school board members and school 
district administrators assuming that the district and community environment had 
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remained constant. Only when the school board and school district administrators gained 
an awareness of changes in voter preferences using a variety of data-driven methods in 
2015 were they successful in passing a school bond referendum. 
Isolated Factors vs. System of Relationships 
The Bowers and Lee (2013) model depicted a series of linear and isolated factors 
[italics added for emphasis] that operated sequentially. The case study data revealed that 
the school bond processes and the development of an individual voter’s school support 
beliefs and voter perceptions developed “within a complete system of relationships 
[italics added for emphasis] affected by multiple levels of the surrounding environment” 
as described in ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1977, p. 513). These 
included, but were not limited to, national, state, and local political and economic 
environments; state and local educational contexts and requirements; parent and 
community member relationships; parent and community perceptions of the school 
board, school district, and school campuses; parent and community perceptions of prior 
school bond election efforts; parent and community communications networks; and 
changes in parental, community member, and teacher school support beliefs due to 
community growth. For example, during the 2015 successful school bond referendum 
election parent and community stakeholders shared two-way communication with the 
school district and the pro-bond PAC. The 2013 failed bond election showed 
communication through informal social networks as significantly and negatively 
impacting the bond election’s results.  
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The case study’s findings clearly demonstrated that, while demographic and 
community demographic information was necessary to begin to understand the 
community context, as indicated in the Bowers and Lee (2013) model, static demographic 
information was not sufficient to understand the development of school support beliefs 
and voter preferences that impact bond election outcomes. The case study findings 
suggest that social interactions across multiple contexts significantly impact the 
development of an individual stakeholder’s and voter’s school support beliefs and 
perceptions. 
As Neal and Neal (2013) suggested in their work on networked ecological systems 
theory, “it is individuals’ patterns of social interactions with another that determine how 
systems relate to one another” (p. 727). For example, parent-teacher interactions, parent-
campus interactions, and parent-district interactions significantly impacted school support 
beliefs, voter preferences, and the election outcomes in both the 2013 and 2015 school 
bond referendum elections. The case study’s findings suggest that an understanding of 
the complex dynamics in the school bond election process may necessitate: 
Going beyond the direct observation of behavior on the part of one or two persons 
in the same place; it requires examination of multiperson systems of interaction 
not limited to a single setting and must take into account as aspects of the 
environment beyond the immediate situation containing the subject. (Neal & 
Neal, 2013, p. 514) 
The weaknesses of the Bowers and Lee model became evident in this case study 
because of the model’s fixed nature and inability to show the interrelationships of people, 
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processes, contexts, and time factors in enough detail. The Bowers and Lee (2013) 
mediated school bond passage model did not “address how or why each of the significant 
variables in the model act in district attempting to pass bonds” (Bowers et al., 2010b, p. 
394). As such the mediated model is insufficient to explain the myriad of critical 
variables that impact the likelihood of a school bond referendum’s passage. These 
weaknesses in the Bowers and Lee (2013) mediated model suggest that a more powerful 
theoretical model may be needed to “portray the complex work and interrelationships of 
district and community actors during the bond election phases” (Bowers et al., 2010b, p. 
394). 
Implications for Practice  
 There are a wide array of implications for practice for school bond referendum 
election efforts for school boards, superintendents, community leaders, and researchers 
alike. Based on this study, school boards and school districts should recognize that 
economic and political factors and community growth may significantly change school 
support attitudes and voter preferences between bond elections, even in communities that 
have supported school bond elections for a long time. Parents, teachers, and community 
members new to a community may need education to understand school district facilities’ 
needs and how those needs impact children. There may be a need to develop school bond 
leadership expertise in parents and community members prior to a future school bond 
election, especially if there has been a long gap, such as 10 or more years, between 
school bond elections.  
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Recognizing the need for voter approval and an authentic commitment to listening 
to parents and community members is essential to building trust with stakeholders. Pre-
bond planning and needs assessment efforts, such as voter surveys, are critical to school 
bond election efforts, because they help understand voter preferences in terms of bond 
content, voter tolerances regarding bond amount, and overall likelihood of bond passage 
in the community. Additional methods of gaining input from key influencers, such as 
face-to-face interviews, are important in mapping the political environment, networking 
with key players, and identifying potential parent and community leaders for school bond 
election leadership positions. Employing multiple methods to gain stakeholder input 
throughout the process is critical in developing a school bond proposal that is appealing 
to parents, teachers, and community members and meets stakeholder needs. Use of 
accurate data about community development and economic growth, community 
demographics, district demographics and growth, tax rates, and tax implications helps 
build a common understanding of the community and district context with its 
stakeholders. Additionally, accurate portrayal of data supports the development of 
compelling messages that can overcome voter resistance. Communication is an important 
element throughout the process. 
Securing expert capacity early, potentially prior to contracting with an 
architectural firm, is important to provide effective support for an overall coordinated 
school bond election strategy with pre-bond development facilities and stakeholder needs 
assessments and planning activities, bond proposal development and facilitation, bond 
campaign marketing, and multidirectional communications activities. Clear decision-
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making processes and protocols form the foundation for development of an attractive 
bond proposal, create a common culture between a diverse group of stakeholders, and 
provide transparency to the greater community. Leadership recruitment and training of 
parents and community volunteers are essential components of a successful school bond 
referendum election process. Finally, providing opportunities to acknowledge and 
celebrate the losses and changes that may occur because of a school bond referendum 
proposal are important and may be used to recognize community heroes, traditions, and 
legacies. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This qualitative single-case study produced a number of variables that impacted 
the success or failure of a school bond election. There are several areas of potential future 
research that are indicated by the findings of the study. As the research study did not 
directly interview teachers, principals, or campus staff about their perspectives on key 
variables in a school bond referendum election, the first recommendation is to conduct 
research with teachers, principals, and other campus staff regarding school bond 
referendum election dynamics from the perspectives of campus-level staff. As parents 
and community members participating in this case study indicated that teachers and 
principals played key roles in the school bond election process, but no direct information 
was available, further research on campus-level perspectives on key variables in school 
bond referendum elections is recommended.   
In addition, non-parent community members were another group not interviewed 
in any great number in this case study. Thus, another productive line of research could be 
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to gain the perspectives of non-parent community members regarding school bond 
referendum election dynamics. Non-parents also represent voters within a community 
and may generate new insight into their decisions about whether to vote for or against 
any bond referendum. 
Interview respondents hinted at the key role that parents and community members 
played in supporting school bond election efforts through a PAC. Both the findings and 
the literature also revealed little specifics about a PAC campaign’s organizational and 
leadership roles and responsibilities, PAC school bond election planning and campaign 
activities, and on leadership recruiting and development for the PAC. Future research to 
elucidate PAC campaign organizational and leadership roles and responsibilities; PAC 
school bond election planning and campaign activities; and on leadership recruiting and 
development for the PAC may better inform a comprehensive model of school bond 
referendum success. 
Bolman and Deal (2008) recognized that the four frames offer a “checklist of 
issues that change agents must recognize and respond to” but do not necessarily provide a 
model that shows how to integrate those elements into a change process that moves 
through time (p. 393). However, Bolman and Deal (2009) integrated the four frames into 
John Kotter’s foundational work of an eight stage change process that is “repeatedly 
found in successful change initiatives” (p. 394), and argued that the four frames when 
integrated into an overall theory of change provide a dynamic model of a change process 
over time. Findings from this case study lead suggest that testing the conceptual model of 
Bolman and Deal’s four frames as integrated with Kotter’s Eight Stages of Change to the 
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school bond election process could be a productive avenue of research in the future. Such 
research could enable the development of a useful comprehensive model of bond 
development and passage. 
Further research on the system of relationships between and among internal and 
external stakeholders is recommended. Theoretical models from other genres of study not 
previously applied to school bond election processes, such as Bronfenbrenner’s 
Ecological Systems Theory (EST), may be helpful “to address how or why each of the 
significant variables in the model act in district attempting to pass bonds” (Bower, 
Metzger & Militello, 2010b, p. 294) and to inform a new theoretical model of school 
bond referenda passage. EST is typically applied to classroom instruction and centers on 
the child in the microsystem of a classroom; however, the findings suggest this theory has 
applications if centered on the parents when enacting a bond referendum.  The model 
could be used to address how or why each of the significant variables found in this case 
study affect a district attempting to pass a bond and to describe and understand the 
complex work and non-linear interrelationships of district and community actors during 
the bond election phases. 
Numerous conditions in the community, including economic growth, tax rates, 
and district growth impacted stakeholder perceptions regarding the successful passage of 
school bond referenda. Property wealth is an additional contextual variable to be 
considered for future research. Future research may also want to investigate the varying 
influences of property tax conditions in different communities on the impact of the 
passage of school bond referendum elections.  
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Appendix C 
DRAFT Letter to Superintendents/School Districts Requesting Permission for Study 
 
Superintendent of Schools 
School District 
Address  
City, State, Zip Code 
 
Dear Superintendent: 
 
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study I am conducting as a part of my Doctoral 
degree in the Department of Educational Administration at the University of Texas at Austin under the 
supervision of Dr. Rubén Olivárez. I am requesting the participation of your school district, including 
yourself and a selected group of district stakeholders, in this study. This letter provides information about 
this project and what the district’s involvement would entail if the district decides to take part. 
 
As you are aware, passing a school bond issue can be a challenge in any community. Surprisingly, there is 
little guidance for school leaders and communities on the issues involved in successfully passing a school 
bond referendum that includes the perspectives of all stakeholders. The purpose of this study is to gain a 
better understanding of the issues involved in the successful passage of school bond referenda, from the 
perspective of a representative group of district and community stakeholders in school districts in Texas. 
 
This study has the potential to help school districts across the state of Texas better understand the needs of 
all stakeholders in their communities and the issues involved in successfully passing a school bond 
referendum.  The results of this study will be disseminated in a variety of formats to enable educators, 
researchers, and board members the benefit of the experience, knowledge, and expertise of you and your 
district stakeholders regarding successful bond referendum passage. 
 
If your district participates, your district will be included as a part of this study. Your district has been 
selected as a district that first failed a bond and then subsequently passed a bond between May 2013 and 
May 2017. 
 
District study participation will include: 
 
Superintendent Participation 
 Individual Interview: Your participation in an individual interview (60 minutes); 
 Review of your interview transcript to ensure interview accuracy and validity of the study; 
 Recommendations for additional Interview Participants: I am asking participating 
superintendents to recommend additional interview participants, including school board 
member or members, the chief financial officer, chief communications officer, the chief 
facilities officer, a principal, parents, and community members to be interviewed in their 
community, as you know those individuals who would probably be able to provide the most 
relevant information. 
 
Stakeholder Interviews 
 Stakeholder Interviews: I am seeking interviews or focus group interviews with a school board 
member or members, the chief financial officer, chief communications officer, the chief facilities 
officer, school principal, parents, and community members, in order to gain the perspectives of a 
representative group of stakeholders. 
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 Individual interviews will be held with a school board member or members, the chief financial 
officer, chief facilities officer, chief communications officer, and a principal. 
 Separate focus group interviews with 2-3 parents and 2-3 community members will be held. 
 Individual interviews and focus group interviews are expected to take 60 minutes each. 
 Participants will also be asked to review their interview transcript to ensure the validity of the 
study. 
 
Document Review 
 I will review documents relevant to recent school bond elections in your district and community, 
and that elaborate the goals, strategies and implementation details of your district’s recent school 
bond elections.  
 These documents may include: district strategic planning documents related to school facilities 
planning and school bond elections in your district; school board meeting minutes related to 
school bond elections; communication documents related to the school bond election to staff 
and/or the community in your district; meeting minutes from school bond advisory group 
meetings; professional documents from school facilities professional consulting firms; newspaper 
articles on the school bond election; documents from a school bond consultant; and any relevant 
school bond referenda documents. 
 Input from you, your staff, or other stakeholders on relevant material is desired and would be 
extremely helpful. 
There will be no risks to the district or to any interview participants. Neither you, nor any participant 
interviewed, nor your school district, will be identified or identifiable in the research in connection with 
any specific reports or publications. All interviews will be conducted to maintain participant privacy and 
confidentiality. Participation in interviews will be completely voluntary, and a participant decision about 
whether or not to participate will not affect any relationship with the University of Texas at Austin or with 
the school district. All participant data will be de-identified and coded with a pseudonym to protect the 
district and participants’ confidentiality, kept in a secure location during the study, and destroyed after the 
mandated period for record-keeping. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this study or would like additional information to assist you in reaching 
a decision about participation, please contact me at 972-802-4818 or by e-mail at 
sheitzman@faithfamilyacademy.org. You can also contact my supervisor, Dr. Rubén Olivárez via e-mail 
rolivarez@austin.utexas.edu. 
 
The information gathered will assist administrators and leaders in public schools systems seeking to pass 
school bond referenda and support communities in making effective decisions regarding school bond 
elections. I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance in 
this project.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Shirley M. Heitzman  Dr. Rubén Olivárez, 
Executive Director of Development,   L. D. Haskew Centennial Professor in Public School  
Faith Family Academy  Administration &  
Executive Director, Cooperative Superintendency 
Program, University of Texas at Austin 
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Appendix D 
Stakeholder Participation Request Letter 
 
This letter is an invitation to participate in a doctoral dissertation study I am conducting as a 
part of my doctoral degree in the Department of Educational Administration at the University of Texas at 
Austin under the supervision of Dr. Rubén Olivárez.  
I am requesting your participation as well as the participation of a representative group of 
community and district stakeholders, such as central office administrators, principals, board members, 
parents, and community members in communities where a school bond election first failed and then 
passed. This letter provides information about this project and what your involvement would entail if you 
decide to take part. 
Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the issues 
involved in the successful passage of school bond referenda from the perspectives of district and 
community stakeholders in school districts in Texas. With your input, this study has the potential to help 
school districts and communities across the state of Texas better understand the issues involved in 
successfully passing a school bond referendum.  
Benefits of Participation 
 If you choose to participate, you will be among a select group of stakeholders in Texas that will be 
included in this study. The study will gain perspectives from stakeholders from communities 
where a school bond election first failed, and then subsequently passed since 2013. 
 A summary of this knowledge and expertise will be shared in future written papers and 
presentations to help educators, researchers, and community members in other Texas communities 
benefit from your experience, knowledge, and expertise regarding successful bond referendum 
passage. 
 In addition, you and your community may benefit from reflective analysis of the school bond 
election process. 
Stakeholder Interviews 
● I am requesting either an individual or focus group interview with the superintendent, parents, 
community members, school board members, and central office staff. 
● Individual interviews and/or focus group interviews are expected to take 60-75 minutes each. 
● Participants will also be asked to review their interview transcript to ensure the validity of the 
study. 
Confidentiality There are no risks to any interview participants or to the district. Neither you, nor 
any participant interviewed, nor your school district/community, will be identified or identifiable in the 
research in connection with any specific reports or publications. All interviews will be conducted to 
maintain participant privacy and confidentiality. Participation in interviews will be completely voluntary, 
and a participant decision about whether or not to participate will not affect any relationship with the 
University of Texas at Austin or with the school district. All participant data will be de-identified and 
coded with a pseudonym to protect the district and participants’ confidentiality, kept in a secure location 
during the study, and destroyed after the mandated period for record-keeping. 
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you 
in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at 972-802-4818 or by e-mail at 
sheitzman@faithfamilyacademy.org. You can also contact my supervisor, Dr. Rubén Olivárez via e-mail 
rolivarez@austin.utexas.edu. 
The information gathered will assist administrators and leaders in public schools systems seeking 
to pass school bond referenda and support communities in making effective decisions regarding school 
bond elections. I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your 
assistance in this project.  
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Appendix E 
Waiver of Consent Script 
Shirley M. Heitzman 
The University of Texas at Austin 
IRB # 2017-08-0106 
 
Thank you for agreeing to speak to me regarding your possible participation in my research study. 
Your participation is voluntary. The purpose of this research is to determine the variables that influence the 
passage of school bond referendum in Texas school districts. I am seeking school districts superintendents, 
administrative leaders, and principals as well as school board members, parents, and community members 
to provide their perspectives on school bond elections. Following one 60-minute individual or focus group 
interview, and the sharing of this transcript with you for your review for credibility, your participation will 
be complete. 
The research study will include:  
A 60-minute individual or focus group interview with you to gain your perspective about the bond 
elections in the past several years in your school district (both failed and successful); 
With your permission, the interview will be tape-recorded to facilitate collection of information, 
and later transcribed for analysis. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will send you a copy of 
the transcript to give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify 
any points that you wish.  
All data collected will occur in a private office or school room or a public library to ensure 
interview privacy and confidentiality based on convenience for you, the participant. 
You will not be identified or identifiable in any reports of this research. For the analysis phase, 
you will be assigned a code identifier, which will be removed in the final document. Pseudonyms will be 
used to mask participants’ and districts’ identities. Therefore, you and your district will not be identified or 
identifiable. 
All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in 
any thesis or report resulting from this study; however, with your permission anonymous quotations may be 
used. Data collected during this study will be kept in a secure location during the study and destroyed after 
the mandated period for record-keeping. Only researchers associated with this project will have access.  
There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.   
The results will be disseminated in a variety of formats to enable educators, researchers, and board 
members the benefit of your experience, knowledge, and expertise regarding school bond elections. You 
may benefit from participation in this research through your personal reflection on your experience with 
school bond elections. Your fellow community members and educators may benefit from the 
recommendations that emerge from the results of the study.  
Please be aware that your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you may discontinue 
participation at any time. Your decision about whether or not to participate will not affect any relationship 
with the University of Texas at Austin or with the school district. Should you elect not to participate, there 
will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.   
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you 
in reaching a decision about participation, please e-mail me at sheitzman@faithfamilyacademy.org, or my 
dissertation supervisor, Dr. Rubén Olivárez at rolivarez@austin.utexas.edu. Any questions about the 
research can also be directed to the University of Texas at Austin’s Office of Research Support at 
orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
 
Participant’s Printed Name:_______________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature: ______________________________________ Date: __________________ 
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Appendix F 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions with Possible Follow-Up Prompts 
 
Interviewer: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. The information gathered from this 
interview will be used as part of a doctoral dissertation for the University of Texas at Austin. I will be 
recording the interview so that the data will be accurate. You may request that the tape recorder be turned 
off at any point in the interview. I’m going to ask you a set of questions about your experiences with the 
past school bond elections your school district, both failed and successful.  When I ask you to questions 
from your experience, think of the school bond election experience with respect to the district and the 
community in its entirety. The entire interview will last approximately an hour. Do you have any 
questions? (Answer any questions.) 
 
Time of interview:  _____________________________ 
Date of interview:  _____________________________ 
Location:   _____________________________ 
Interviewer:   _____________________________ 
Interviewee:   _____________________________ 
 
1. What is your role in the district or community? 
Prompt: How long have you been in this role in this school district or community? 
Prompt: Were you in this role during the during the bond election that failed? During the bond 
election that passed? 
 
I am going to ask questions about two (2) bond elections in your district. I am first going to ask you 
questions about the bond election  that failed (give date). Then I am going to ask you a few questions about 
the school bond election that passed. 
 
2.  What was your involvement or role in the school bond referendum election that failed? That 
passed? 
 
Bond Failure Questions 
 
3. What was the overall context of the district and community for the bond election that failed? 
Prompts: 
District Strategic Plan & Educational Vision 
School Facilities’ Condition 
District Relationship with Community 
Prior Bond Election Results 
Prior Facilities Construction Outcomes 
District Demographics 
Community Demographics 
Existing Property Values and Tax Rates 
 
4.  For the school bond election that failed, why was there a need to have a school bond referendum? 
Prompts:  
Were there facilities changes that were needed? 
Were there changes in the needs of instructional programming or accessibility issues in the 
district? 
What were the enrollment trends in the district at the time? 
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5. What kind of school bond election planning and campaign activities were undertaken to pass the 
first bond election that failed (Structural Variables)?  
Prompts: 
How was an overall facilities plan developed? Did the plan include detailed information on 
educational need and financial impact?  
How was the bond referendum plan developed? 
What organizational structures, if any, were used to coordinate communications and/or decision-
making processes between district leaders, school board leaders, campus leaders, parents, and 
community members? Were new structures needed? (Structural) 
What specific role descriptions, procedures, protocols, or rules were developed or used for the 
varying roles of district leaders, school board leaders, and community leadership as a part of the 
bond process? 
What kind of communications plan and communications activities were developed? 
 
6. How were stakeholders, including school board members, school district leaders, campus leaders, 
parents, and community members involved in the first bond election that failed (Human Resource 
Variables)?  
Prompts: 
In what ways was input solicited from board members? parents? community members? campus 
staff? teachers? and district staff? 
In what ways did school bond election efforts seek to meet the needs of individuals in the district 
and community? 
In what ways were parents and community members actively involved in contributing to and 
running the school bond election campaign? 
In what ways were training, resources, and support provided to district leaders, school board 
leaders, school staff, and community members regarding the bond development process? 
 
8.  What political variables affected the outcome of the first bond election that failed? (Political 
Variables) 
Prompts: 
How was an overall agenda effectively developed and communicated during the school bond 
referendum(a) process? 
Were there key players, individuals or groups that impacted the outcome of the bond election?  
(Political) 
In what ways, if any, did credible, influential team members serve in key roles in the bond 
referendum process? (Political) 
Were there key issues or events that affected the outcome of the bond passage? 
In what ways were key issues negotiated during the school bond election proces? 
In what ways was it necessary to defuse opposition? How did you anticipate counterstrategies? 
What strategies did you utilize to defuse opposition? (Political) 
Prompt for School District Leaders: In what ways did the district work to map the political 
environment? 
o   In what ways were informal channels of communication used? 
o   In what ways were influential individuals or groups identified? 
o   In what ways were possibilities for mobilizing internal and external players analyzed? 
 
8.  How were school bond efforts communicated and shared, for the school bond election that failed? 
(Symbolic Variables) 
Prompts:  
In what ways was a “compelling story” developed and told in the bond referendum(a) process? 
How were ceremonial activities used during in the bond referendum(a) process? 
How were early signs of progress communicated and celebrated? 
How were losses or changes acknowledged and/or celebrated (mourned?) (Symbolic) 
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9.  What do you think were the most important variables that contributed to the failure of the school 
bond election that failed?  
 
10.  What were the missing elements in the bond election campaign that failed?  
 
Bond Success Questions 
11.  What was the context of the district and community at the time of the second bond election (that 
passed)? 
Prompts: 
Were there changes in any of these areas? 
District Strategic Plan & Educational Vision 
School Facilities’ Condition 
District Relationship with Community 
Prior Bond Election Results 
Prior Facilities Construction Outcomes 
District Demographics 
Community Demographics 
Existing Property Values and Tax Rates 
 
12.  For the school bond election that succeeded, why was there a need to have a school bond 
referendum? Were there significant differences between the context of the bond election that 
failed and the successful bond election? 
Prompts:  
Were there facilities changes that were needed? 
Were there changes in the needs of instructional programming or accessibility issues in the 
district? 
What were the enrollment trends in the district at the time? 
 
13. What school bond planning and campaign activities were taken to pass the second bond election 
that succeeded? (Structural Variables) 
How was an overall facilities plan developed? Did the plan include detailed information on 
educational need and financial impact?  
How was the bond referendum plan developed? 
What organizational structures, if any, were used to coordinate communications and/or decision-
making processes between district leaders, school board leaders, campus leaders, parents, and 
community members? Were new structures needed? (Structural) 
What specific role descriptions, procedures, protocols, or rules were developed or used for the 
varying roles of district leaders, school board leaders, and community leadership as a part of the 
bond process? 
What kind of communications plan and communications activities were developed? 
 
14. How were stakeholders, including school board members, school district leaders, campus leaders, 
parents, and community members involved in the first bond election that succeeded (Human 
Resource Variables)?  
Prompts: 
In what ways was input solicited from board members? parents? community members? campus 
staff? teachers? and district staff? 
In what ways did school bond election efforts seek to meet the needs of individuals in the district 
and community? 
In what ways were parents and community members actively involved in contributing to and 
running the school bond election campaign? 
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In what ways were training, resources, and support provided to district leaders, school board 
leaders, school staff, and community members regarding the bond development process? 
 
15.  What political variables affected the outcome of the first bond election that succeeded? (Political 
Variables) 
Prompts: 
How was an overall agenda effectively developed and communicated during the school bond 
referendum(a) process? 
Were there key players, individuals or groups that impacted the outcome of the bond election?  
(Political) 
In what ways, if any, did credible, influential team members serve in key roles in the bond 
referendum process? (Political) 
Were there key issues or events that affected the outcome of the bond passage? 
In what ways were key issues negotiated during the school bond election process? 
In what ways was it necessary to defuse opposition? How did you anticipate counterstrategies? 
What strategies did you utilize to defuse opposition? (Political) 
Prompt for School District Leaders: In what ways did the district work to map the political 
environment? 
o   In what ways were informal channels of communication used? 
o   In what ways were influential individuals or groups identified? 
o   In what ways were possibilities for mobilizing internal and external players analyzed? 
 
16.  How were school bond efforts communicated and shared, for the school bond election that 
succeeded? (Symbolic Variables) 
Prompts:  
In what ways was a “compelling story” developed and told in the bond referendum(a) process? 
How were ceremonial activities used during in the bond referendum(a) process? 
How were early signs of progress communicated and celebrated? 
How were losses or changes acknowledged and/or celebrated (mourned?) (Symbolic) 
 
 
17. What do you think were the most important variables that contributed to the success of the second 
school bond referendum? 
 
18. What were the biggest differences between the school bond election that failed and the school 
bond election that succeeded? 
 
19.  Looking back over the entire bond election process, what advice would you give another district 
that was preparing for a bond issue campaign? 
Prompt: What would you advise them to avoid a fail/pass scenario? 
 
Conclusion of Interview 
I will be using a pseudonym for you when I write up the transcripts for the interview.  I will listen 
to your interview and write up the transcripts. Once this is completed, I will send the transcript to your 
email address and ask that you read it over. I will also ask for your response to a few reflection questions 
about reading the transcripts, such as: 
1. Does the transcription attached accurately reflect your experience with the districtwide strategic 
compensation plan? 
2. Is there anything you feel I should add or clarify about your experience with the school district 
bond elections? 
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Appendix G 
List of Documents Reviewed by the Researcher 
 
2013 Bond Presentation 
2013 Bond Presentation Schedule 
2013 Bond Social Media Informational Plan – Week One 
2013 Election Results May 2013 
2013 Email from Opposition to Staff 
2013 Parent Letter April 2013 
2013 TFISD Chart Technology Funding 
2013 TFISD Short Life Principal Amortization 
2013 TFISD Bond 2103 Information Brochure 
2013 Texas School District Bond Election Results May 2013 
2013 Town Newspaper Article on School Bond Election April 2013 
 
2015 Board F2F (Face-to-Face) Binder Contents 
2015 Board F2F Communications 
2015 Board F2F Summary of Board F2F Visits 
2015 Board F2F Summary of Board Feedback 
2015 Bond Presentation Schedule 
2015 Designing Transformation Meeting Debrief 
2015 TFISD Bond Presentation 
2015 TFISD FACTS Committee 
2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meetings #1-#7 Agendas 
2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meetings #1-#7 Minutes 
2015 TFISD FACTS Committee Meetings #1-#7 Presentations 
2015 TFISD FACTS Recommendation 
2015 TFISD Social Media Posts 
2015 TFISD Visioning Agenda 
2015 TFISD Voter Survey 
2015 TFISD Voter Survey Staff Verbatims 
2015 TFISD Voter Survey Top-Lines 
 
District TAPR Reports 
District Website 
Newspaper articles 
TFISD Bond Election History 1968-2015 
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Appendix H  
Adapted from Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 395, with permission 
Structural Frame 
-Develop a coordination strategy 
Comprehensive Bond Election Plan 
o Bond Election Needs Assessment 
o Bond Proposal Development Plan 
o Bond Election Campaign Plan 
o Bond Campaign Plan (Marketing the 
Bond) 
-Build implementation plan 
o Facilities Needs Assessment & Plan 
o Bond Proposal 
-Create structures to support change process 
o Decision-making and/or 
communications structures between 
district leaders, school board leaders, 
campus leaders, parents, and 
community members 
o -Role descriptions, procedures, 
protocols used as a part of the bond 
process 
-Remove or alter structures and procedures 
that support the old ways 
- Plan for short term benchmarks or 
“victories” during the school bond 
referendum(a) process 
-Keep people on plan 
-Align structure to new culture 
Human Resources Frame 
-Involve people throughout the organization; 
solicit input 
o Methods of involving people 
throughout the organization to solicit 
input, including campus staff and 
classified/hourly staff 
o Methods of soliciting input from the 
parents and community members 
-Run team-building exercises for guiding 
team 
-Hold meetings to communicate direction as 
well as solicit feedback 
-Provide training, resources, and support 
provided to district leaders, school board 
leaders, school staff, parents, and community 
members regarding the bond development & 
election process 
-Create a “culture” between all groups 
involved in the bond referendum process 
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Political Frame 
-Organize and communicate an overall 
agenda 
-Map the political terrain: 
-Determining informal channels of communication 
-Identifying principal agents of political influence 
-Analyzing possibilities for mobilizing internal and 
external players 
-Network with key players; use power base to 
impact the outcomes of the school bond 
referendum election 
-Stack team with credible, influential team 
members to serve in key roles in the school 
bond referendum process 
-Create arenas; build alliances; defuse 
opposition in the school bond referendum 
process 
-Invest resources and power to ensure early 
wins 
-Defuse opposition, anticipating 
counterstrategies 
Symbolic Frame 
-Tell a “compelling story” in the school bond 
referendum process 
-Install a commanding officer on the guiding 
team 
-Create a “hopeful vision of the future rooted 
in organizational history” 
-Visible leadership involvement; kickoff 
ceremonies 
-Use ceremonial activities in the school bond 
referendum process 
-Stage public hangings of 
counterrevolutionaries 
-Celebrate and communicate early signs of 
progress 
-Hold revival meetings 
-Acknowledge and celebrate losses or 
changes  
o Mourn the past; celebrate the heroes of the 
revolution; share stories of the journey 
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